DON&apos;T LOOK BACK IN ANGER. FREEDOM, FATALISM AND THE FUTURE. by G. Andreoletti
Don’t Look Back in Anger. Freedom,
Fatalism and the Future
Giacomo Andreoletti
Contents
1 A Journey into Fatalism 5
1.1 What Fatalism amounts to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.1 Three claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.2 Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.1.3 Why should we be worried? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Two classic Arguments for Modal Fatalism . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2.1 A bit of Modal Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2.2 The Main Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Prior Truths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Ockhamism and the freedom to do otherwise . . . . 30
Introducing a Third Truth Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The Mutable Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.2.3 Taylor’s Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
The Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Taylor’s Argument Modal Structure . . . . . . . . . . 51
Standard responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.3 Again on Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.3.1 Another bit of Modal Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.3.2 Modal Fatalism Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.3.3 What is wrong with the Main Argument and Taylor’s 62
1.4 Why I am not worried . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1.4.1 Lazy Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
1.4.2 Deliberation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1.4.3 Moral Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2 A New Argument for Modal Fatalism 77
2.1 Two Principles which imply Modal Fatalism . . . . . . . . . 77
2.2 The Disagreement on (SUF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
1
CONTENTS 2
2.3 What are we left with . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3 Time Travel and Fatalism 86
3.1 Time Travel in One-Dimensional Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.2 Another Odd Story . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.3 The Specter of Fatalism with respect to Mit and Time Travel 98
3.4 The Specter fades away . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.5 Powers, Fatalism and Abilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.6 Protecting the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4 Changing the Past 110
4.1 An Attempt to Change the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2 Two Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.3 Times and T-slices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.4 The Past has not changed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5 Defending A Mutable Future 124
5.1 Free Will and the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.2 Geach and the Changing Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.3 A case in favor of the Changing Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
Acknowledgements
On this occasion there is no one I wish to acknowledge.
Thank you1.
1Actually, I am profoundly in debt with several people and friends who had the
patience to discuss and read the material of this work. I am sure those people — let
me just mention my advisors Giuliano Torrengo and Achille Varzi — know how much
I am thankful to them. Also, I am even more sure they have enough sense of humor to
appreciate my acknowledgment.
Introduction
“Oh, if only I’d bought that
stock! If only I, if only I
purchased THAT house years
ago! If only I’d made a move on
THAT woman. If this, if that.”
You know what? Give me a
break with your could have’s
and should have’s. Like my
mother used to say, “If my
grandmother had wheels, she’d
be a trolley car.” My mother
didn’t have wheels. She had
varicose veins.
Whatever Works — Woody
Allen
We sometimes regret things we have done in the past. We may even
despise ourselves for deeds we have done in the past. If I had not done
that, I would not have ended up like this. All of us have plenty of examples
which fall into this category. This kind of attitude toward the past might
be overwhelming and lead to total despair. As a remedy, people are told
that it’s no use crying over spilt milk. What is done is done, and cannot
be undone. However, the disappointment remains. The thought that we
could have done otherwise and act better than what we have done is still
there. Fatalism, the topic I will be mostly dealing with in this work, offers
a better medicine. There’s no point thinking that things could have gone
otherwise. A fatalist would say that the way they went was the only way
they could have gone, and this should be consoling. So, we are done
with the past. But what about the present and the future? A fatalist,
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very straightforwardly, claims that there is no difference between past and
future. According to him or her, we should have the same attitude toward
the future. There is only one way things could go. And here, if the fatalist
is correct, we are again overwhelmed. How can we claim to be free to want
or do anything? Are we just living a life which is already pre-determined?
What is the point of living such a life? In what follows I will try to carefully
address these questions. My answer will be that we should not be too much
worried if the kind of fatalism I favor turns out to be true.
In the novel “Jacques the Fatalist” by Diderot, the protagonist claims all
the time that what happens to him was already written on high. What this
’high’ might consist of will be investigated throughout this work. In fact,
we shall see that there are different kinds of fatalism and different sources
that seem to point to fatalism.
Fatalism is often quickly dismissed as an untenable doctrine, which at
best can count as sophistry. I don’t agree with this judgment. One of my
goals is to convince the reader that fatalism, at least one kind of it, has to
be taken seriously and that it deserves respect and attention within our
metaphysical investigations.
In chapter 1 we shall see what different kinds of fatalism there are
and what is their nature. Then, we will focus on two classic arguments
to the conclusion that fatalism holds. In chapter 2 I will give my own
argument in favor of fatalism. In chapter 3 I will take time travel in one
dimensional time as a case study. I will argue that issues which arise within
the debate of the metaphysical possibility of time travel can be resolved
by fatalism. In chapter 4 I try to refute a recent attempt which has been
made to show that the past could change, even if time is one-dimensional.
Ultimately, in the final chapter I will talk about a theory according to which
the future might literally change. The theory provides two interesting ways
to refute fatalism. I will provide an example which is supposed to favor
the changing future.
I’ve been told that a dissertation should have a single main thesis.
Mine has it, but it has the form of a disjunction. The received view is
that the future cannot change and yet fatalism is false. I want to negate
this conjunction. This denial gives us a disjunction. Either we should be
fatalists — and it’s not so bad after all — or we should believe that we can
change the future. Hence, don’t look back in anger. Go and change your
future, it might work.
Chapter1
A Journey into Fatalism
In this first chapter I introduce fatalism and its different understandings. I
try to make it clear in the first section that there are at least two different
kinds of fatalism, here labeled lazy and modal fatalism. The following sec-
tion on modal logic is needed to understand the nature of modal fatalism.
I then address two classic arguments to the conclusion that modal fatalism
holds, and the standard responses which are found in the literature on
this topic. I then provide a new reason that should incline us to think that
those two arguments do not get through. Ultimately, I will try to show that
although fatalism has always been seen as an untenable doctrine because
of its consequences, this is not necessarily correct. Even though lazy fa-
talism does have unpleasant and seemingly fallacious implications, modal
fatalism can perfectly address the problems which are usually associated
to fatalism.
1.1 What Fatalism amounts to
I start this section by discussing three claims. These claims are going to
help us with defining lazy and modal fatalism. Ultimately, I will show
why fatalism has to be taken seriously and what consequences it might
seem to have.
1.1.1 Three claims
We are about to start the discussion on fatalism by putting on the table
three claims. The first two are admittedly vague, whereas the third is often
employed as a definition of fatalism. These three claims will help us to
5
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provide a distinction between different kinds of fatalism. Here are the
three claims.
The Symmetry Thesis. There is a symmetry between the past and the
future.
Causal Connectedness. What happens at a time causally depends on
what happens at other times.
Powerlessness. Agents are powerless to do anything other than what
they actually do.
Let’s start with the first claim. What does it mean to say that the future is
like the past? It probably depends on what we are talking about. One way
to argue for the symmetry (or the asymmetry) of past and future is to put
it in ontological terms. Suppose I now have to provide a full inventory of
what exists. To start, it seems that I need to include all entities that exist
at this very moment in time I am making the list. Should I include past
entities, say Socrates, and future entities like the event of my grandson
taking his first college class? Here there is disagreement. An eternalist
would be willing to claim that it is reasonable to put in the inventory
all past, present and future entities. He or she would probably argue
for this in virtue of the fact that our best scientific theories, like special
theory of relativity, treats the time-dimension in the same way the three
space-dimensions are treated. It would be a non-sense to not include in the
inventory an object spatially located in a country far away from where I am
doing my list, just because it is spatially away from me. The same could be
said for those entities located at times distinct from the time I am making
my list. Another possible response is to claim that past entities do exist,
whereas no entity which exists is such that it is also located in the future.
This is the so called growing-block view, according to which everything
which exists is either past or on the edge of the block. Or, we could say, as
the presentist does, that all the entities which exist are located in the present
time, the time when I am doing my list. Back to the symmetry/asymmetry
distinction, presentism and eternalism treat past and future symmetrically
with respect to ontology. According to eternalism we have both past and
future entities in our inventory of the world. According to the presentist,
neither of them are in our list. The growing-block theorist instead posits
an ontological asymmetry between past and future. We have past entities
in our inventory, and no entity in the list is such that it is future.
The symmetry/asymmetry issue can be addressed with respect to other
aspects. One might say for instance that while the past is closed, the future
is open. Take the first American Presidential election. It is an event which
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now lies in the past. Almost everyone agrees that there is nothing we can
do to change, alter or influence past events. For instance, we cannot now
prevent that George Washington was elected, nor we can bring about that
John Adams was elected. What is done cannot now be undone. Things
might seem different with respect to future events. For instance, we can
now influence, at least partially, the result of the next presidential election.
Another symmetry between past and future might come from the fact
that certain Laws of Nature do not distinguish between past and future.
Take Newtonian dynamics. All there is in a Newtonian picture of the
universe is just particles. Particles have intrinsic properties like mass and
charge, and the only dynamical property they have, i.e. the only property
which changes with respect to time, is position in space. Newtonian dy-
namics dictates how the universe evolves, in the sense that it provides an
algorithm to predict with certainty how an isolated system, or the entire
universe, is going to be at another time, given how it is at the time we
take to make our prediction. It turns out that the algorithm for inferring
toward the future and the one for inferring toward the past are one and
the same. That is, if you have a time T and another time T1 at a certain
temporal distance, there is just one way to predict with certainty the state
of the system at T1 given how the system at T is, together with the assump-
tion that the time flows from T toward T1. The point is that it does not
matter at all whether T1 lies in the past or in the future with respect to T.
This in turn implies that whatever can happen forward, can also happen
backward. That is, if you have a movie of a Newtonian process, made
up of a sequence of instantaneous frames1, and you put all the frames in
reverse order, the result is another movie which is as well in perfect accord
with Newtonian Laws. Whether other systems of Laws of Nature fail to
make a distinction between the past and the future is the subject of a wide
debate we cannot address here.
The symmetry/asymmetry issue has a fundamental role in debates
about metaphysics of time. We have strong intuitions that the future is
different from the past, in the sense that the past is fixed, whereas the fu-
ture is the realm of different alternative possibilities. But, are we entitled
to trust this intuition? As we have seen, one may have reasons to treat
past and future ontologically on a par. Or, one may posits the symmetry
in virtue of the nature of Laws of Nature governing our world. Further-
more, once a decision is made on this issue in one sense or the other, what
1Note that velocity can’t be part of an instantaneous state, because velocity is the rate
of change in position with respect to time. Hence, you need more than one instantaneous
state to make sense of velocity.
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consequences should we have? We live our lives toward the future. What
if the past is like the future. Would this be a threat to our Free Will? What
other consequences would we have?
Let us now turn to the Causal Connectedness thesis, according to which
what happens at a time causally depends on what happens at other times.
What causation amounts to, if there is such thing, again, is the subject of
an enormous debate. For the purposes of what we are going to discuss,
we can rely on Lewis’s counterfactual account of causation. The idea there
is that a cause is something that makes a difference in the course of events.
A difference with respect to what? The counterfactual analysis responds
by saying to what would have happened, had the cause not occurred. As
Lewis (1973) puts 2 it
Whether e occurs or not depends on whether c occurs or not.
The dependence consists in the truth of two counterfactuals.
O(c) O(e), ¬ O(c) ¬ O(e).(p.563)
The truth conditions for counterfactuals used by Lewis (1973) are given
as follows. Where A and B are propositions, A  B — if A were true, B
would also be true — is true at a possible world α if and only if either a)
there isn’t a possible world where A is true or b) there is a possible world β
where A and B are true and such that it is more similar to α than any other
possible world where A is true and B false. A major role is played by the
notion of comparative similarity. This notion allows us to say things like
the world β is more similar to α than the world γ is. Lewis takes this notion
to be primitive. Judgments of similarity between worlds are based on a
trade off between similarities of Laws of Nature governing the worlds, and
similarities of facts within regions of spacetime of those worlds. A precise
account of similarity can’t be given, Lewis argues, and this is why he takes
the relation to be a primitive notion. However, two constraints are imposed
by Lewis on the relation of similarity among possible worlds. First, for
any world α, α is more similar to itself than any other world. Second, the
relation of similarity is such that it gives rise to a weak ordering where
ties are permitted. The first constraint yields the result that if A and B are
true at a world α, then the counterfactual AB is true at α. This holds in
virtue of the clause b of the truth conditions for counterfactuals adopted
by Lewis. If A and B are true at α, necessarily there is a possible world in
which A and B, α itself, which is more similar to itself than any world in
which A is true and B false.
To give an example, I throw a stone toward a window at a time, and
slightly later in time the window breaks. The event of me throwing the
2where O(x) refers to the proposition that x occurs.
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stone brought it about that the window breaks. Had I not thrown the stone,
the window would have been unbroken. The previous counterfactual
sentence appears to be true. A world where I do not throw the stone
and the window breaks nonetheless must contain more differences, with
respect to the actual world, than any world where I don’t throw the stone
and the window doesn’t break. Therefore, the counterfactual is true at the
actual world in virtue of the clause b3. Hence, the counterfactual analysis
says, this counts as an episode of causation. What I did caused something
else, my behavior at a time affected the nature of another time.
What about cases of Backward Causation, namely cases where the effect
precedes in time the cause? Suppose time travel toward the past is possible.
The time traveler could punch herself in the face before her trip, say in 2015,
and then have a black eye after her arrival in the past. If so, the effect would
precede in time the cause. Lewis’s counterfactual analysis does not rule
out cases of backward causation, neither does the Connectedness Thesis
as it is formulated.
Our world is a world where it seems that causation constantly takes
place. Events continuously cause, or bring about, or prevent other events.
But this is not necessarily so, we can imagine scenarios where there are no
such things. Suppose Tom is a marionettist playing with his puppets. There
are events which happens in the “marionette-world”. Arguably, the events
of the marionettes are not causally related to one another. They are all
causally dependent on what Tom does with the wires. Similarly, suppose
there is an omnipotent God4. For all we know, it could be the case that
what happens in the universe is always the result of God’s intervention,
like what happens in the marionettes ‘world’ is always the result of Tom’s
moves. In such case God would be the only entity with causal powers, and
all which happens in the universe would be causally dependent on God’s
acts. Or, we can also imagine a possible world where there are no lawlike
and causal regularities. Such a world would be a sequence of unrelated
events where constant and abrupt changes would render a non-sense any
talk about causation. An example could be a world where the position
of all particles are represented by functions of the position with respect to
time and such functions are discontinuous at all their points.
3The other relevant counterfactual, i.e. had I thrown the stone, the window would
have been broke is true in virtue of the fact that the antecedent and the consequent are
true at the actual world.
4We will make use of examples involving God just illustratively. This is not a theology
dissertation. Even though fatalism has been discussed a lot within theology because of
the worries it raises, fatalism is a metaphysical doctrine which can be discussed without
bringing God into the picture
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The Connectedness Thesis can be rendered in terms which are in ac-
cordance with Special Theory of Relativity. It would become something
like the claim that what happens at a spacetime point may be causally
dependent on what happens at another spacetime point, provided the two
spacetime points are separated by a time-like (or light-like) interval, where
two spacetime points are separated by a time-like (or light-like) interval if
one could get from one point to the other by moving with a speed smaller
than (or equal to) the speed of light.
To sum up, we take it as a platitude that in our world there are contin-
uously episodes of causation. This thought is also a guidance in our lives.
We act in certain ways because we know, or tend to think, that from certain
causes, certain effects will follow. The Connectedness Thesis claims that a
network of causation is at play in our world. Events in our world are not
isolated from each other. Rather, they are intertwined in a causal network.
Lewis’s counterfactual account is a powerful way to make sense of this
causal network. As we shall see later, there are kinds of fatalism which can
rely on counterfactual claims in order to account for causation.
The Powerlessness claim says that no agent has ever the power to do
otherwise than what he or she actually does. It is simple and complex at
the same time. On the one hand, it is complex because it depends on what
we mean by powers, and this may be a subject of great controversy. We’ll
have a great deal more to say about this later. On the other hand, it can
easily be illustrated by examples. Suppose Holly has a microchip installed
in her brain. The microchip controls her brain and dictates any action she
performs. It seems plausible to say that Holly has never the power to do
otherwise than what she actually does. The microchip forces her to raise
her right hand at a given time, and then she does. Could have she done
otherwise? The answer is negative, given that her conduct was determined
by the microchip. What the Powerlessness claim does is to generalize this
kind of situation to any agent. According to it, every agent is, in some sense
or another, similar to Holly in this respect. A person’s conduct is always
such that the person has never the power to do otherwise than what he or
she in fact does.
1.1.2 Definitions
With the help of three claims discussed above, we are ready to address
the problem of what fatalism amounts to. It is a metaphysical doctrine,
and as such it might be problematic to pin down an unique definition of
it. Different authors have meant different things with the same word. We
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will go through different understandings of fatalism.
We introduce the first understanding with a quote from Van Rensselaer
Wilson (1955). He says:
The typical fatalist contends that human effort, human wisdom,
human skill, even human stupidity, have no causal continuity
with the future. The same future will occur, according to the
fatalist, no matter what we human beings know or don’t know,
do or don’t do, seek or shun. (p.70)
Another passage from Ryerson (2011) seems to attach the same thought to
the doctrine of fatalism.
The fatalist contends, quite radically, that human actions and
decisions have no influence on the future. (p.5)
These two passages can suggest a first characterization of fatalism.
Lazy Fatalism. What will happen will happen no matter what one does.
Surely, as Ryerson observes, this is a bold claim. Even more surely, this
doctrine is clearly false, at least in the world we happen to inhabit. It is not
the case that future events will happen no matter what we do. Suppose
that I am poisoned and as a matter of fact I will die in twenty minutes.
Suppose also that there is an antidote capable of healing me. The antidote
is such that with certainty it will make me recover. Clearly, my future
death in twenty minutes is not going to happen no matter what I do. On
the contrary, my future death in twenty minutes depends on things I do
now. For instance, my future death depends on me abstaining from taking
the antidote now. I said that this doctrine is clearly false, at least in our
world. It could be true in conceivable scenarios. Tom the marionettist is
again playing with his puppets. This time he is following a script he wrote
years ago. The marionettes play is well written. The marionettes act as
if there were causal connection among them. On the script, marionette A
punches marionette B, and then B falls down on the floor. Being in a bad
shape that day, Tom is not playing very well with his wires. He makes
a mistake when he is playing that part of the script. A doesn’t actually
punch B, because A misses B. B falls down nonetheless, cause Tom is more
careful with that move of his wires. In such scenario it is reasonable to say
that the event of B falling was going to happen no matter what. All actions
are fated to happen in the sense given by Lazy Fatalism. For instance,
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A’s actions are causally irrelevant to future happenings, because the only
things causally relevant are Tom’s moves5.
So, regarding the three claims discussed above, Lazy Fatalism denies
the Causal Connectedness thesis. It accepts the symmetry claim, where the
symmetry amounts to the idea that present actions are causally irrelevant
for both the past and the future. Actions, in this view, do not affect the
past, and neither affect the future. Lazy Fatalism is silent about the third
claim, in the sense that it is compatible both with the acceptance of the
Powerlessness claim and with the denial of it. A case like the marionettes
case is a case where the marionettes are incapable of doing other than
what they actually do, because they are overwhelmed by a power they
have no control over, namely Tom’s moves. But, one might imagine a
situation where there are agents capable of acting differently from how
they actually act, and yet future events happen no matter what they do. An
universe without any regularity outside agents would arguably be such a
case. Suppose you ordinarily persist in a world where things outside you
continuously change in an abrupt and totally unpredictable manner. In
such case, you might have the power to do otherwise, yet it seems there
would be no way to affect future happenings outside you.
Lazy Fatalism is clearly wrong because we take it to be the case that
there is a causal network in our world. We do affect with our acts future
events: I take a medicine and as a result I recover. I throw a stone and then
the windows breaks. It is thus no wonder that no philosopher endorsed
such a view. But why could Lazy Fatalism be, maybe just for a little while,
considered possibly true in our world? Probably because it may sound
similar to the widely accepted idea that the future cannot change. One
might think that future events will happen no matter one does because the
future cannot change. But this is clearly not the case. The fact that the
future cannot change does not imply that there aren’t causal connections
among events. If the future effects are fixed and part of the future, so are
their causes, provided the Connectedness thesis is true.
We shall move now to a more interesting account of fatalism. We start
with a quote from Mackie (2003), where she says:
Generalizing, the fatalist concludes that one never has the abil-
ity to avoid doing anything than one actually does (p. 129)
Van Inwagen (1983) says something similar.
5And notice that here the counterfactual analysis of causation delivers the correct
answer. In the described scenario, A does not punch B and B falls down as if it were
punched by B. A missing B does not cause B fall, because it is not true that had A punched
B, B would have not fallen.
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Fatalism, as I shall use the term, is the thesis that it is a logical
or conceptual truth that no one is able to act otherwise than he
in fact does.(p.23)
The two quotes are very similar. We can express the content they share 6
with this second account of fatalism.
Modal Fatalism. For any agent, for any act, for any time, the agent has not
within his or her power to act otherwise than he or she actually does.
This is a kind of fatalism which is shaped in terms of the concept of the
power to do otherwise. I call it Modal Fatalism because it employs the no-
tion of power, which as we shall see better later, can be treated as a modal
expression. According to this account, if you acted in a certain way at a cer-
tain time, you couldn’t have done otherwise, and this of course generalizes
to all acts, agents and times. It should be noted that Modal Fatalism relies
on modal discourse in terms of powers, whereas Lazy Fatalism focuses on
distinct times and denies causal connections among events happening at
those times.
Iacona (2007) offers this definition of fatalism
Fatalism is the doctrine according to which if something hap-
pens, it is necessary that it happens, and if something does not
happen, it is impossible that it happens. (p. 45)
This definition boils down to Modal Fatalism, provided you restrict it
to agents’ acts. Saying that whatever happens is necessary means that
when someone acted, he or she couldn’t have done otherwise. Similarly,
saying that whatever does not happen is impossible means that the acts
not performed were not within the agent’s power.
Some authors define fatalism in terms of Free Will. For instance, Mer-
ricks (2009) says:
In my opinion, the Main Argument is the strongest argument
for fatalism; that is, it is the strongest argument that moves from
truths in the past to a present or future lack of freedom. (p.88)
6Van Inwagen puts in the definition of fatalism that the lack of the power to do
otherwise is a logical or conceptual truth. I don’t understand what this specification
means. Fatalism is a metaphysical doctrine. If it’s true, reasonable, debatable and the
like, it’s just because it does or might follow from other concepts through logical reasoning,
as any other metaphysical doctrine.
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The Main Argument is a standard argument for fatalism; we will talk
about it to a great extent later. What Merricks has in mind here, though,
is the understanding of Free Will in terms of the concept of being able
to do otherwise. What Free Will amounts to of course it the subject of
a wide debate. It is true that traditionally the power to do otherwise
has been considered constitutive of the notion of Free Will. But there are
alternatives. One might cash out Free Will in terms of spontaneity. In this
sense, one act would be free, if nothing external coerced it. Or one might,
as Frankfurt does, say that one acts freely if the desires on which the act
is based are those which are in turn desired. And of course, Free Will can
be understood in many other different ways. For the rest of this work,
we will stick to the notion of having the power to do otherwise. This is
the notion modal fatalism targets, and it is the one which is denied in the
Powerlessness claim.
How does modal fatalism relate to the three claims we have seen above?
modal fatalism amounts to a claim that Powerlessness holds. It does then
accept the Symmetry Thesis, in the sense that according to modal fatalism
no one has ever had, has or will have the power to do otherwise. Past and
future are alike in this respect. It is then silent with respect to the Causal
Connectedness Thesis.
There seems to be another account of fatalism, cashed out in terms
of unpreventability of future events. This account would claim that the
doctrine of fatalism amounts to the idea that all future events are now
unavoidable or unpreventable, like the past ones clearly are. Taylor (1963a)
seems to suggest so in this passage:
We all, at certain moments of pain, threat, or bereavement, are
apt to entertain the idea of fatalism, the thought that what is
happening at a particular moment is unavoidable, that we are
powerless to prevent it.(p.54)
Now, I think that arguably modal fatalism implies this kind of unpre-
ventability. Take the case where I am poisoned and I die ten minutes by
now. This clearly implies that no one will prevent the occurrence of my
death, i.e. no one will perform an act such that it does prevent my death
from happening. Now, according to modal fatalism, this means also that no
one will have the power to perform an act such that it ensures my survival.
And the way we normally understand something as unpreventable is in
terms of powers. That the sun will rise tomorrow is unpreventable, in the
sense that no one has the power to stop the sun from rising. Hence, modal
fatalism yields this kind of unpreventability. But again, we must stress
that this does not necessarily mean that there aren’t causal connections.
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Had I took the antidote, surely I would have survived. It is important to
stress that modal fatalism is compatible with the Causal Connectedness
thesis. Hence, I would suggest that we should avoid cashing out modal
fatalism in terms of unpreventability. It is true that modal fatalism implies
unpreventability in the sense I have just shown. Yet, unpreventability sort
of intuitively conveys the wrong idea that nothing could prevent future
events which will happen or cause those that which won’t.
To wrap up this part, we have our three claims, which have been useful
to introduce different kinds of fatalism. We can illustrate them via the
following table.
Table 1.1: Kinds of fatalism
Symmetry Causal Connectedness Powerlessness
Reasonable Fatalism 3 3 3
Modal-Lazy Fatalism 3 7 3
Lazy Fatalism + PTDO 3 7 7
All kinds of fatalism accept a symmetry between past and future. As
Taylor (1962) says:
A fatalist, in short, thinks of the future in the manner in which
we all think of the past. (p.41)
Then, we have distinguished between two cases of fatalism, lazy and
modal fatalism. Lazy fatalism is the thesis according to which things
happen no matter what agents do, whereas modal fatalism claims that
agents have never the power to do otherwise than what they actually do.
The former is a denial of the Causal Connectedness thesis. The latter is
the claim that Powerlessness holds. So, we have fatalism if either there
is an 7under Causal Connectedness or a 3under Powerlessness. Hence,
the case where there is a 3under Causal Connectedness and a 7under
Powerlessness does not appear in the table because it would not be a case
where we have fatalism.
Modal-lazy Fatalism combines the claim that there are not causal con-
nections among events and the claim that agents are powerless to do other
than what they in fact do. Take a case where an omnipotent God-like
creature governs everything that happens, like Tom does with his mari-
onettes. The creature would be the only entity with causal powers, and
such scenario would amount to a case of modal-lazy fatalism.
The third case, lazy fatalism + power to do otherwise (PTDO), denies
the causal network among events and allows agent to have the power to
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do otherwise. A scenario without any kind of regularity or causal laws
outside agents would be such a case. In such case, agents would be free in
the sense captured by the notion of having the power to do otherwise. Yet,
things outside them would happen no matter what they freely do.
The first case, modal fatalism combined with the existence of a causal
network is the most interesting case. It denies to agents the power to
do otherwise, yet in such fatalism agents can affect or bring about future
events in virtue of the existence of a causal network. I label this ’reason-
able fatalism’. Reasonable fatalism is a sub-case of modal fatalism. Modal
fatalism by itself simply denies to agents the power to do otherwise. Rea-
sonable fatalism also accepts the Causal Connectedness thesis. For most
of the rest of this dissertation I will be focusing on modal fatalism and its
sub-case reasonable fatalism.
1.1.3 Why should we be worried?
Why should we be worried about modal fatalism, i.e. the idea that agents
have never the power to do otherwise? This question has two senses.
The first one has to do with certain consequences we are inclined to think
modal fatalism has. The second sense has to do with the thought that
many metaphysical and scientific theories seem to imply modal fatalism as
a consequence. According to the first sense, we should be worried about
modal fatalism because it is traditionally considered a threat to our human
lives. According to the second one, modal fatalism is an issue that has to
be addressed carefully.
As for the first sense, many philosophers think that modal fatalism has
undesirable consequences. For instance, it might seem that deliberation
would be useless, if modal fatalism were a true doctrine. We think about
deliberation in terms of choosing among different open alternatives, and
according to fatalism there is always just one path open, the one we will
actually embark ourselves in. And then there is moral responsibility. One
might think that no one should ever be held responsible and deserve
punishments and rewards, if modal fatalism were true, because with any
given act we do, it is true that we can’t do otherwise than what we do.
And intuitively, when someone is blaming me for something I didn’t do, it
sounds as a really solid excuse to say that I couldn’t do that, because it was
not within my power. Similarly, if someone is blaming me for something
I did, it sounds as a really good excuse to say that I could not have done
otherwise. The problem is that modal fatalism seems to justify these two
excuses to any act whatsoever. We shall have a great deal more to say
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about these worries in section 1.4. I will argue there that even if these seem
highly problematic consequences for modal fatalism, there are still ways
to accommodate them without rejecting modal fatalism.
We turn now to the issue that modal fatalism seem to follow from
various metaphysical and scientific theories. Are there reasons which
seem to point out that modal fatalism might be true after all? I think that
plenty of metaphysical doctrines and scientific theories seem to suggest
that modal fatalism is true, in the sense that they cast doubts on our power
to do otherwise, which is precisely what is denied by modal fatalism.
Does a block universe view entail modal fatalism? According to a block
universe view, all times are ontologically on a par. Past, present and future
times are all equally real. Talking of future and past is just a matter of a
relative standpoint. But we are all fatalist with respect to the past, in the
sense that we know there is nothing we can do about it. Should we also be
fatalist with respect to the future?
What about 4-dimensionalism? According to 4-dimensionalism, per-
sons and objects are four dimensional worms, extended through space and
time. This means that my future temporal parts constitute, together with
all the other ones, what I am. And my future temporal parts exist in the
same manner my present part does — they are fully characterized and
unalterable. How could I have the power to do other than what is done by
my (now) future temporal parts?
What about the Bundle Theory about objects? According to the Bundle
Theory, objects and persons, are just collections of properties. Suppose I
am sitting at T and standing at T1. How can we make sense of this change
that occurs to me? If at T what defines me are just my properties, then
as soon I lose one, it might seem that I cease to exist at T1. One standard
way to avoid this undesirable consequence is to claim that it is not the case
that at T I am constituted by the property of being sitting. Rather, what
constitutes me are the property of being-sitting-at-T and the property of
being-standing-at-T1. But again, if I am something which is constituted
by the property of being-standing-at-T1, at T, how could I refrain from
standing at T1?
What about super-essentialism, the idea that every property we have is
essential? This is not a popular view, but it happens that philosophers like
Leibniz endorsed such a view. If any property is essential, it seems that
things cannot ever be otherwise. I raise my hand at a certain future time.
This is part of my essence exactly like the fact that I am an human being.
How could I possibly have the power to refrain from doing something
which is essential to me?
What if the prevailing laws of nature are deterministic? If so, a single
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instantaneous state of the world together with the laws of nature determine
an unique past and an unique future. So, say that the state of the world ten
seconds ago determines that I will raise my right hand ten seconds from
now. How could I have the power to refrain from raising my hand? This
event depends on a past state and on laws of nature, two things I don’t
have control over.
What if the prevailing laws of nature are indeterministic? Take quan-
tum mechanics in the Copenhagen interpretation. Here things evolve in
time according to the Schrodinger equation. And this dynamics provides
perfectly deterministic and correct predictions about future times, and so
we would be at the previous point. Indeterminism comes in just when we
have measurements. Here what happens is that two outcomes are equally
probable given the same initial conditions. Needless to say, it means that
which outcome obtains is just a matter of chance. And again, it seems we
can’t have control over what is chancy.
What if the future totally depends on how the past was? Everyone
believes that our personality, the environment we lived in, and our past
experiences affect the way we act. What if they, maybe together with other
factors we did not mention, fully determine the way we act? Those are
things we don’t have control over, because they all lie in the past. If so, it
may be that we don’t have control either over what those things entail, i.e.
the way we act.
Some of our best scientific theories might also suggest modal fatalism.
Take the special theory of relativity. According to it, an absolute present
does not exist. What is the present, i.e. all the things simultaneous with a
present time, is a matter of frame of reference. People in different frames of
reference will disagree about what events are present. This means also that
what is past and what is future is relative. Alice on her spaceship could
pass by Bob, and they would disagree about pastness and futureness of
the same event. The same event might be past for Alice and future for Bob.
And the theory says that they are both correct, because they are in different
frames of reference.
Of course, the theories we mentioned do not strictly imply the truth of
modal fatalism. There are ways to resist a fatalistic conclusion, even though
one accepts the theories we have seen above. But what I want to highlight
is that modal fatalism is a doctrine we should seriously deal with, given
that lots of different theories or doctrines seem to point to that conclusion.
The other thing worth considering carefully is whether modal fatalism
does really posit a threat to human agency and our moral lives. I shall
argue that modal fatalism together with the Causal Connectedness thesis
— reasonable fatalism — has not such bad implications as it is commonly
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thought.
1.2 Two classic Arguments for Modal Fatalism
Having shown what modal fatalism amounts to, we now move forward
and see how one could argue for a fatalistic conclusion. The two arguments
we are about to analyze, the Main Argument and Taylor’s argument, are
arguments to the conclusion that no agent has ever the power to do oth-
erwise than what he or she actually does. Hence, they are arguments for
the Powerlessness Thesis and consequently for modal fatalism. The first
one, The Main Argument as it is commonly called, traces back to Stoic
philosophy and has been thoroughly discussed throughout all the history
of philosophy. Everyone dealing with issues like truth and time is sup-
posed to say something about the Main Argument. As a matter of fact, no
one accepts the Main Argument. Yet, it is interesting to see how there are
different strategies in the literature to resist it.
The second argument traces back to Aristotle with respect to its struc-
ture. I will analyze the, I think, improved version Taylor (1962) gave.
Taylor’s argument is intriguing and it is not clear how it can be refuted.
Before going into the details of the two arguments, we shall deal with a bit
of modal logic, because it will be needed to have a better grasp of the two
arguments.
1.2.1 A bit of Modal Logic
In order to get a better understanding of the Main Argument, we need to
say that the schema K is valid in all models of modal logic. This section is
devoted to understanding what the previous sentence means. I will rely
on Chellas (1980). First of all, here is the schema K.
K. (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
where A and B are meta-variables which range over sentences of the
object language L. The object-language L is composed by all atomic sen-
tences (p, q, r . . . ), together with the non-atomic ones constructed out of
atomic ones, standard connectives and modal operators, according to the
usual recursive definitions. K7 states that if necessarily A implies B, then if
necessarily A, then necessarily B. Necessity distributes over a conditional.
7which is equivalent to ((A→ B) ∧ A)→ B in virtue of propositional logic.
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A schema is a set of sentences which share the same form. By the schema
K we want to refer to all sentences which have the form of a conditional,
where in the antecedent of it there is a necessitation in front of a conditional
with a first sentence in the language as antecedent and a second (or possi-
bly the same) sentence as consequent, and in the consequent of it we have
another conditional where the antecedent is the necessitation of the first
sentence and the consequent is the necessitation of the second sentence.
For instance, if we assign to the metavariable A in K the value p and
to the metavariable B the value ¬q, the following sentence is an instance of
the schema K
(1.1) (p→ ¬q)→ (p→ ¬q)
Sentences may be true or false. In modal logic, truth and falsity are
relative to models and possible worlds. That is, a sentence is true or false
at a possible world in a model. A model is a structure <W,R,P>, where W
is a set of possible worlds, R is a binary relation on W and P is a function
from sentences of the object-language to subsets of W. R is the accessibility
relation which tells us what worlds are accessible to other worlds. We
write αRβ to mean that the world β is accessible (or possible) with respect
to α . The main idea is that it is not necessarily the case that every world
in W is accessible with respect to any other world in W. Different kinds of
accessibility relations specify different models. P provides an assignment
of truth values to atomic non-modal sentences. Technically, P is a function
from atomic sentences of our language to a subset of W. Given an arbitrary
sentence p, P(p) gives you the set of all worlds in W where p is true.
Truth conditions for non-modal sentences are as usual, whereas truth
conditions for modal sentences are the following.
A is true in the model M at the world α iff for every β such that αRβ,
A is true at β in M.
^A is true in the model M at the world α iff for some β such that αRβ,
A is true at β in M.
We can now move on to the notion of validity, a concept which is built
up in terms of truth at a world in a model. Validity applies to sentences,
and it applies to schemes as well, given that we defined them as sets of
sentences. There are different degrees of validity. We have the highest
degree of validity when a sentence is true at every possible world in every
model. For instance, tautological sentences enjoy this degree of validity.
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No matter how the model is, the sentence is true in all possible world
within the model. We can have other degrees of validity. For instance, a
sentence is said to be valid in a model M if it is true in all the worlds in the
set W of M. Or, a sentence may be valid in a class of models. Suppose we
build up a set of models, say the set of all models where R is reflexive. A
sentence is said to be valid in the class iff for every model in the class it is
the case that the sentence is true at all worlds provided by the model. For
instance, it is provable that any sentence of the form A → ^A is valid in
the class of all models where R is reflexive.
We are now in a position to prove that the schema K is valid in all
models and enjoys the highest degree of validity, i.e. K is true at every
possible world in every model. We give an informal proof of it. To do
so, we take an arbitrary world α in an arbitrary model M and we make
no assumption whatsoever on the nature of W, P and R, which specify the
model M. We then assume that the antecedent of K is true at α in M. Now
we need to show that the consequent of K is true at α in M. The consequent
of K is a conditional, hence we proceed by assuming its antecedent A
as true at α in M. We now reason as follows. We are not making any
assumption on the nature of M. So, either α doesn’t R any world, or α Rs at
least one world. In the first case, B is true at α in M, because in such case
B is true at any world which is accessible from α. In the second case, there
is at least one world which is seen by α. We call this world β and again,
we make no assumptions whatsoever on its nature, besides the fact that
αRβ. With the assumptions made thus far, necessarily β is a world where
(A → B) and A are true in the model. It follows that B is true as well at β
in M. Hence, we have the result that in any world accessible from α it is
the case that B is true. In other words, B is true at α in M. Given that we
made no assumptions on the nature of M and α, the result generalizes to
all models and all worlds. Thus, we proved what we wished to prove. K
is valid in all models of modal logic.
1.2.2 The Main Argument
To my knowledge, nobody accepts the Main Argument8. Yet, I think it is an
argument worth considering, given its puzzling nature. The argument’s
strength is proved by the fact that there are several different strategies to
resist it. The Main Argument moves from two plausible ideas; the first one
is the fixity of the past, while the second one is the existence of prior truths.
The fixity of the past may be expressed by the famous saying which claims
8Also known in the literature as the Master Argument.
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that there’s no point crying over spilt milk. If something belongs to the
past, there is nothing we can do to change it. We could learn lessons from
what happened in the past, but we have no power to prevent what already
happened. It is often said that not even an all-powerful God could change
what took place in the past.
Prior truths are truths which involves two distinct times. Let us take a
case where at T-10 an irreversible process is going to cause an explosion in
a nuclear plant within ten seconds. It is true at T-10 that the process begins.
It is also true at T-10 that, given the unstoppable nature of the process, there
would be an explosion at T0. The latter sentence expresses what we mean
by a prior truth. It is a truth about a time, T-10, which delivers a content
belonging to another time, in this case T0. It is a necessary condition for
making sense of prior truths that one accepts the notion of propositions
having a truth value at times, rather than having it simpliciter. That is, we
can, or maybe we have to, say that ’p is v at t’ is a correct expression when
we talk about truth, where ’p’ refers to a proposition, ’v’ refers to a truth
value, and ’t’ refers to a time. In the case of the nuclear explosion, the prior
truth amounts to say that the proposition that there BE a nuclear explosion
at T0 is true at T-10. I use italic, the infinitive and the reference to a specific
time to refer to tenseless propositions, i.e. propositions which are not
dependent on the context of evaluation, since they do not have any tensed
constituent and come with a specific time in their content. One who accepts
the notion of prior truths, has to accept that propositions have a truth value
at a time, even if we are dealing with the kind of tenseless propositions just
described. It is easy to see that there are two times involved in a prior truth,
T0 and T-10 in the example given. The former is embedded in the content
of the proposition, while the latter is the time at which the proposition has
the truth value.
Let us see now one ill-formed version of the Main Argument. We go
through this ill-formed version in order to highlight the force of the correct
version.
The ill-formed Main Argument
Suppose Jones raises his right hand at T. From this it follows that the
proposition that John RAISE his right hand at T is true at T. If such proposi-
tion is true at T, then it is always true (i.e. true at all times). Then,
(1) it was true 1,000 years prior to T that Jones RAISE his right hand at T
(2) Necessarily, if it was true 1000 years prior to T that Jones RAISE his
right hand at T, then Jones raises his right hand at T
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(3) Therefore, it is not the case that it is within Jones power to refrain
from raising his right hand at T
The argument starts with an assumption about an arbitrary and ap-
parently contingent fact, here the fact that Jones raises his right hand at
T. A prior truth about what Jones does at T then comes in with premise
(1). It then takes as a further premise that there is a necessary connection
between the prior truth and what the prior truth is about. This second
premise seems unproblematic: how could it not be the case that Jones
raises his right hand at T, if it was already true that he would do so 1,000
years prior to T? The argument ultimately gets to its fatalistic conclusion
by transferring the necessity to Jones’ action. If Jones raises his right hand
at T, this happens out of necessity, in virtue of the necessity involved in
(2). Of course, there is nothing special with the act of Jones raising his
right hand at T, nor with the time 1,000 years prior to T which constitutes
the prior truth. The argument can be easily generalized to any action, any
time and any agent.
The argument is ill-formed because its structure amounts to a modal
fallacy. Let us say that p is the proposition that it BE true 1,000 years prior
to T that Jones RAISE his right hand at T and q is the proposition that Jones
RAISE his right hand at T. Then, the ill-formed Main Argument structure is:
1 q Hyphotesis
2 p 1 - Premise (1)
3 (p→ q) Premise (2)
4 q 1,2,3
The step from 1 to 2 is informally justified by the notion of prior truths.
If q is the case, then it BE true 1,000 years prior to T that q, which is p. Step
3 states the necessary connection between p and q, which as we have seen
it appears to be unproblematic. And finally step 4 follows from the first
three steps.
In order to see why the argument structure is fallacious, it is sufficient
to provide a counterexample, i.e. a model where the hypothesis and the
two premises are true and the conclusion false. To do so, we take a model
where we have two possible worlds, α and β. We then assume that the
accessibility relation is such that αRβ, i.e. β is an accessible world with
respect to α. Ultimately, the model is such that p and q are both true at
α and false at β. We now evaluate the hypothesis and the premises of
the argument at α. They turn out to be true in the described model. The
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hypothesis and the first premise are true at α simply because p and q are
true at α. Premise (2) is also true at α because (p → q) is true in every
accessible world with respect to α. (p→ q) is true at β, in virtue of the fact
that p is false at β. So, the hypothesis and the two premises are true when
evaluated at the world α in the model. However, the conclusion q is false
at α. In fact, it is not the case that q is true in all the accessible worlds
with respect to α, because q is not true at β. This quick modal reasoning
refutes the ill-formed Main Argument in virtue of its fallacious structure
and also suggests how to amend it. The obvious move to make is to add
a necessity-box in front of the first premise, so that we can employ K to
reach the fatalistic conclusion. Then, the structure becomes
1 q Hyphotesis
2 p 1 - Premise (1)
3 (p→ q) Premise (2)
4 ((p→ q) ∧ p)→ q) K
5 q 2,3,4
With respect to the previous structure, here a necessity-box is added in
front of p in step 2, and therefore the principle K, which we have seen is
valid in all models of modal logic, can be summoned.
What reasons could we have to add a necessity-box in front of p? The
reason might come from the fixity of the past, because after all p reports
a fact about the past, namely something that was happening 1,000 years
prior to the time of Jones raising his right hand, i.e. the fact that at that
time the proposition that Jones RAISE his right hand at T was already true.
Fischer and Todd (2015) make this point, when they are talking about
incompatibilism between prior truths and the power to do otherwise:
Clearly, the thought here as something to do with the nature
of the past and the nature of what we could plausibly have a
choice about. That is, the incompatibilist recommends that we
accept premise (1) on the basis that it is an instance of a more
general thesis concerning our lack of power over the past. (p.4)
It is not within my power now to affect the event of Caesar crossing the
Rubicon, because it is simply too late for me to exercise some power over
that event. In this sense, this event and the proposition that states its oc-
currence are now necessary. Similarly, one might argue that Jones has no
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power over what was true 1,000 prior to his existence. So, in the same sense
the proposition that Caesar CROSS the Rubicon in 49 BC is now necessary,
p is now necessary because there is nothing Jones could do to change the
fact that in the past the proposition q was true. Having said that, this is
how the Main Argument becomes.
The (correct) Main Argument
Suppose Jones raises his right hand at T. From this it follows that the
proposition that John RAISE his right hand at T is true at T. If such proposi-
tion is true at T, then it is always true (i.e. true at all times). Then,
(4) Necessarily, it was true 1000 years prior to T that Jones RAISE his
right hand at T
(5) Necessarily, if it was true 1,000 years before T that Jones RAISE his
right hand at T, then Jones raises his right hand at T
(6) Therefore, it is not the case that it is within Jones power to refrain
from raising his right hand at T
Again, the argument purports to establish that if Jones raises his right
hand at T, then he can’t refrain from doing it. We have seen that there is
nothing special with Jones’ act, nor with the time T. Hence the argument
generalizes, and if correct it proves the schema A→ A, given its premises.
This is exactly the conclusion a fatalist would need.
It is worth noting that it looks as if different modalities are involved in
the argument. The modality in the second premise appears to be of the
broadest kind. There are not possible worlds such that the antecedent of
the conditional embedded in the necessity-box is true, and the consequent
false. Or, it seems unconceivable to think about a scenario in which the
antecedent is true and the consequent false. The modality in the first
premise instead seems to be of another kind. It has to do with what
Jones has within his power at T and it is the kind of modality the fatalism
debate addresses. The modality in the conclusion is the same of the first
premise. So, one might thing that the whole argument is equivocal because
different modalities are involved. I don’t think this is the case. After all,
the modality used in the conclusion is narrower or equal to all modalities
involved in the two premises. The argument would be equivocal if it drew
a conclusion involving a modality broader than the narrower modality
used in the premises. But this is not what happens in the (correct) Main
Argument.
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So, the argument is valid. The conclusion follows from the two premises.
Hence, there are three ways to reject it. The first one is to claim that the
argument is not sound, i.e. that at least one of its two premises is not true.
The second possible way is to claim that the premises are equivocal or
even meaningless. The third one is to attack the background assumptions
the argument relies on. As I already said, nobody accepts the (correct)
Main Argument together with its background assumptions. And this is
understandable. The (correct) Main Argument sounds like metaphysical
sophistry. Why should our freedom of action be limited by prior truths,
when it seems that those truths depend on what we do? However, there is
not an universal agreement about what is wrong with the (correct) Main
Argument. Several different strategies have been employed to resist the
fatalistic conclusion. In the next sections we shall see four different ways
to criticize the argument: the rejection of the notion of prior truths , Ock-
hamism, the introduction of a third truth value and the mutable futurism.
Prior Truths
Van Inwagen (1983) provides a reason for not accepting the Main Argu-
ment. His strategy to reject it focuses on the notion of prior truths. He
attacks the notion of a proposition being true (or false) at a time. According
to Van Inwagen, an expression like “the proposition p is true at T” is either
meaningless, or, if we attach the only plausible meaning to it, it does not
grant the Main Argument’s conclusion. We shall focus here on the first
horn of the disjunction, i.e. the idea that talking about truth (or falsity) at
a time is meaningless. Of course, if things are so, the Main Argument does
not get through, because it relies on talks about truth at a time in its two
premises and in the background assumptions.
Before showing why talks about propositions being true or false at a
time are meaningless, Van Inwagen illustrates the account of propositions
he favors. He says he does not need to give a full account of propositions,
because few basic concepts about truth and propositions are sufficient to
refute the Main Argument and its usage of prior truths. Van Inwagen starts
by saying what propositions are. As he says:
I do not mean anything mysterious by “proposition”. I use this
word as a general term for the things people assent to, reject,
find doubtful, accept for the sake of the argument, attempt to
verify, deduce things from, and so on. (p. 62)
He then goes on by saying that propositions have properties.
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Propositions...may be empirically verifiable, hard to under-
stand, inexpressible in the tongue of a certain tribe, and so
on. (p.64)
Among the properties of propositions, there are truth and falsity. Proposi-
tions may be true or false.
Van Inwagen then moves towards considerations about sentences. Sen-
tences are typically used to express propositions. I can utter the sentence
“the Queen Elizabeth I died on 24 March 1603” to unambiguously express
the proposition that the Queen Elizabeth DIE on 24th March 1603, a propo-
sition which is true if and only if the Queen Elizabeth dies on 24th March
1603. Sentences, like propositions, may be true or false. But, Van Inwagen
argues, they are true (or false) just in virtue of expressing true (or false)
propositions. Thus far, nothing special has been claimed. However, there
is a special type of sentences which needs to be analyzed more carefully.
These are sentences containing indexical words, i.e. words which can ex-
press a different content in different contexts of utterance. Here are the
examples Van Inwagen uses to make his point:
(7) I am Napoleon (uttered by a madman)
(8) I am Napoleon (uttered by Napoleon)
(9) I am about to die (written by Ariel in 1973)
(10) I am about to die (written by Ariel in 1983)
We assume Ariel dies in 1983, three days after having written the sentence
(10) in his diary. (7) and (8) are made up with the same words. Yet, the
madman said something false and Napoleon said something true. The
same holds for (9) and (10). Ariel is wrong when she writes down (9) in
her diary, while she is right when she writes down (10). We have seen that
sentences are true or false in virtue of expressing true or false proposition.
So, it must be the case that (8) and (10) express true propositions, whereas
(7) and (9) express false propositions. Given that the proposition expressed
by (8) and the one expressed by (7) have different properties, because one
is true while the other is false, they must be numerically distinct in virtue
of the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. And indeed they are.
(8) expresses the true proposition that Napoleon is Napoleon, whereas (7)
expresses the false proposition that the madman is Napoleon. What about
(9) and (10)? Again, the two sentences differ in their truth value, one is
true and the other false. Hence they must express different proposition.
What is the source of this indexical phenomenon? Here the indexical “I”
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clearly refers to the same individual in both contexts. “About” is a vague
term, and we can assume for the sake of simplicity that it unambiguously
means within one year. So, we are still looking for a reason why (9) and (10)
express two distinct propositions, in spite of the fact that the same sentence
is used by the same individual. The only candidate left is the present tense
in the sentence, which is used at two different times. In fact, the sentence
as it used in (9) expresses the false proposition that Ariel DIE in 1973, while
the same sentence used in (10) expresses a distinct proposition, namely
the true proposition that Ariel DIE in 1983. Hence, tenses within sentences
behave like indexical terms in some important respect. The same sentence
can deliver different contents if uttered at different times.
We now go back to the Main Argument. We have seen that in order to
state it, we take advantage of expressions like the proposition q was true
1,000 years prior to T. This usage is attacked by Van Inwagen. As he says
...the above paragraphs contain phrases I do not understand.
Among them are: “true at some particular moment”, “true at
every moment”, “became true”, “remained true”, “is unchange-
ably true”, and so on. That is — and we must be very careful
about this — I do not see what these phrases mean if they are
used as they are used in the above argument for fatalism. (p.66)
Here is why Van Inwagen thinks so. The idea again is that tense in
sentences behaves indexically. The result is that the propositions expressed
by sentences already contains a reference to a time9. If at T I say “I am
happy”, I express the proposition that Giacomo BE happy at T. If at T I say “I
will be happy in two days” I express the proposition that Giacomo BE happy
at T+2. Now, Van Inwagen observes that it seems more appropriate to say
that such propositions are true or false simpliciter instead that true or false
at times. They are true just in case what is said to take place at a certain
time takes place at that time, and false otherwise. Talking about truth at a
time is misleading and unnecessary.
A supporter of the truth-at-a-time talk may react by appealing to the
following discourse, which is discussed by Van Inwagen. One might say
in 2010 “that municipal bonds are a good investment”. In case municipal
bonds were a good investment in 2000, but they are no longer a good
investment in 2010, then a possible reply could be “that used to be true,
but it is no longer true nowadays”. This is a piece of discourse which
9with the exceptions of timeless propositions like the proposition that the sum of all
angles is always the same in any triangle. These exceptions are of course irrelevant with
respect to fatalism, which is concerned with human agency, which obviously happens in
time.
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appears to be natural and transparent. Moreover, it seems to suggest that
there is something —to make it clear, one and the same thing — which
used to be true and which is no longer true. That something might be a
proposition, because we have seen that propositions are the bearers of the
properties of truth and falsity. If things are so, the fatalist usage of truth-at-
a-time would be legitimate. Suppose that a newspaper used the headline
“municipal bonds are a good investment” in the year 2000 and used the
same headline in 2010. According to the talk “that used to be true” taken
at face value, the two headlines expressed one and the same proposition,
namely the proposition that municipal bonds are a good investment. Let’s
call this proposition ”s“. If things were so, the specification of time when
talking about the truth of falsity of s would be not only legitimate, but
even necessary. We would need to say things like — s was true in the
year 2000, whereas s is false in the year 2010. But, Van Inwagen has an
easy time to explain away this “used to be true”” kind of talk. If such an
usage were to be taken literally, we should be allowed to say things like
“the 2000 edition of the newspaper used to be reliable, but today, that very
same edition is not reliable anymore, because it states something, i.e. s,
which is nowadays false”. But this last statement is clearly absurd. The
2000 edition is and always will be reliable, because it expressed the true
proposition that municipal bonds Be a good investment in 2000 by means of
the headline “municipal bonds are a good investment”. The 2010 edition
is and will always be not reliable, because the same headline expresses the
false proposition that municipal bonds BE a good investment in 2010. Clearly,
the “used to be true” usage refers to the fact that if someone had used the
sentence “municipal bonds are a good investment” in 2000 he would have
expressed a true proposition, whereas if he had used the same sentence in
2010 he would have expressed a different and false proposition.
As such, the argument does not uncontroversially establish that the
truth-at-a-time talk is meaningless. It may establish that tenseless propo-
sitions do not change truth value over time. However, this does not imply
that the truth-at-a-time talk is meaningless. We do say things like it is true
today that Caesar DIE in 44BC and one may take this kind of talk literally.
Or, we could say that even if propositions fundamentally have a truth
value simpliciter, there is a derivative sense according to which it is correct
to say that propositions have truth values at times, in virtue of the principle
that if something is true (or false) simpliciter, then it is true (or false) at all
times. Or, one might favor tensed propositions. In such case, even if there
is a temporal index embedded, it might be reasonable to have truth values
which change over time, thereby making sense of the truth-at-a-time talk.
For instance, Prior (1976) seems to make this point:
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One way of sliding out, on which I don’t think it is necessary to
waste much time, is to make nonsense of most of the argument
by denying that you can attach a time to a truth-value. But
in fact we all use phrases like “was true yesterday” perfectly
happily when we are not philosophizing...
We have seen one strategy Van Inwagen used to refute the Main Argu-
ment. It is based on a rejection of the concept of prior truths, which the
Main Argument needs in order to get through. It seems uncontroversial
that tenseless propositions do not change truth value over time. Yet, this
does not rule out the legitimacy of the truth-at-a-time talk which is em-
ployed in the Main Argument. We shall see a different strategy in the next
section.
Ockhamism and the freedom to do otherwise
In this section I will illustrate the so-called Ockhamist strategy to refute
the Main Argument. I will rely on Fischer and Todd (2011) version of
Ockhamism. The strategy is based on two main elements. The first one
is an account of what an agent can or cannot do, which does justice to the
idea that the past is fixed. The second one is the distinction between soft
and hard facts.
The account of what an agent can or cannot perform sounds as follows.
Can Account
An agent A can perform (has within his or her power) an act φ at a time
T and a world w iff there is an accessible possible world where A does
perform φ at T.
The account as such is incomplete, because it does not say anything
about the nature of the accessibility relation. The most obvious way to
characterize the accessibility relation is to require that the accessible pos-
sible worlds are such that they are historically identical to w up to the
time T. In other words, two worlds are historically identical up to T just in
case they are qualitatively indistinguishable up to T. This account of “can”
does justice to the idea that the past is fixed, i.e. the idea that we have
no power over what is past. The following case illustrates why things are
so. Suppose that today John wants to buy an expensive car, but he is far
from having the necessary money to buy it. Everybody would agree that
John cannot purchase the expensive car. His lack of money would stop
him from purchasing it. If John has not the money to buy it, it means that
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at the moments in time prior to today, there is not enough money on his
bank account. We check now what the described “can” account predicts.
In order to establish whether John can buy the car today, we have to check
all the possible worlds which are identical to the world where John wants
to buy a car, from their beginning to today, i.e. the moment in time in
question. In all those worlds, John has not the necessary money to buy the
car. This implies that in all those worlds John does not buy a car. As a result,
the account correctly predicts that in the world that John inhabits, he can’t
purchase the expensive car. If he could purchase the car, John could do
something which would change the past, which is absurd.
That being said, a fatalist who accepts the Main Argument could adopt
this account of can and argue in favor of fatalism. He or she could say that
looking at John’s yesterday bank account was after all unnecessary. In fact,
if John doesn’t purchase today the car, it was true 1,000,000 years ago that
he would not have done so, and this fact lies in the past. Hence, he or she
would conclude that all the accessible worlds are such that there are facts
which imply that John would not purchase the car today. This of course
generalizes to any fact, any time and any agent, and so it would lead to the
fatalistic conclusion that no one has ever the power to do otherwise.
To avoid this fatalistic conclusion, here it comes the Ockhamist dis-
tinction between soft and hard facts. Fischer and Todd (2011) puts the
distinction this way.
The distinction between hard and soft facts (although not the
terminology) traces back to William of Ockham. Ockham em-
ployed this distinction to give a certain sort of response to the
Divine Foreknowledge Argument, but the distinction is crucial
also in providing a proper interpretation of the argument itself.
Hard facts are (in some way that is hard to characterize pre-
cisely) temporally non-relational as regards the future (relative
to the time they are about). More specifically, a hard fact about
some time T is genuinely about T and not also genuinely about
some time after T. In contrast, a soft fact is temporally relational
as regards the future (relative to the time it is about); that is, a
soft fact about some time T is at least in part genuinely about
some time after T. (p.115)
To illustrate the distinction, we take the following two facts. It is a fact
about 2008 that Obama was elected. It is also a fact about 2008 that Obama
was elected 8 years prior to me typing this sentence. The first fact qualifies
as hard, because it has to do only with 2008. The latter is soft, because it is
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as it is in virtue of things happening in 2008 (Obama’s election) and things
happening in 2016 (me writing that sentence).
With the Ockhamist machinery in our hands, we can now challenge the
Main Argument. The reader probably remembers that the Main Argument
appeals to facts like the fact that it was the case 1,000 years prior to T that
Jones would raise his right hand at T. Clearly, this sort of fact goes under
the category of soft facts, because it says something about 1,000 years prior
to T and about a time which is future with respect to 1,000 years prior
to T. Now, an Ockhamist would say that when we look at the accessible
worlds with respect to a time T and a world w to determine what an agent
can or cannot do, we should take as accessible all the worlds which are
identical to w up to T just with respect to the hard facts. This, in the case
of Jones and his right hand, yields the result that it may be the case that
there are accessible worlds such that they would differ from Jones’s world
with respect to the soft past. That is, there might be worlds where it was
true in the past that Jones would not raise his right hand at T and Jones
does not raise his right hand at T. This would be the case in circumstances
where we would not have “hard” reasons to think that Jones’s behavior is
forced by things which would undermine his power to do otherwise, like
the past presence of a microchip in his head. If so, the “can” account gives
us the result that it might be the case, if circumstances allows it, that Jones
can refrain from raising his right hand at T, even if he does not do so at T.
So, we have a counterexample against modal fatalism.
Going back to the Main Argument, it should be made it clear that the
Ockhamist does not deny that
(11) it was true 1,000 years prior to T that Jones would raise his right
hand at T.
provided Jones raises his right hand at T. (11) truly reports a soft fact
about what was the case 1,000 years prior to T. What is not true, the
Ockhamist believes, is the fact that Jones has no power at T over the fact
reported by (11). He or she would argue that whether (11) holds or not
depends on what Jones does at T. If he has the power to do otherwise at
T, then it is within Joness power whether it was the case that 1,000 years
prior to T that Jones would raise his right hand at T. Hence, the Ockhamist,
in virtue of this dependence relation, argues that the necessity-box in front
of (11) in the (correct) Main Argument may render (11) false — it would
be false if as a matter of fact Jones has such a power at T.
To sum up, if Jones raises his right hand at T, the Ockhamist concedes
to the fatalist who believes in the Main Argument that it was true 1,000
years prior to T that Jones would raise his right hand at T. This means that,
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with certainty, John will raise his right hand at T. Whether Jones has or not
the power do to otherwise, though, does not depend at all on the soft fact
employed in the Main Argument. It does depend just on the hard past
with respect to T.
On a side note, the distinction between soft and hard facts can be
employed to make sense of the so-called Thin Red Line Theory about the
future, which is itself inspired by the work of Ockham. According to this
view, at any moment in time there is a single unique actual future, labeled
the Thin Red Line, which corresponds to how things will actually unfold.
Yet, it mat be the case that at some point in time, more than one future is
possible, besides the actual one. Take a time T and all the hard facts about
times prior to T. It may be the case that more than one continuation is
possible after T. For instance, an indeterministic scenario where the same
initial conditions can give rise to different outcomes would be such a case.
However, by taking into account all soft facts about times prior to T, we
have the result that only one possible future is singled out, i.e. the Thin
Red Line. For instance, there would be a soft fact about the past according
to which the outcome at T1 is such and such. By taking into account only
hard facts, distinct futures are possible. By bringing into the picture soft
facts too, the Thin Red Line is lighted.
Introducing a Third Truth Value
In this section we shall deal with another classic strategy to resist the
fatalistic conclusion provided by the Main Argument. The strategy is based
on the introduction of a third truth value between truth and falsehood. We
will illustrate it with the help of Lukasiewicz (1967). As he says:
I can assume without contradiction that my presence in Warsaw
at a certain moment of next year, e.g. at noon on 21 December, is
at the present time determined neither positively or negatively.
Hence it is possible, but not necessary, that I shall be present in
Warsaw at the given time. On this assumption the proposition
I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21 December of next year can
at the present time be neither true nor false. For if it were true
now, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary,
which is contradictory to the assumption. If it were false now,
on the other hand, my future presence in Warsaw would have
to be impossible, which is also contradictory to the assumption.
Therefore the proposition considered is at the moment neither
true nor false ... (p. 53)
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Here is the way I understand this famous passage. Lukasiewicz starts
his reasoning with the idea that what happens at a time, say the year
1922, is compatible with more than one future. What happens in 1922 is
compatible with his presence in Warsaw in December 21st 1923 and, it is
also compatible with his absence from Warsaw the same day, i.e. there
is no contradiction with assuming all the facts about 1922 together with
Lukasiewiczs future presence in Warsaw, and there isn’t a contradiction as
well if we assume all the facts about 1922 together with his future absence
from Warsaw. That is to say, how the world is in 1922 does not settle the
issue about Lukasiewiczs whereabouts one year later. The obtained result
is that his presence in Warsaw the day in question is not necessary, and so
is his absence. We state this first conclusion with (12).
(12) it is not necessary in 1922 that Lukasiewicz will be in Warsaw one
year later and it is not necessary in 1922 that Lukasiewicz will not
be in Warsaw one year later.
This first part of Lukasiewicz reasoning does not justify by itself the intro-
duction of a third truth value. For instance, an Ockhamist might say that
even if it is true in 1922 that Lukasiewicz would (or would not) find himself
in Warsaw one year later, this might not be necessary (or impossible). And
so here is the point where the Main Argument kicks in. The reader should
remember that the Main Argument purports to prove the validity of con-
ditionals of the form A → A, and that one of the two sources the Main
Argument relies on are the so called prior truths, whereas the other is the
fixity of the past. For any future event, The Main Argument states, there
are prior truths about that event, therefore the future event will happen of
necessity.
Let us say that we are in 1922, “F(n)” is the future operator which means
“in n time units it will be the case that”, “n” is the temporal index which
specifies the time interval, and “w” stands for Lukasiewicz’s presence in
Warsaw. We can then form the two following tensed propositions. The
proposition F(1)w, which is the proposition that in one year it will be the
case that Lukasewicz is in Warsaw, and the proposition F(1)¬w, which is
the proposition that in one year it will be the case that Lukasiewicz is not
in Warsaw.
We might then give this very brief argument, which moves from the
future excluded middle (FEM) together with the conclusion of the Main
Argument to the idea that one of two mutually exclusive future events is
necessary. In 1922, we can reason as follows.
FEM-MA-N(From FEM and Main Argument to Necessity)
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(13) either F(1)w is true or F(1)¬w is true
(14) if F(1)w is true , then F(1)w is necessary
(15) If F(1)¬w is true, then F(1)¬w is necessary
(16) therefore, either F(1)w is necessary or F(1)¬w is necessary
Premise (13) is not exactly an instance of (FEM). (FEM) states that any
claim of the form F(n)φ∨F(n)¬φ is valid10. It must not be confused with the
standard excluded middle form φ ∨ ¬φ, because the negation in (FEM) is
embedded in the future operator. (FEM) is justified by the intuitive thought
that among two mutually exclusive events which exhaust the possibilities,
necessarily one of them will take place at a given future time. It seems
straightforward to derive (13) from F(1)w ∨ F(1)¬w. Thus, we have (13).
Premises (14) and (15) are true if one accepts the Main Argument. Prior
truths about future events, together with the fixity of the past, lead to the
necessity of the events the prior truths are about. (16) then follows. But
(16) is in contradiction with (12), the conclusion of the considerations made
in the first step of Lukasiewiczs reasoning — that his presence is Warsaw
is not necessary, nor is his absence.
We need to stop for a while at this point. The careful reader could
be worried about the fact that thus far we discussed the Main Argument
in terms of tenseless propositions. The argument FEM-MA-N instead
employs tensed proposition, where the tense is fundamental and part
of the content of the proposition. Hence, we should show how the Main
Argument can be given in terms of tensed propositions. This will justify the
steps (14) and (15) employed in FEM-MA-N. To do so I borrow Øhrstrøm
(2009) tempo-modal formalism and the argument he illustrates there, with
some passages made more explicit.
The tempo-modal formalism takes the following five principles as ax-
ioms, where “p” and “q” stand for any well-formed formula in the lan-
guage, and the operator P(n) is the past operator which has to be read as “it
was the case n units of time ago that..”, in analogy with the metric future
operator introduced above.
Axioms
A1 F(y)φ→ P(x)F(x)F(y)φ
A2 (P(x)F(x)φ→ φ)
A3 P(x)φ→ P(x)φ
10I will be using the greek letters φ andψ as metavariables for propositions which come
with tensed operators, as it is customary in the literature.
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A4 ((φ→ ψ) ∧ φ)→ ψ
A5 F(x)φ ∨ F(x)¬φ
These axioms parallel the assumptions which the (correct) Main Argument
needs in order to get through. A1 corresponds to the move the Main
Argument makes from truth of a proposition at a time to truth of the same
same proposition at an earlier time. The Main Argument moves from the
idea that if the relevant tenseless proposition is true at a time, it is also true
at earlier times. Here A1 tells us that we are allowed to ‘go back’ in time
as much as we want, provided we make the necessary adjustments with
the tensed operators. A2 corresponds to the second premise of the Main
Argument. It seems to be a matter of necessity that if it was the case x
units ago that it would be the case x units of time later that p, then now p.
Similarly, the Main Argument claims that it is a matter of necessity that if
it was true 1,000 years ago that Jones RAISE his right hand at T, then Jones
raises his right hand at T. A3 delivers the idea of the fixity of the past.
If something was the case in the past, it is now unpreventable, i.e. there
is nothing we can do now about it. As in the Main Argument, it seems
that two kinds of necessity are at play. A3 employs the kind of necessity
fatalism is interested in, i.e. necessity in terms of what an agent has or
hasn’t within his or her power. A2 (and A4 as well) refers to a kind of logic
or metaphysical necessity. A4 is just the modal principle K, which as we
have seen it is needed for the Main Argument to be formally valid. A5 is
the Future Excluded Middle. Similarly, The Main Argument employs the
standard excluded middle to conclude that all actions are either necessary
(if performed) or impossible (if not performed).
We are now in a position to give the (correct) Main Argument in tensed
terms. Again, we reason about Lukasiewicz’s future whereabout as if we
were in 1922.
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The Tensed Main Argument
1 F(1)w→ P(1000)F(1000)F(1)w A1
2 P(1000)F(1000)F(1)w→ P(1000)F(1000)F(1)w A3
3 F(1)w→ P(1000)F(1000)F(1)w 1,2
4 (P(1000)F(1000)F(1)w→ F(1)w) A2
5 (P(1000)F(1000)F(1)w→ F(1)w)→ (P(1000)F(1000)F(1)w→ F(1)w) A4
6 P(1000)F(1000)F(1)w→ F(1)w 4,5
7 F(1)w→ F(1)w 3,6
Step 1 is an instance of A1. Step 2 is an instance of A3. Step 3 follows
from 1 and 2 and the transitivity of conditionals. Step 4 is an instance of
A2. Step 5 is an instance of A4. Step 6 follows from 4 and 5 in virtue of
propositional logic. The conclusion 7 follows from 3 and 6 in virtue of
propositional logic. We can obtain the result F(1)¬w → F(1)¬w just by
replacing w with ¬w in the tensed Main Argument. These two results are
the formal analogous of what is employed in (14) and (15) of FEM-MA-N.
Time to get back to FEM-MA-N. The conclusion of it is in contradiction
with (12), which intuitively seem to be true according to Lukasiewicz.
Hence, something must be given up. Lukasiewicz clearly accepts steps
(14) and (15) of FEM-MA-N when he says “for if it were true now, my
future presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary. . . ”. This way the
only possibility left is to reject premise (13) of FEM-MA-N. What happens
if we claim that (13) is false?
(13) either F(1)w is true or F(1)¬w is true
If (13) is false, we have equivalently that it is not the case that F(1)w is true
and it is not the case that F(1)¬w is true. That is, we have (¬13)
(¬13) ¬(F(1)w is true) ∧ ¬(F(1)¬w is true)
(¬13) is a conjunction, so by classical logic we are allowed to draw con-
clusions from both conjuncts and then put the results together. We start
from the first conjunct.
(i) ¬(F(1)w is true). (ii) Hence, F(1)w is false. (iii) Therefore, ¬F(1)w
The step (ii) is justified if Bivalence holds and we use standard truth tables
compatible with Bivalence. If truth and falsity are the only possible truth
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values as Bivalence dictates, from the fact that it is not the case that F(1)w
is true it must follow that F(1)w is false. The step (iii) is justified by the
thought that the negation of a false claim is true, which holds indepen-
dently from Bivalence.
The second conjunct leads us to F(1)w in a similar but more complicated
way.
(iv) ¬(F(1)¬w is true). (v) Hence, F(1)¬w is false. (vi) Hence, ¬F(1)¬w.
(vii) Hence, ¬¬F(1)w. (viii) Therefore, F(1)w
Step (v) is justified if Bivalence holds. Again, if truth and falsity are the
only possible truth values, from the fact that it is not the case that F(1)¬w
is true, it follows that F(1)¬w is false. Step (vi) is justified by the idea that
a negation of a false statement is true, which, as just seen, is independent
from Bivalence. Step (vii) moves the negation sign which follows the fu-
ture operator in (vi) before the future operator. Its intuitive ground is the
fact that saying that at a given future time something will not take place
is tantamount to saying that it is not the case that at the given future time
that something will take place. We shall see later that the claim just made
can be disputed. Step (viii) is just the result of canceling out two negation
signs from (vii). (iii) and (viii) form a contradiction.
To sum up, FEM-MA-N lead us to (16), which is in contradiction with
(12). Given that Lukasiewicz believes in the intuitive truth of (12) and
accepts the premises (14) and (15) of FEM-MA-N, Lukasiewicz considers
the premise (13) to be the culprit and he thus rejects it. But in turn, we
have shown that the denial of (13) together with Bivalence and other plau-
sible principles lead us to the two contradictory statements (iii) and (viii).
Hence, something else must be given up. Lukasiewicz thus rejects Biva-
lence. Statements about future events which are not presently settled have
a third truth value which goes beyond the list of truth values allowed by
Bivalence. This way, (13) is not true. If the future Lukasiewicz’s where-
about is presently unsettled, both F(1)w and F(1)¬w have the third truth
value, and thus neither of them is true. It doesn’t matter how we call this
third truth value. It is usually referred to as indeterminate or neither true
nor false. What is important is that it represents a middle ground between
truth and falsity and that the introduction of it amounts to a denial of Bi-
valence. By doing this, we no longer have the contradiction of the claims
(iii) and (viii). We derived both of them by employing Bivalence. If we
reject Bivalence, the steps from (i) to (ii) and from (iv) to (v) made above
are no longer justified.
It turns out that this is not the only way to make sense of future con-
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tingent events, if there are such things. It is possible to argue that all
future contingent propositions are false, instead that assigning to them the
third truth value. In Chapter 7 of his 1967 Past, Present, and Future, Prior
discusses such a view.
The reasoning employed to defend the all-false view on future contin-
gents is similar to the one it is used to justify the introduction of a third
truth value. Most of the steps are the same. An all-false theorist starts from
the idea that (12) is in contradiction with the conclusion of FEM-MA-N.
He or she then denies the truth of premise (13) of FEM-MA-N.
(13) either F(1)w is true or F(1)¬w is true
which leads us to
(¬13) ¬(F(1)w is true) ∧ ¬(F(1)¬w is true)
We then have the two inferences from the two conjuncts.
(i) ¬(F(1)w is true). (ii) Hence, F(1)w is false. (iii) Therefore, ¬F(1)w
(iv) ¬(F(1)¬w is true). (v) Hence, F(1)¬w is false. (vi) Hence, ¬F(1)¬w.
(vii) Hence, ¬¬F(1)w. (viii) Therefore, F(1)w
Thus far, we are reasoning following the same track used by a third-value
theorist. But, and here comes the difference, an all-false theorist accepts
the steps from (i) to (ii) and from (iv) to (v), and he or she concludes the
reasoning by saying that both F(1)w and F(1)¬w are false. Bivalence is thus
preserved, because a third truth value is not introduced and (13) is denied
in virtue of the fact that both both F(1)w and F(1)¬w are false. Of course,
at this point something must be said to avoid to have both (iii) and (viii),
otherwise we would have a contradiction. At least one of the paths which
lead us there must be stopped. The strategy goes as follows. The main idea
is that the operator F(n) means something like “it is presently determined
that in n time units it will be the case that...”. This way F(n)ψ is true iff
ψ is already settled, and false otherwise. This means that F(n)ψ is false
in two cases. Either F(n)ψ is false because ¬ψ is determined to happen
in the future, or because ψ is not presently settled. This way it is easy to
see that the move from (vi) to (vii) is not legitimate, and this is so because
in such a view we can’t safely move a negation sign from the scope of a
future operator to the outside. In other words, formulas like F(n)¬ψ and
¬F(n)ψ are not equivalent. In fact, if ψ is presently unsettled, F(n)¬ψ is
false, whereas ¬F(n)ψ is true because it is an external negation of a false
statement.
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The all-false view of future contingent propositions makes sense of
contingency, necessity and impossibility of future events. If F(n)ψ is true,
then ψ is necessary. If F(n)¬ψ is true, then ψ is impossible (and so far we
are agreeing with a third truth value theorist). If F(n)ψ and F(n)¬ψ are
both false, then ψ is contingent.
Of course, these two views, the third truth value view and the all-false
view, do not come without costs. One of the main problems the two views
share is the so-called prediction problem. Suppose someone said in 1922
that Lukasiewicz will be in Warsaw one year hence. Assume then that
when 1923 comes, Lukasiewicz as a matter of fact finds himself in Warsaw.
It seems correct to say that what has has been said in 1922 was true. But
this is not what the two theories say. According to the third truth value
theorist, what was said wasn’t true because it was neither true nor false.
According to the the all-false theorist things are even worse, what was said
was literally false.
Another problem worth mentioning has to do with the Law of Exluded
Middle. It seems a logical truth that any sentence of the form ψ ∨ ¬ψ is
true. But things get problematic for the third truth value theorist. Suppose
that ψ is the sentence “it will be the case in one year that Lukasiewicz is in
Warsaw”, pronounced in 1922. This sentence and its negation are neither
true nor false according to the third truth value theorist. What shall we
say of the whole disjunction when the two disjuncts have the third truth
value? We may be tempted, upon considering this case, that the whole
disjunction is true when the two disjuncts have the third truth value.
After all, Lukasiewicz will or will not be in Warsaw the day in question.
But what about sentences like “either it will be the case in one year that
Lukasiewicz is in Warsaw or it will be the case in one day that I have eggs
for lunch” where the meal I am going to have tomorrow is also presently
unsettled. If the disjunction of two indeterminate disjuncts yields a truth,
then we have to say that this disjunction is true. But this seems intuitively
wrong, because it could turn out that Lukasiewicz will not be in Warsaw
and I will not have eggs. One might then say the disjunction operator
is not truth-functional. It yields a truth when the two disjuncts are both
indeterminate and are contradictories, and it yields another truth value
when the two disjuncts are both indeterminate but are not contradictories.
This could probably do, but besides seeming an ad hoc move, it seems also
that the disjunction operator is truth-functional. The all-false theorist has
a similar problem. He or she can claim that the exluded middle holds
unrestrictedly, because there isn’t a third truth value in the picture and
the external negation works in the ordinary way. But the future excluded
middle, F(x)ψ∨F(x)¬ψ is not guaranteed to be true, because both disjuncts
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may be false. And again, this seems intuitively wrong. And there are also
other problems we don’t have time to discuss. Iacona (2007) contains a
thorough discussion of these problems.
To conclude, the introduction of a third truth value (and the all-false
view as well) is justified by, among other things, the acceptance of the idea
coming from the Main Argument that prior truths imply necessity . So, one
might say that this move is not properly a rejection of fatalism. But, I think
these two strategies go legitimately in the category of the theoretical moves
against fatalism for at least two reasons. The first reason is that they deny
a crucial background assumption used in the (correct) Main Argument.
The Main Argument claims that if Jones raises his right hand at T, it is true
at T that Jones RAISE his right hand at T. The Main Argument then goes
from the truth at a time, to truth at all times. A third truth value theorist
and all-false theorist deny this latter move. Even if it’s true at T that Jones
raises his right hand at T, it doesn’t follow that it was true before T that
Jones would raise his right hand at T. If Jones’ act was unsettled prior to
T, the proposition in question was either neither true nor false or simply
false. The second reason is that the two views are motivated by the idea
that the past together with the present may fail to settle an unique future,
which is precisely the opposite of what a fatalist would be willing to say.
The Mutable Future
In this section we shall deal with a rather unknown view, i.e. the idea that
the future is mutable. Todd (2016) recently presented the picture, which is
originally due to Peter Thomas Geach (1977). I will first explain what this
view amounts to and we’ll see then how it provides at least two ways to
refute the Main Argument.
The Mutable Futurist claims that the future might literally change.
What does this could possibly mean? We will see first what it does not
mean. The Mutable Futurist doesn’t claim that there is change in the
future. To say that there is change in the future is to say that at least two
future times are qualitatively different or that at least two future times
contain qualitatively different entities. For instance, probably the year
2097 will contain more advanced technology than the year 2083. This kind
of change in the future is an uninteresting platitude everyone agrees on.
Nor the Mutable Futurist claims that the future changes because future
times will become present, as a standard A-theorist would say. Rather, the
Mutable Futurist claims that a given content or constituent of a given future
time might be replaced by something else as time goes by. This way the
future changes, from containing something to containing something else
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or from being constituted by something to being constituted by something
else.
Todd puts it this way in presenting the view.
what is distinctive of Geachs view is that it is possible for some-
thing X to be such that, at T1, it will happen at T10, but at T3
such that it will not happen at T10. (p.2079)
certain events sometimes can make it so that what will happen
ends up not happening, or that what previously was such that
it will not happen does happen...we get the following unique
result: it could very well be that at T1 it was true that X would
happen at T10, but that, at some time later than T10, it is not true
that X happened at T10. (p.2080)
In such a picture future oriented propositions behave accordingly. We
may have cases where future contingent propositions change their truth
value over time. They can go from being true to being false, and from
being false to being true. Suppose that at T1 X is going to happen at T10,
and then at T3 the future changes, Y instead of X is going to happen at T10.
If things are so, the proposition that X will happen at T10 is true at T1 and
it becomes false at T3, while the proposition that X will not happen at T10
is false at T1 and it becomes true at T3.
I bet that the reader at this point has already a lot of objections to this
view about the future. We will have a great deal more to say about it in the
last chapter. As for now, I just need to say that I agree with Todd when he
claims that this view should deserve the role of a metaphysical contender
within the debate on time. We are about to take a look at two motivations
for this view. The first one comes from Geach himself, the first proponent
of this picture, whereas the second comes from Todd.
Geach says that what motivates the changing future view is what he
calls the “logic” of prevention. As Geach says:
But what then is prevented? Not what did happen, but as-
suredly what was going to happen. The aeroplane was going
to crash into the sea and 100 men were going to be drowned;
the pilots prompt action prevented this. For not everything that
does not happen is prevented: only what was going to happen.
(p.47)
Geach argues for the idea that when an event is prevented from happening,
that event is such that it was going to happen, but then it didn’t, thanks to
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the preventative act which ensured the non-occurrence of it. Suppose that
a preventative act occurs at the time T3 and it prevents the occurrence of an
event X at T10. Geach would say that before T3 X was going to happen, and
after T3 X is no longer going to happen. At T3, the future time T10 changes
from containing X to not containing X.
The second motivation, given by Todd, has to do with the utility of
foreknowledge. It seems uncontroversial that foreknowledge of the future
is useful in case I have to make a decision in the present. Suppose I am
about to buy stocks and I am wondering which investment will make
the more gain. Surely, the foreknowledge of how the stock market will
behave would make me incredibly rich in few days. It seems that the more
knowledge I have, the better for me. But, if I had a total knowledge of
what will happen in the future, and the future cannot change, then this
knowledge would seem to be totally useless, because I would foreknow
also my future actions, stocks purchases included. Suppose A is going
to be a good investment and B a bad one. And suppose I’ll buy B. If I
knew everything about the future, I would also know that I will buy B,
despite knowing it’s a bad investment. So, partial knowledge of the future
is an advantage when I have to deliberate. And, the more knowledge of
the future I have, the better for me. But, as this knowledge approaches
completeness, it becomes useless. This is true if the future is immutable.
So, here is the argument in favor of the mutable future. The immutability of
the future together with full foreknowledge of the future seem to imply that
full foreknowledge is useless. But foreknowledge seems to be extremely
useful. Hence, one might conclude by modus tollens that the future must
be mutable. These two motivations are not conclusive. One might have an
alternative account of prevention which does not posit a mutable future,
or one might have a different account of foreknowledge. We will discuss
this view in more details later.
To conclude, I will show how a Mutable Futurist can reply to the Main
Argument. First of all, like a third truth value theorist, the Mutable Futurist
can claim that from the fact that it is true at T that Jones raises his right
hand at T it does not follow that it has always been true in the past. Maybe
it was the case before T that Jones would not raise his right hand at T, but
then the future changed.
The second reply has to do with the second premise of the Main Argu-
ment.
(8) Necessarily, if it was true 1000 years before T that Jones RAISE his
right hand at t, then Jones raises his right hand at T
According to a Mutable Futurist the conditional is not guaranteed to
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hold. It is not guaranteed that if it was true 1000 years prior to T that
Jones would raise his right hand at T, then Jones does so at T. Some event
happening from 1000 years prior to T and up to T might prevent Jones’
raising his right hand at T. If the future changes from containing the event
of Jones raising his right hand at T to not containing it, the antecedent is
literally true while the consequent false. This way the second premise of
the Main Argument is falsified.
1.2.3 Taylor’s Argument
We now turn to another classic argument in favor of modal fatalism. In
(1962) Richard Taylor published a paper where he provides an argument in
favor of fatalism. His point is that six commonly accepted and reasonable
assumptions lead to fatalism. The argument has an Aristotelian flavor,
because it employs the principle of Bivalence and it has the form of a dis-
junctive dilemma. However, I think Taylor’s argument is an improvement
of the Aristotelian one. The further step Taylor does seem to strengthen
the fatalistic conclusion. Like Aristotle, Taylor himself wasn’t a fatalist.
His ultimate position was to reject at least one of the assumptions which
grounds his argument. Anyway, here I am not concerned with what view
Taylor held, rather, I’ll try to illustrate and analyze his argument and the
responses to it. I will argue that most of the standard responses found in
the literature do not refute the argument. Later on, I will show what I think
is wrong with it. Taylor’s argument proves too much, because it conflates
deterministic and indeterministic cases.
The Argument
Taylor’s argument rests on six assumptions, which he calls “presupposi-
tions”. So, before going through the argument, we shall see what these six
assumptions are. As he says:
Presuppositions. The only presuppositions we shall need
are the six following.
First, we presuppose that any proposition whatever is either
true, or, if not true, then false. This is simply the standard
interpretation, tertium non datur, of the law of excluded middle,
usually symbolyzed (p∨¬p), which is generally admitted to be
a necessary truth.
Second, we presuppose that, if any state of affair is suffi-
cient for, though logically unrelated to, the occurrence of some
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further condition at the same or any other time, then the for-
mer cannot occur the latter occurring also. This is simply the
standard manner in which the concept of sufficiency is expli-
cated. Another and perhaps better way of saying the same
thing is that, if one state of affairs ensures without logically en-
tailing the occurrence of another, then the former cannot occur
without the latter occurring. Ingestion of cyanide, for instance,
ensures death under certain familiar circumstances, though the
two states are not logically related.
Third, we presuppose that, if the occurrence of any condition
is necessary for, but logically unrelated to, the occurrence of
some other condition at the same or any other time, then the
latter cannot occur without the former occurring also. This is
simply the standard manner in which the concept of a necessary
condition is explicated. Another and perhaps better way of
saying the same thing is that, is one state of affair is essential
for another, then the latter cannot occur without it. Oxygen, for
instance, is essential to (though it does not by itself ensure) the
maintenance of human life, though it is not logically impossible
that we should live without it.
Fourth, we presupposes that, if one condition or set of con-
ditions is sufficient for (ensures) another, then that other is nec-
essary (essential) for it, and conversely, if one condition or set
of conditions is necessary (essential) for another, then that other
is sufficient (ensures) it. This is but a logical consequence of the
second and third presuppositions.
Fifth, we presuppose that no agent can perform any given
act if there is lacking, at the same or any other time, some con-
dition necessary for the occurrence of that act. This follows,
simply from the idea of anything being essential for the accom-
plishment of something else. I cannot, for example, live without
oxygen, or swim five miles without ever having been in water,
or read a given page of print without having learned Russian,
or win a certain election without having been nominated, and
so on.
And sixth, we presuppose that time is not by itself efficiaci-
uos; that is, that the mere passage of time does not augment
or diminish the capacities of anything and, in particular, that it
does not enhance or decrease an agents powers or abilities. This
means that if any substance or agent gains or loses powers or
abilities over the course of timesuch as, for instance, the power
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of a substance to corrode, or a man to do thirty push-ups, and
so onthen such gain or loss is always the result of something
other than the mere passage of time. (p.42-43)
We shall say something about these six assumptions. The first one, as it
is stated, appears to be the principle of Bivalence, even if Taylor labels it
the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). The Principle of Bivalence states that
truth and falsity are the only possible truth values for declarative sentences
expressing propositions, those truth values being exhaustive and mutually
exclusive. So, a semantic abides Bivalence if any sentence in the language
has exactly one truth value, truth or falsity. The Law of Excluded Middle
(LEM) is validated if any sentence of the form (A ∨ ¬A) is true. The two
principles are not one and the same. For instance, we could have semantics
like supervaluationism where LEM holds, whereas Bivalence does not. In
any case, as we shall see, the Taylor Argument just needs the standard
LEM.
The second, third and fourth assumptions deal with the relations of
necessary and sufficient conditions. Taylor uses as relata of the relations
states of affairs. If a state of affairs s is sufficient for another state of affairs
n, it means that s cannot occur without n also occurring. If things are so, the
occurrence of n is said to be necessary for the occurrence of s. We use italic
letters to refer to propositions which claim that a state of affairs occurs, i.e.
s is the proposition that s occurs. We then express the notions of sufficiency
and necessity through the material implication. s → n expresses the fact
that s is sufficient for n and n is necessary for s. It is important to note that
this kind of relation might hold between states of affairs no matter what is
the time of their occurrence — that is, we can have a sufficient or necessary
relation among any two states of affairs either when the two states of affairs
are simultaneous or when one precedes or follows the other in time. This
property of indifference with respect to time for the relations of sufficiency
and necessity among states of affairs is crucial in the Taylor’s argument.
Taylor himself gives the following examples to illustrate the relation.
(17) John is alive from 10 to 11 pm→ there’s oxygen around from 10 to
11 pm.
(18) John ingests cyanides at 10 am. → John dies at 11 am
(19) John wins the elections in November→ John has been nominated
in May.
In the first case, the two states of affairs are simultaneous. In the second
one, the state of affairs which ensures the other one occurs earlier in time.
In the last one, the state of affairs which is sufficient for the other one
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occurs later in time. Taylor underlines that these relations don’t have a
logical nature. Ingesting cyanides does not logically imply death. Things
are so in the actual world, i.e. given the prevailing circumstances and laws
of nature occurring in our world. For instance, there are possible worlds
where cyanides does not lead to death.
The sixth presupposition, the one about the passage of time, might be
illustrated as follows. Suppose it is not within my power to speak Finnish
at T, because I have never studied it and suppose also that I then learn it
within two years. So, I cant speak Finnish at T, but I can at a later time.
Sure enough, learning Finnish takes time. But its not the fact that time
passed that explains why I acquired this power. I acquired this power or
ability because of the studies I have done, not because time has passed. I
have to confess I don’t understand why Taylor needs his sixth assumption.
It seems to me that his argument does not rest upon this innocuous and
plausible assumption.
The fifth assumption is the most important. It appears to be innocuous.
In fact, it is mostly because of this assumption that we are able to reach the
fatalistic conclusion. The assumption states that no agent can perform an
act at a time if there is lacking at least one condition necessary, at the same
or any other time, for the occurrence of that act. For instance, I can’t buy
a car if I don’t have enough money, because having enough money is a
necessary condition for the purcase. Or, I can’t survive if there’s no oxygen
around, because the presence of oxygen is necessary for life. The list goes
on. I can’t see if I am blind. I can’t have a drink with Socrates if Socrates
is dead. These seems to be all straightforward and uncontroversial claims.
Taylor argues that these claims are true in virtue of the principle captured
by his fifth presupposition.
We are now in a position to analyze the argument. First of all, Taylor
invites us to consider the following situation. Suppose that if today I read
on a completely reliable newspaper an headline which states that there
has been a sea battle yesterday, then yesterday there has been a sea battle,
whereas if I read another kind of headline on the same newspaper, then
yesterday no sea battle occurred. That is, the state of affairs of me reading
today an headline which states that there has been a sea battle is sufficient
for the occurrence of a sea battle yesterday, and, reading another kind of
headline is sufficient for the sea battle non-occurrence. We name the states
of affairs of me reading the first kind of headline and me reading the second
kind h and h′, whereas b and and b′ stand for the sea battle occurrence and
non-occurrence. We then have
(20) h→ b
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(21) h′ → b′
Imagine then that I am about to perform the act of reading the newspa-
per. If someone were to claim that it is within my power to read the first
kind of headline and it is within my power to read the second kind, which
we may express modally like this
(22) ^h ∧^h′
then, everybody would agree that he or she has said something false.
The battle either occurred yesterday or did not, and the newspaper head-
line reliably depends on what occurred yesterday. Furthermore, what I
am about to read depends on something which is now beyond my control,
namely what happened yesterday. If it were within my power to bring
about the state of affairs h, and it were within my power to bring about
h′, necessarily it would be the case that it is within my power to bring
about a state of affairs sufficient for the past to change, given that we have
(20) and (21). Hence, (22) must be false. Taylor argues that the reason
why (22) is false can be explained by an argument which adopts the six
presuppositions we have been talking about.
Fatalism toward the past
(23) Either a sea battle occurred yesterday, or no sea battle occurred
yesterday.
(24) If a sea battle occurred yesterday, then there is lacking a necessary
condition for the act of reading the second kind of headline. So, it
is not within my power to read the second kind of headline.
(25) If no seabattle occurred yesterday, then there is lacking a necessary
condition for the act of reading the first kind of headline. So, it is
not within my power to read the first kind of headline.
(26) Hence, Either it is not within my power to read the second kind
of headline or it is not within my power to read the first kind of
headline.
The conclusion is a proper denial of (22). In fact, (26) states that at least one
of the two conjuncts of (22) is false. It is easy to see that the argument just
given employs Taylor’s assumptions. Premise (23) is just an instance of
LEM. Premise (24) utilizes the assumptions on the nature of the sufficient
and necessary relations together with the fifth assumption. By reasoning
under the hypothesis that a sea battle occurred yesterday, we have the
result that a condition necessary for reading the second kind of headline
is lacking. Hence, via the fifth assumption, it is not within my power to
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read the second kind of headline. Premise (25) is of course analogous, and
then, by assuming classical logic, the conclusion logically follows, because
the argument has the form of a disjunctive dilemma.
To sum up, the argument for fatalism toward the past appears to be
correct, and everybody should be willing to assent to it. The problem is,
and Taylor insists on this, that a parallel argument can be given when there
is a lack of a necessary condition in the future rather than in the past like
in the headline case.
Here is the further example Taylor provides. Suppose I am an admiral
who is about to issue an order to my fleet. If I issue a certain order, then
a sea battle will occur tomorrow. If I don’t or I give another order, no sea
battle will occur tomorrow. If we name o, o′, b and b′respectively the states
of affairs of me issuing the battle order, not issuing it, and the sea battle
occurrence and non occurrence we have that
(27) o→ b
(28) o′ → b′
We can now provide the Taylor argument to show that only one be-
tween two alternative courses of action can be within my power. The
argument is the same as the one gave above, we just need to change some
tenses.
Fatalism towards the Future
(29) Either a sea battle will occur tomorrow, or it won’t.
(30) If a sea battle will not occur tomorrow, then there is lacking a
necessary condition for the act of issuing the battle order. So, it is
not within my power to issue the battle order.
(31) If a sea battle will occur tomorrow, then there is lacking a necessary
condition for the act refraining from issuing the battle order. So, it
is not within my power to not issue the battle order.
(32) Hence, either it is not within my power to issue the battle order or
it is not within my power to refrain from issuing it.
Again, the conclusion states that among two mutually exclusive and
exhaustive courses of event, only one of them is within my power and
open to me. Needless to say, this kind of argument can be generalized
to any agent and any act, every time we have the kind of sufficient and
necessary relations Taylor uses.
Does the conclusion stated by Taylor’s argument amount to the kind of
fatalism we are interested in? We have seen that the core fatalist claim has
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a conditional form. It states that if something happens, then it is necessary
that it happens. Or, equivalently, if something does not happen, then it is
impossible that it does. (32) instead has a disjunctive form. The answer
to the previous question is in the affirmative. (32) can be transformed to
the conditional fatalistic claims with the help of LEM. That is, either I give
the sea battle order or I don’t. Suppose I do. Clearly then, it is within
my power to give the order. This means that the first disjunct of (32) is
false and the second must be true. The second disjunct states that it is not
within my power to refrain from issuing the order, which is equivalent
to saying that issuing the order is necessary. So, If I issue the sea battle
order, I necessarily do so. Suppose instead that I don’t issue the order.
Then, it is within my power to refrain from issuing the order. Under this
hypothesis, the second disjunct of (32) is false and thus the first must be
true. And the first just states that it impossible for me to issue the sea battle
order. Hence, If I don’t issue it, it is impossible that I do so. We could
state the same result in a more formal way. That is, we can show in modal
formal discourse how the scheme A → A and ¬A → ¬^A follows from
the schema ¬^A ∨ ¬^¬A, whose Taylor’s argument conclusion (32) is an
instance.
1 ¬^A ∨ ¬^¬A (32)
2 ^A→ A 1, PL
3 A→ ^A T ^
4 A→ A 2,3
5 A→ A T
6 ^A→ A 2,5
7 ¬A→ ¬^A 6, PL
Step (1) is the schema Taylor’s argument is an instance of, which is
logically equivalent to step (2). Steps (3) and (5) are instances of the modal
schema T and its dual, a schema which a fatalist better accept, in order
to avoid bizarre results11. Steps (4) and (7) are what we were looking for.
Hence, Taylor’s argument conclusion can be reduced to a more standard
fatalistic form. That is, what happens is necessary and what does not is
impossible.
11It will be clarified in section 1.3 why this must be so.
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Taylor’s Argument Modal Structure
In order to provide a better understanding of Taylor’s argument, I will give
its modal structure. I go back to the modal language L already introduced
in section 1.2.1. In particular we should bear in mind that all the sentences
of L contain a reference to a time and express tenseless propositions with
a time index in their content. The notion of necessity, and consequently
of possibility, at stake within the fatalist debate is the notion of historical
necessity. Fatalism is an agent-centered doctrine, in the sense that it is
interested in what agents can or cannot do at a certain time. Hence, it is
mainly focused on those sentences of L such that they are about an agent
doing something at a certain time — we can name this subset of L, L′. It
is natural to interpret historical necessity as applied to atomic sentences
of L′ with the modal notion of ’being within one’s power at time T‘. For
instance, a formula like ^p, where p expresses the proposition that Jones
RAISE his right hand at T, has to be read as “it is within Jones’s power to
raise his right hand at T”.
That being said, we can modally express Taylor’s fifth assumption, that
is
Fifth, we presuppose that no agent can perform any given act if
there is lacking, at the same or any other time, some condition
necessary for the occurrence of that act.
. We modally express it through the following schema
(5th) ((A→ B) ∧ ¬B)→ ¬^A
which is treated as a theorem by Taylor. Then the argument for fatalism
toward the future can be modally given as follows.
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1 o↔ ¬o′
2 o→ b
3 ¬o→ ¬b
4 b ∨ ¬b LEM
5 b Hyp
6 b↔ ¬¬b PL
7 ((¬o→ ¬b) ∧ ¬¬b)→ ¬^¬o 5th
8 ¬^¬o 3,5,6
9 b→ ¬^¬o 5 — 8
10 ¬b Hyp
11 ((o→ b) ∧ ¬b)→ ¬^o 5th
12 ¬^o 2, 10
13 ¬b→ ¬^o 10 — 12
14 ¬^¬o ∨ ¬^o 4,9,13
Step 1-2-3 are justified by how the order-sea battle example is built.
Then, the argument starts with an instance of LEM. The argument is valid
in virtue of its disjunctive dilemma form. The last step is Taylor’s argument
conclusion for fatalism toward the future.
Standard responses
Most of objections toward Taylor’s argument focus on the schema^A→ A,
which as we have seen is derivable via the schema T from (32), i.e. Taylor’s
argument conclusion in the argument for fatalism towards the future. For
instance, Saunders (1962) argues as follows in one of his replies to Taylor.
in order to enjoy whatever situation we might desire, we need
not go to the trouble to bring them about; or, rather, to bring
them about we have only to acquire the power to bring them
about (p.67)
The bottom line of this passage is that it is bizarre to hold such a view.
It is bizarre to claim that a mere power to perform an act φ is sufficient
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for the occurrence of that act. Admittedly, a modal fatalist thinks so and
this is indeed a strange result. But, at least two things can be said as a
rejoinder. First of all, to point out that a doctrine is strange or counter-
intuitive does not by any means harm the consistency or truth of that
doctrine. Many metaphysical doctrines, and scientific theories as well,
have counter-intuitive bizarre results. The consequence of modal fatalism
pointed out by Saunders is strange, just because modal fatalism is strange.
Again, this should not count as a good reason to refute modal fatalism.
Second of all, we have seen above that the schema^A→ A and the schema
¬^¬A∨¬^A are intertwined. That is, one can derive the former from the
latter via T, and vice versa12. The schema ¬^¬A ∨ ¬^A is just the idea
that the future is closed, because it amounts to the thought that among two
alternative courses of events only one is open. Rejecting ^A→ A implies
a rejection of ¬^¬A ∨ ¬^A as well. That is, if Saunders’s objection were
conclusive, we would have an argument for the openness of the future which
lies solely on the intuitive weirdness of a statement which is equivalent to
the closeness of the future. Such an argument clearly won’t do, and thus
neither Saunder’s objection does. Metaphysical theories should rest on
something more than intuitive appeal.
There is another and more compelling objection which comes again
from Saunders. Again, the objection is against the truth of the schema
^A→ A and Taylor’s fifth presupposition. Here is Saunders (1962).
Now to point out that this supposition is, indeed, erroneous.
My knocking upon a thin wooden door is a sufficient condition
for the door shacking. Hence the door’s shaking is a necessary
condition for my knoking upon the door. But the door’s shaking
is not a necessary condition for my ability to knock upon the
door.... I may decide not to knock upon and the door may not
shake, but it does not follow that I did not have it in my power
to knock. (p.54)
We must first notice that Saunders here implicitly equates the notion of
having an ability and the notion of having it within someone’s power to.
This is so because Saunders switches between the two expressions in the
quoted passage, thereby treating them as they were one and the same. I
think this is the main flaw of Saunder’s reply to the Taylor’s argument. But
before arguing for this, let us see how Saunders objection can be analyzed.
It attacks the fifth presupposition, which is employed by Taylor in the
12We have seen above as ^A → A can be derived from ¬^¬A ∨ ¬^A via T. How
¬^¬A ∨ ¬^A can be derived from ^A→ A will be shown in section 1.3.2.
CHAPTER 1. A JOURNEY INTO FATALISM 54
premises (30) and (31) of his argument for fatalism toward the future. Let
us take (30)
(30) If a sea battle will not occur tomorrow, then there is lacking a
necessary condition for the act of issuing the battle order. So, it is
not within my power to issue the battle order.
Saunders would reason as follows about this premise. He would say
that the occurrence of the battle tomorrow is a necessary condition for my
giving the battle order today. But, he would go on, the battle tomorrow
is not a necessary condition for my ability to issue the battle order. Hence,
under the hypothesis that a sea battle does not occur tomorrow, it follows
only that I do not issue the order, not that I don’t have the ability to do so.
It might be the case that I do not issue the battle order, and yet I have the
ability to issue it — because, for instance, I know how to issue orders, I
know the proper words to use, my mouth muscles are properly functioning
and so on. In such case, even if a sea battle does not occur tomorrow and
hence I do not issue the battle order, I have the ability to issue it. Thus,
by equating the talk about powers and the one about abilities, in such case
it would be within my power to issue the battle order. This of course,
provides also a counterexample to^A→ A. If things are as Saunders says,
it might be that it is within my power to issue the order and yet I don’t
issue it. This way, the premise (30) — and (31) as well — turns out to be
false, and thus Taylor’s argument for fatalism toward the future is blocked.
Taylor has an easy rejoinder against the kind of reasoning employed by
Saunders. Taylor observes that if Saunders objection against the argument
for fatalism toward the future is sound, then we will also have good reasons
to reject the argument for fatalism toward the past. Let us take one of the
premises of the argument for fatalism toward the past, (24).
(24) If a sea battle occurred yesterday, then there is lacking a necessary
condition for the act of reading the second kind of headline. So, it
is not within my power to read the second kind of headline.
Now, Taylor observes, I certainly have the ability to read an headline
which states that no sea battle occurred yesterday, even though a sea battle
did occur yesterday and the newspaper is completely reliable. This is so
because I know how to read, my eyes and my brain are properly working,
and so on. So, by following the kind of reasoning Saunders employed and
by equating the talk about powers and abilities as he does, it might be
the case that when a sea battle did occur yesterday and the newspaper is
reliable, it is within my power to read an headline which states that no sea
battle occurred. But, performing such an act is sufficient for there being
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peace yesterday. At this point, Taylor invokes what is traditionally called
the transfer principle.
Transfer Priciple. If it is within an agent x power to φ, and φ implies
ψ, then it is within x’s power to bring about that ψ.
The transfer principle is intuitively strong. If it is within my power
to swim, and swimming implies water disturbance in the water, then it is
within my power to bring about that there is water disturbance. And, in
virtue of the transfer principle, if it is within my power to read an headline
which says that no sea battle occurred, when in fact it did, and reading
such an headline is sufficient for the non-occurrence of it, then it is within
my power to bring about that no sea battle occurred yesterday when in
fact it did. And this result is of course absurd. To sum up, Taylor reasons
as follows with his rejoinder. If we accept Saunders objection against the
argument for fatalism toward the future, then we have a parallel objection
against the argument for fatalism toward the past. If so, by denying
fatalism toward the future, we end up with the absurd result that it may
be sometimes in our power to change what happened in the past.
I find Taylor’s rejoinder successful against Saunders’ objection. And,
more can be said about this. We have seen that Saunders implicitly equates
the notions of having the ability and have it within one’s power. I think
those two notions should be clearly distinct. To show why things are so, let
us take an example which has been discussed within the literature about
Taylor’s argument. Take a professional pole-vaulter who often pole vaults
14 feet. Suppose he now finds himself in a room where the ceiling is 10
feet high. We do say that he has the ability to pole vault 14 feet, yet it is
not now within his power to pole vault 14 feet in a room 10 feet high. This
should suffice to show that, contrary to what Saunders implicitly assumed,
there is a distinction to be made here between the two notions. Powers and
abilities behave differently. Abilities generally depend on things which are
internal with respect to the agent. I can, in the ability sense, walk because
my human body allows me to do so. I can read, because I have been
trained to do so. I can swim if I have successfully taken swimming classes.
Rather, what is and what is not within my power, depend surely on my
abilities, but also on external circumstances. I can’t, it is not within my
power to, walk if I am tied up in a chair. I can’t read if there is no light.
I can’t swim if there is no water around. Moreover, agents usually keep
the abilities they have throughout their whole life, once they have learned
them. Unless something really damaging happens to me, I am likely to
keep my ability to read for the rest of my life. On the contrary, powers
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are continuously lost and gained through time, because they depend also
on external circumstances, which quite obviously constantly change too
throughout time. It is clear that what is at stake in the fatalist debate is
what is possible and what is not possible for an agent at a specific time
under specific external circumstances. Hence, the notion of having within
one’s power is what we should be interested in.
There is another objection which can be raised against Taylor argument,
and again it has to do with his fifth presupposition. We have seen that we
can treat it modally as follows.
(5th) ((A→ B) ∧ ¬B)→ ¬^A
We should note that this schema is valid in few models. It turns out
to be valid just in those models where the accessibility relation has the
property of vacuity.
Vacuity. If αRβ, then α = β
And the Taylor’s argument conclusion, namely ¬^A ∨ ¬^¬A as well
is valid in all models where the relation of accessibility has that property
of vacuity. So, one might argue that Taylor’s argument begs the question,
because the fifth assumption already has the fatalistic conclusion in its
pockets. However, I don’t think this would be a fair objection. Modal
logic is just a means to regiment our discourses, and it must be neutral
with respect to our metaphysical preferences. And, the fact that fatalism
follows from Taylor fifth — together with the other — assumptions is
precisely what Taylor wanted to prove. He has independent reasons to
think that his fifth presupposition should be accepted, for instance the fact
that it explains why the argument for fatalism toward the past is correct.
Another possible move one could make has to do with the notion of a
necessary condition for performing an act. One might argue that necessary
conditions for performing an act always lie in the past with respect to the
performance of that act. This way, the argument for fatalism toward the
future would be refuted, whereas the argument for fatalism toward the
past would be retained. Indeed, a very good results. Yet, such a move
would be highly problematic for at least two reasons. First of all, it seems
to be ad hoc. Whether the future must be treated like the past with respect
to its openness or closure is precisely what is at stake in the fatalism/anti-
fatalism debate. Saying that there aren’t future necessary conditions for
a present performance of an act seems to be justified either only by our
pre-theoretical attitudes toward the future or by the fact that we don’t want
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modal fatalism to hold with respect to the future. In the former case, it
would be just a matter of intuitions, which a fatalist could after all not share.
In the latter case, this response would be just a rejection and not a refutation.
Second of all, by saying that there aren’t future necessary conditions for
a present performance of an act we are equivalently saying that a present
performance of an act can never be sufficient for the occurrence of a future
state of affairs. Again, a conclusion which seems worse than fatalism.
To sum up, I find Taylor’s argument powerful and compelling. Its
nature is surely puzzling and as we showed, it is not easy to come up
with good reasons to block the argument. All the responses we have been
talking about suffer of flaws. I will argue in section 1.3.3 that Taylor’s
argument proves too much, and thus it cannot be entirely trusted.
1.3 Again on Definitions
In this section I am going to discuss to a greater extent the modal claims
which constitute modal fatalism. Before doing so, I introduce another bit
of modal logic. Ultimately, I will show what I think is wrong with the Main
Argument and Taylor’s.
1.3.1 Another bit of Modal Logic
We introduced in section 1.2.1 some modal logic concepts. In this one
we are going to say something more about validity and the accessibility
relation. I will rely again on Chellas (1980). We have seen that there is an
interesting notion of validity. A schema may be valid in a class of models
— that is, the schema is true in all possible worlds in all models which
belong to that class. Classes of models can be determined via the nature
of their accessibility relation. As we have seen, the accessibility relation
R in a model tells us what worlds are accessible to other worlds in that
model. Relations may have properties. For instance, a relation R in a
model M is said to be transitive if and only if for any α, β and γ, it is the
case in M that if αRβ and βRγ, then αRγ. The class of all models where
R is transitive is the set of all models such that their accessibility relation
satisfies transitivity. A model where R is, say transitive, is itself said to be
transitive. The class of transitive models is the set of all transitive models
. What is philosophically interesting is that different accessibility relations
validate different scheme.
It turns out that there is a general accessibility relation, k,l,m,n-incestuality,
which provides general results in terms of what schemas are validated by
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R’s properties.
k,l,m,n-incestuality A relation R in a model M is k,l,m,n-incestual if and
only if for any α, β and γ in M, if αRkβ and αRmγ, then there is a δ in M
such that βRlδ and γRnδ.
By αRnβ, with n≥0, we mean that the world β can be reached from α in
n steps, via the accessibility relation. For instance, αR2β means that there
is a world γ such that αRγ and γRβ. αR0βmeans that α is β. R1 is simply R
itself. Similarly, we can write formulas like nA to mean that the box sign
is repeated n times. For instance, 2A means A. Truth conditions for
such formulas are as follows. nA is true in the model M at the world α iff
for every β such that αRnβ, A is true at β in M. ^n A is true in the model M
at the world α iff for some β such that αRnβ, A is true at β in M.
It can be proven that the schema Gk,l,m,n is valid in the class of k,l,m,n-
incestual models13
Gk,l,m,n. ^klA→ m^nA.
This gives the general result that if we are given any schema which can be
expressed by filling numbers in Gk,l,m,n, we automatically have a relation of
accessibility which is sufficient to validate that schema. For instance, the
schema 4
4. A→ A
is Gk,l,m,n where l=1, m=2 and k=n=0. This means that a 0,1,2,0-incestual
model validates the schema 4.
0,1,2,0-incestuality A relation R in a model M is 0,1,2,0-incestual if and
only if for any α, β and γ in M, if αR0β and αR2γ, then there is a δ in M such
13Here is an informal proof. Let α be an arbitrary world in an arbitrary model M which
is k,l,m,n-incestual. We then assume the antecedent of Gk,l,m,n. It follows that there is a β
such that αRkβ and it is true at β in M that lA. We wish to prove that it is true at α in M
that m^nA. That is, we wish to prove that for any world such that αRmit, it is the case in
that world that there is at least a world n steps away from it where A is true. So, we pick
an arbitrary world, call it γ such that αRmγ. Given that αRkβ and αRmγ, and the model is
k,l,m,n-incestual, there is a world, say δ, such that βRlδ and γRnδ. Given that lA is true
at β in M, every world l steps away from β is a world where A holds. Hence, it is true at δ
that A. We wished to prove that at our arbitrary γ there is at least one world n steps away
from γ where A holds. δ can serve such a purpose, given that k,l,m,n incestuality states
that γRnδ and A holds at δ.
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that βR1δ and γR0δ.
which is for any α, β and γ in M, if α=β and αR2γ, then there is a δ in M
such that βRδ and γ=δ. Which is, if αRγ in two steps, then there is a world
δ in the model, which is γ itself, which is seen by α in just one step. And
this is just a way to express transitivity, i.e. the idea that if αRβ and βRγ,
then αRγ. Hence, transitive models validate the schema 4.
1.3.2 Modal Fatalism Principles
We have already seen that modal fatalism has to do with what agents can
or cannot do. Its formulation employs modal notions and the specific sense
of “can” at stake is what is possible and what is not possible for an agent
at a specific time under specific circumstances. We have seen in section
1.2.3 that the notion of having within one’s power seems to capture this
idea, and we expressed this notion with the modal symbol^. For instance,
a formula like ^p, where p expresses the proposition that Jones RAISE his
right hand at T, has to be read as “it is within Jones’s power to raise his right
hand at T”. Under this interpretation of the ^ symbol in terms of powers,
it is natural to take the  symbol as the dual of ^. That is, we have as a
theorem in L A ↔ ¬^¬A. p, which is equivalent to ¬^¬p, has to be
read as “it is not the case that it is within Jones’s power to refrain from
raising his right hand at T”.
We characterized in section 1.1.2 modal fatalism as the idea that for any
agent, for any act and for any time, the agent has not within his or her
power to act otherwise than he or she actually does. Another definition
of modal fatalism is the idea that whatever happens, it is necessary that it
happens and what does not, it is impossible that it happens. We can start
from this last definition and give it modally as the schema Tc.
Tc. A→ A
which is a theorem if and only if its dual Tc^ is a theorem14.
14If the schema Tc is a theorem, then ¬A→ ¬A is a theorem, which is logically
equivalent to¬¬A→A, which in turn is equivalent to^A→A in virtue of the definition
of ^. As for the other side, if Tc^ is a theorem, then ^¬ A→ ¬ A is a theorem, which is
logically equivalent to A→ ¬^¬A, which in turn is equivalent to A→ A in virtue of the
meaning of .
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Tc^. ^A→ A
Tc, or equivalently Tc^, taken as theorems deliver in modal terms the
idea that no agent has ever the power to do otherwise than what he or she
in fact does. For instance, if A is, say, “Jones raises his right hand at T”, and
it is the case that A, it follows via Tc by modus ponens that it is not the case
that it is within Jones’ power to refrain from raising his right hand at T.
That is, it is not within John’s power to do otherwise than raising his right
hand at T. It must also be noted that Tc is what the Main Argument aims to
prove. The reader should remember that the Main Argument starts with
claims like “Suppose Jones raises his right hand at T” and it eventually
conclude that if so, it is not within Jones’ power to refrain from raising his
right hand. Moreover, from Tc, or equivalently Tc^, taken as theorems, we
can derive Taylor’s argument conclusion in its form ¬^A ∨¬^¬A.
1 A ∨ ¬A PL
2 ^A→ A Tc^
3 ¬A→ ¬^A 2, PL
4 ^¬A→ ¬A Tc^
5 A→ ¬^¬A 4, PL
6 ¬^A ∨ ¬^¬A 1, 3, 5, PL
We are now in a position to exploit the k,l,m,n-incestuality we have
been talking about in the previous section. In fact, Tc has the form of Gk,l,m,n
where m=1 and k=l=n=0. 0,0,1,0-incestual models will validate Tc.
0,0,1,0-incestuality A relation R in a model M is 0,0,1,0-incestual if and
only if for any α, β and γ in M, if αR0β and αR1γ, then there is a δ in M such
that βR0δ and γR0δ.
0,0,1,0-incestuality informally means that if a world α Rs something,
say γ, then there is a world δ, which is α itself in virtue of the identities,
which is seen by α. This property is generally named vacuity.
Vacuity. For every α and for every β, If αRβ, then α=β .
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That is, either α is blind or at most it sees itself. Such models validate
the fatalistic formulas Tc, Tc^ and Taylor’s conclusion15.
It must be noted that vacuity by itself can produce bizarre results. For
instance, at some worlds in vacuous models formulas like A∧¬^ A — the
impossible happens — ¬^A∧¬^¬A — some act is neither within one’s
power, nor is not-doing it — A ∧ ¬A — two mutually exclusive events
are both necessary — are true. All these bizarre results are due to the fact
that vacuity does not guarantee that a world sees at least one world. It
leaves open the possibility of blind worlds, and in those world those three
bizarre formulas turn out to be true. A modal fatalist better not have those
formulas. The right move to do is to accept also reflexivity.
Reflexivity. For every α, αRα.
It can be shown that reflexivity is 0,1,0,0-incestuality. Hence, reflexive
models validate T and its dual T^
T. A→A T^. A→ ^A
These two principles are quite natural to accept for a modal fatalist.
The former says that whatever is necessary it happens, while the latter
says that whatever happens is possible. Under the interpretation of modal
symbols in terms of powers, T says that if it not the case, say, that it is
within my power to refrain from φing at T, then I φ at T. T^ says that if I φ
at T, then it is within my power to φ at T. These claims are uncontroversial
and not in need of an explanation16
To sum up, vacuous models captures the modal fatalist principles Tc,
15It is interesting to note that, whereas vacuity validates Tc, Tc^, and Taylor’s conclu-
sion, there is a relation of accessibility which validate Taylor’s conclusion but not Tc and
Tc^. In fact, Taylor’s conclusion ¬^A ∨ ¬^¬A is equivalent to G1,0,1,0 in virtue of propo-
sitional logic, that is ^A → A. This means that 1,0,1,0-incestuality validates Taylor’s
conclusion. The property of 1,0,1,0-incestuality is for any α, for any β, for any γ, If αRβ
and αRγ then for some δ, β=δ and γ=δ. That is, a world sees at most one world. This
shows why if Tc, or equivalently its dual Tc^, is a theorem, then also Taylor’s conclusion
is a theorem, whereas the converse does not hold. Tc, or equivalently its dual Tc^, cannot
be derived from Taylor’s conclusion, unless T is also a theorem.
16We should also note that a modal fatalist who accepts T, T^, Tc and Tc^ has as a
consequence a collapse of modalities. From T and T^we have ^A→ A, in virtue of the
transitivity of conditionals. From Tc and Tc^ we have A→ ^A, again in virtue of the
transitivity of conditionals. In few steps we realize that then we have that A↔A↔ ^A.
This collapse might seem unpleasant. In fact, it is not and it might count as an interesting
modal logic. Again, it appears to be strange just because modal fatalism is strange. A
fatalist might not agree on our judgement about what is strange and what is not.
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Tc^ and Taylor’s argument conclusion. A modal fatalist should also have
reflexivity in order to capture uncontroversial claims about powers and to
avoid the bizarre results we have seen.
1.3.3 What is wrong with the Main Argument and Taylor’s
In the previous sections we talked about the Main Argument and Taylor’s
one. Here I want to say what I think is a common flaw for both arguments.
Both of them conflate deterministic and non-deterministic scenarios. We
can loosely characterize determinism as the theory which apply or not
apply to systems of Laws of Nature. A system of Laws of Nature is
deterministic if and only if the system is such that a single instantaneous
state of the world together with the Laws of Nature provides an unique
way things are at all other times. That is, a single instantaneous way the
world is has an unique past and future history which is in accordance with
Laws of Nature. On the contrary, non-deterministic systems of Laws of
Nature allow for more than one history which is compatible with a single
instantaneous state of the world.
Here is a simple case of a non-determinstic scenario. I borrow the
following example about Quantum Mechanics from Albert (1992). We
need to tell a short story about electrons and their color and hardness17.
Hardness and color are two measurable properties of electrons. It hap-
pens that those properties can assume only two possible values. Electrons
can be either black or white, and can be either hard or soft. We have de-
vices which are able to perfectly measure those properties. We call these
devices hardness box and color box. These property measurements are
repeatable. An electron which is measured to be, say, hard at a time, will
be measured to be hard later on, if no tampering with it occurs between
the two measurements. Also, there are no correlations between the two
properties. Half of the electrons which are measured to be black and have
then their hardness measured are found to be hard, whereas half of them
are measured to be soft. Similarly for the white ones, and for the color of
hard and soft ones. There is an experiment which can be carried out which
has surprising results. We need three measurement boxes, two color boxes
and one hardness box. We first feed a set of electrons in the first color box.
Half of the electrons will be measured white and half of them black. We
17Of course electrons do not have the properties of color and hardness. Albert uses
those terms to talk about incompatible properties like the angular momentum with which
an electron spins around an axis and the angular momentum with which it spins around
another axis. Talking about hardness and color just makes it easier to illustrate what is
going on.
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take the white ones and we feed them in the hardness box. Half of them
will be measured to be hard, and half of them soft. We now take those
electrons which were measured to be white by the first color box and mea-
sured to be soft by the second hardness box and we feed them in the third
color box. We expect that those electrons should be measured to be white,
because that is how their color was measured by the first color box. As a
matter of fact, this is not what happens. Half of them will be measured
to be white, and half of them will be measured to be black. The hardness
box in the middle of the process seemed to randomize the color of white
electrons which were fed in. This is an example of the uncertainty princi-
ple. Electrons with a definite color don’t have a definite hardness property,
and viceversa. Thus, we can never say that an electron has a certain color
property and a certain hardness property. It can be proved that this is not
a matter of our ignorance or a lack of proper measurement devices. This is
how things fundamentally are. The point that interests us here is that we
have a case where the exact same initial conditions give rise to different
outcomes. We take the electrons which were measured to be white by the
first box and soft by the second one. As we have said, half of them will be
measured white and half of them black. It can also be proven that there
are no hidden variables here which would explain which electrons will be
measured white and which of them will be measured black. If you take an
electron which is about to enter the third box, two outcomes are possible,
i.e. two possible future continuations. It will either be measured to be
white or to be black. Same initial conditions, two possible outcomes.
We now apply the Main Argument and Taylor’s one to this electron
story. Let us say that at T the electron is about to enter the third box, and
at T1 is measured to be black. Now, we apply to this scenario the Main
Argument.
The (correct) Electron Main Argument
Suppose the electron is measured to be black at T1. From this it follows
that the proposition that the electron BE black at T1 is true at T1. If such
proposition is true at T1, then it is always true (i.e. true at all times). Then,
(33) Necessarily, it was true at T that the electron BE black at T1.
(34) Necessarily, if it was true at T that the electron BE black at T1, then
the electron is black at T1.
(35) Therefore, it is not the case that it is within the electron’s power to
be measured white at T1.
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Talking about what is within the electron’s power may sound odd and a
categorical mistake, given that an electron is an inanimate entity. If so, one
can replace it with what is or is not within the electron’s capability. What
I want to highlight is that according to the Main Argument applied to the
electron case, if the electron is measured to be black at T1, it was necessary
at T that it would be measured so. But this is clearly a wrong result. We
have experimental evidence that at T it was possible for the electron to be
measured white instead of black. The Main Argument proves too much.
It applies necessity where there should not be any necessity. In other
words, by applying necessity to every event, it conflates deterministic and
non-deterministic cases.
Taylor’s argument suffers the same flaw. We consider again the three
boxes case to show why. Suppose a reliable observer is observing the mea-
surement of the third box. If the electron is measured to be black, then the
observer believes the electron is black. If the electron is measured to be
white, then the observer believes the electron is white. This is what it is to
be a reliable observer of the measurement of the third color box. Now, this
gives us the kind of sufficient and necessary relations among state of affairs
which Taylor exploits in his argument. We now apply Taylor’s argument.
Fatalism towards the Future
(36) Either the observer will believe the electron is black, or she will
believe the electron is white.
(37) If she will believe the electron is black, then there is lacking a nec-
essary condition for the electron to be white. So, it is not within the
electron’s capability to be white.
(38) If she will believe the electron is white, then there is lacking a
necessary condition for the electron to be black. So, it is not within
the electron’s capability to be black.
(39) Hence, either it is not within the electron’s capability to be white or
it is not within the electron’s capability to be black.
Again, the delivered result is wrong. It was possible for the electron
to be measured white, and it was possible for the electron to be measured
black. And this contrasts with the Taylor’s argument applied to the electron
case.
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1.4 Why I am not worried
Fatalism is often seen as an untenable doctrine. The fact that everything
that happens is necessary and what does not is impossible seem to imply
undesirable consequences. It might seem that any action we decide to do
would be in vain. It might seem also that the process of deliberation would
be futile. And ultimately, it might seem that we are unable to make sense
of the moral sphere. I will argue in the next sections that a reasonable
fatalist can resort to strategies to resist these dreadful conclusions. The
reader should bear in mind that a reasonable fatalist is a kind of modal
fatalist. Modal fatalism amounts to the acceptance of the Powerlessness
thesis. Reasonable fatalism accepts the Causal Connectedness thesis as
well.
1.4.1 Lazy Argument
One of the main critics against fatalism has to do with the fact that if a
future event is fated to happen, then it is pointless to make any effort to
bring it about its occurrence or prevent it from happening. In other words,
it might seem that fatalism implies that goal-directed actions are pointless.
This does violence to our common understanding of how our world works.
Usually, idle people do not get almost anything out of their lives, whereas
people who make efforts to achieve the results they want do. The Lazy
Argument is a classic argument against the doctrine of fatalism, because
it tries to move from fatalism toward the counter-intuitive idea that goal-
directed actions are pointless. It may be stated as follows, where A stands
for a sentence about a future event and φ stands for a verb expressing an
action predicate.
Lazy Argument schema
(40) either it is fated that A or it is fated that not-A
(41) If it is fated that A, then, whether or not you φ, A
(42) If it is fated that not-A, then, whether or not you φ, not- A
(43) Therefore, with regard to A, it is futile to φ
The steps just given provide us with an argument schema. By filling
the schema with the proper ingredients we end up having instances of the
Lazy Argument. By an action being futile with respect to a future event A,
we mean that that action would be a waste of time with respect to A. Maybe
φ could be pleasant or enjoyable for different reasons, but if it’s futile with
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respect to A, it means that it does not affect whether A will obtain or not.
So, even though the word “futile” does not explicitly appear in (41)-(42),
whereas it does in the conclusion, we can see that by “whether or not you
φ ” we mean that φ is futile18. This argument has the form of a disjunctive
dilemma and it is valid, hence it holds within classical logic. If the schema
is also sound, i.e. all its instances are sound, then a fatalist has a problem,
because it would follow that every action we take directed to a goal is futile.
Hence, a fatalist has to come up with a strategy. Of course,a modal fatalist
can’t deny the first premise. It is part of his or her doctrine that whatever
happens, is fated to happen in the relevant sense. Hence, given that A or
not-A will obtain, either A is fated to happen or not-A is. A modal fatalist
thus has to challenge the truth of at least one of the two other premises,
and I want to argue that reasonable fatalism can. Before seeing how this
could be done, it is worth making it clear what kind of conclusion the Lazy
Argument purports to prove. The conclusion of the Lazy Argument is not
full inertia and inactivity as the most rational course of action. Rather, its
conclusion is that between different courses of actions, we should always
prefer the most pleasant per se, i.e. the one which by itself brings the most
pleasure, regardless of what its consequences might be . Suppose I want
to pass an exam, that is, I want the future event of me passing the exam to
occur, and I am wondering whether I should study or watch a TV show.
By filling the Lazy Argument schema with the desired event and the two
alternative courses of actions, we end up having that with respect to the
exam, it is futile to study and it is futile to watch the TV show. That is, both
actions will not affect the outcome of my future exam. In fact, according
to the Lazy Argument, any action I take now would not affect the outcome
of my future exam. Thus, if the Lazy Argument is correct, full inactivity is
not necessarily the most rational thing to do. It is the most rational only
if it is the one that brings most pleasure. Rather, I should always prefer
the action which gives me immediate pleasure, which in some case might
be full inactivity. In the case under consideration, according to the Lazy
Argument, I better watch the TV show, because at least I would get joy out
of it and I would avoid the pain of studying.
These considerations just made give us an hint of why some instances
of the Lazy Argument can be considered fallacious by a reasonable fatalist.
The Lazy Argument hinges on the idea that there aren’t causal connections
18Dummett(1964) gave a vivid example of an instance of the Lazy Argument, which was
popular during the bombing of London during the Second World War. “Either you are
going to be killed by a bomb or you are not going to be. If you are, then any precautions
you take will be ineffective. If you are not, all precautions you take are superfluous.
Therefore it is pointless to take precautions.” (p.345)
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among the occurrence of events in our world. That is, the Lazy Argument
implicitly denies the Causal Connectedness claim we have seen in section
1.1.1— the idea that what happens at a time may causally depend on what
happens at other times. We have already seen that the kind of fatalism I
am interested in, reasonable fatalism, accepts that thesis. So, here is how
a reasonable fatalist can reject some instances of the Lazy Argument. First
of all, we should note that if a future event E is fated to happen, so are all
the events which constitute past necessary conditions for the occurrence
of E. Then, we should note that the occurrence of a necessary condition for
the future event E may be a cause of the occurrence of E, and in this sense
would not be futile. We use again the case of the exam, and we fill the
Lazy Argument schema in the proper way.
Studying for an exam
(44) either it is fated that I will pass the exam or it is fated that I will not.
(45) If it is fated that I will pass the exam, then, whether or not I study,
I will pass the exam.
(46) If it is fated that I will not pass the exam, then, whether or not I
study, I will not pass it.
(47) Therefore, with regard to me passing the exam, it is futile to study.
We assume then that I pass the exam only if I study. Then, premise (45)
can be disputed by a reasonable fatalist. First of all, if it is fated that I will
pass the exam, then I will pass the exam. But, we are assuming that I pass
the exam only if I study. Thus, it must be fated also that I study. Second
of all, we can see that there is the proper causal dependence between me
studying for the exam and me passing it. Suppose that I study and then I
pass the exam. The counterfactual which claims that had I not studied, I
would not have passed the exam turns out to be true. My studying made
a difference, and brought it about my success in the exam. Hence, it is not
futile. In this case, premise (45) turns out to be wrong.
We should note that the Lazy Argument sometimes delivers a correct
result. Suppose that the result of my exam is not determined by my
performance, but rather, the professor grades the assignments in a random
and arbitrary way. In this case, the argument given above is correct. If I
knew that the professor is going to grade the assignments in such way, the
most rational thing to do would be to enjoy myself, because my present
behaviour would not affect the future outcome of my exam.
To sum up, the Lazy Argument can be rejected by a modal fatalist who
believes in causal connections among events. What we do in the present
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can sometimes affect the way the future will be. Hence, in some cases, it
is rational to pursue those courses of actions which may be painful in the
present but which are going to produce a greater good in the future. The
fact that a future event is fated should not affect our decisions, because
the means which are going to bring about an end would also be fated and
necessary for its occurrence.
1.4.2 Deliberation
Some authors raised worries concerning fatalism and the process of human
deliberation. Aristotle made the following point, when he was discussing
the fatalistic idea that everything that happens, happens out of necessity.
there would be no need to deliberate or to take trouble (thinking
that if we do this, this will happen, but if we do not, it will not).
A reasonable fatalist does think that all events are necessary, and that
whatever actually happens is such that it can’t be otherwise. But, it hardly
follows that it is not the case that if I take a course of action, such and
such will then happen, and if I take a different course of action, something
else will happen. The fact that different courses of action bring about
different effects is simply due to causal connections among events, namely
something a reasonable fatalist can embrace without any problem. Hence,
this Aristotelian worry about deliberation applies only to lazy fatalism and
not to a modal fatalist who embraces the Causal Connectedness Thesis.
Van Inwagen (1983) raised another kind of worry. He starts by saying
that
the fatalist believes that if an agent is in fact going to do some
particular thing, then that thing is the only thing he can do, the
only thing it is open to him to do. (p.61)
This is certainly true for a modal fatalist. He then goes on by saying
And it seems to be a feature of our concept of deliberation that
we can deliberate about which of various mutually exclusive
courses of action to pursue only if we believe that each of these
courses of action is open to us. Therefore, anyone who accepts
fatalism... must, on pain of self-contradiction, refrain from
deliberating about future courses of action. (p.61)
We often spend time deliberating. And it is true that when we do so,
we believe that more than one course of action is open to us. Van Inwagen
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thinks that this, together with the belief in the truth of fatalism, gives rise to
a contradiction within the set of an agent’s beliefs. Say that I am choosing
between A and B, two mutually exclusive courses of action. Since I am
deliberating whether to do A or B, I believe that both A and B are open to
me, Van Inwagen would say. But, if I am a modal fatalist, I also think that
only one between A and B is open to me. And this undoubtedly would
amount to a contradiction in the set of my beliefs.
At least two responses are possible to this worry. The first one has to
do with practical considerations, whereas the second one has to do with
our limited knowledge of the future.
The first one is illustrated by Pereboom (2001).
...at the moment of choice, we must indeed make what might
well be the false and unjustified assumption that more than
one course of action is available to us. It then claims that it is
legitimate to assume this cognitive posture because the practi-
cal gains of engaging in deliberation are significant enough to
outweigh the losses of having false and unjustified beliefs. We
are left with the following choice: either deliberate and have
a belief that you know might well be false whenever you do,
or cease to deliberate. In this case, practical rationality would
appear to have the upper hand. (p.136)
I think this way of arguing properly takes care of the worry raised
by Van Inwagen. To this, I want to add that the false and unjustified
belief (if modal fatalism were true) that more than one course of action
is open to me does not have any practical loss. False beliefs generally
have a negative impact. Suppose I am deliberating about what stocks I
should buy from the market. False beliefs about the future market behavior
surely affect negatively the choice I am about to make, whereas true beliefs
are going to affect positively my choice. Or, suppose that I have the
false beliefs that if I do A, then such and such will happen and if I do B,
something else will happen. If those beliefs about the future consequences
of my actions are false, they are going to have a negative impact on my
process of deliberation, in the sense that I am likely to not achieve what I
want to achieve with my actions. But, the false and unjustified belief (if
modal fatalism were true) that more than one course of action is open, is
completely harmless with respect to a practical point of view. I simply can’t
see how this kind of belief would have any impact at all on my process of
deliberation.
The second response has to do with epistemic openness. If I am a
coherent modal fatalist, I do believe that only one between A and B is
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open to me. But I don’t know which one of the two options I am going
to choose, i.e. I don’t know what will happen, even though I believe that
what will happen will necessarily happen. Hence, I don’t believe that I
will do A and I don’t believe that I will do B. I am uncertain about what
I will eventually decide to do. And there is absolutely no contradiction
in this set of beliefs. In other words, the openness I believe in when I am
deliberating might be of an epistemic kind, in the sense that it is grounded
in my limited knowledge of the future, not in how things really are. The
future might very well be metaphysically closed and epistemically open.
How the world is now is compatible with just one possible continuation,
only one choice is really open, but the set of my beliefs might be compatible
with more than one option about my future choices. By saying that the
openness we believe in when we engage in deliberation is just epistemical,
the contradiction pointed out by Van Inwagen fades away19.
1.4.3 Moral Responsibility
Fatalism is often seen as a doctrine which does violence to our intuitions
and threatens our ordinary ways of thinking. One of the major worries
comes from considerations about moral responsibility. One might argue
that fatalism rules out moral responsibility and that this amounts to an
unpleasant result. My aim in this section is twofold. First, I wanna show
that a reasonable fatalist can endorse a moral principle which has nothing
to do with the concept of moral responsibility and can do a lot of explana-
tory job with regard to our moral attitudes. Second, I wanna show that
perhaps there is nothing wrong with abandoning the concept of moral
responsibility.
Here is one reason why modal fatalism seems to fail to make sense of
19I thank Andrea Iacona for pointing out to me a worry with respect to epistemic
openness. There seem to be cases where epistemic openness is irrelevant. Suppose I
want to have a drink and I don’t know whether there is wine or beer in my refrigerator,
and just one of the two is there. In such case, it is epistemically open whether I’ll have
beer or wine. However, it wouldn’t be rational to deliberate about what I will drink,
because the most rational thing to do would be to check the content of my refrigerator.
I think that a reasonable fatalist might respond that this case shows that it is rational to
collect information before deliberating, when it is possible to do so. However, I don’t
think this principle causes harm to the strategy of appealing to epistemic openness to
explain deliberation. Most of the cases regarding deliberations about future courses of
actions and their possible consequence are such that it is impossible to collect all the
relevant information, because what lies in the future is in general unknown to us. Hence,
epistemic openness might remain, in spite of the metaphysical closeness due to modal
fatalism.
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our moral lives. It comes from a very simple argument which combines
the so-called Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) and fatalism. Here
is the argument.
(PAP) A person is morally responsible for what he or she has done only
if he or she could have done otherwise
(48) No one has ever the power to do otherwise
(49) Hence, no one is ever morally responsible.
(48) expresses the fatalistic idea that for any action any person performed,
it is never the case that the person could have done otherwise than what
he or she has actually done. Combined with (PAP), we have the result
that no one is ever morally responsible. If we buy into another principle,
we can reach another conclusion. The principle I have in mind is one that
relates moral responsibility and the justice of punishments and rewards.
The principle, which I shall call the principle of Moral Responsibility (MR),
could be stated as follows.
(MR) A punishment (or reward) of a wicked (righteous) act is just only
if the person who acted can be held morally responsible for the act.
The acceptance of this principle, together with (49) gives us the corollary
that all punishments are unjust. Now, what could a reasonable fatalist say?
Of course, a reasonable fatalist can’t abandon (48), because it is the main
thesis of modal fatalism. And, no one can reasonably accept the conclusion
that all punishments we usually assign are morally wrong. For this would
amount to say that it is morally wrong to assign a fine to someone who
was driving his car so fast that he jeopardized other people’s lives or that it
is morally wrong to send to jail someone who deliberately killed someone
else. Such results are clearly to be avoided and I want to argue that there
are ways out for a reasonable fatalist to avoid this conclusion. A fatalist
could accept (49), the idea that no one is ever morally responsible, and
he or she could have a different account that explains why punishments
and rewards are just, even in the absence of moral responsibility. If so, we
could save the legitimacy and rationality of punishments and rewards we
usually assign.
Before showing how this strategy can be pursued, I want to say some-
thing about the quick argument from (PAP) and modal fatalism to (49).
The principle (PAP) is controversial. Frankfurt (1969) challenged it and
declared it wrong. He came up with counterexamples to that principle.
His strategy amounts to show that the power do to otherwise is not a nec-
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essary condition for moral responsibility. Fischer (1986) gives an example
of a Frankfurt case. The case involves Green, a man who saved a child
and has a microchip installed in his brain , which is controlled by a team
of scientists in California.
Though Green (the man who rescued the child) has had a device
implanted in his brain, the device does not play any role in
Green’s decision to save the child (and his subsequent action).
That is, the device monitors Green’s brain activity but does not
actually intervene in it. Let us suppose that this is because the
scientists can see that Green is about to decide to save the child
and to act accordingly. But let’s also suppose that the scientists
would have intervened to bring about a decision to save the
child if Green had shown an inclination to decide to refrain
from saving the child. That is, were Green inclined to decide
on his own not to save the child, the scientists would ensure
electronically that he decide to save the child and also that he
act to carry out his decision. (p.41)
This kind of cases can be seen as counterexample to (PAP). This is
so because it seems that Green couldn’t have done otherwise. It was
impossible for him to refrain from saving the child, because had he tried to
do so, the device implanted in his brain would have ensured the child save.
Yet, our moral intuitions inclines us to say that Green deserves credit for
what he did. He was in control of his decisions and behavior when he saved
the child, whereas the scientists in the lab who have the power to control
his brain didn’t play any causal role in this case. Hence, contrary to (PAP),
we have a case where it is true that the person is held morally responsible
for an act, even though he couldn’t have done otherwise. That being said, I
don’t think that Frankfurt cases would be of any help to the modal fatalist.
Sure, by denying (PAP) we would block the argument to (49). But, since
Green saved the child without any intervention by the California scientists
via the brain device, a reasonable fatalist needs to say that Green could
have not refrained from saving the child, and this is so independently of
considerations about the microchip in his head. So, I think a reasonable
fatalist should resort to another strategy. As I said before, I think the most
appropriate way would be to abandon moral responsibility and retain the
justness of punishments and rewards we usually assign. The principle
(MR) is the one a reasonable fatalist should question.
Can we call into question (MR)? Yes, if we have alternatives. And, there
are alternatives. A fatalist may think that punishments and rewards are
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just as long as they are effective. That is, we are allowed to assign a pun-
ishment to a person only if the punishment is such that we have reasons
to think it will be a negative reinforcement which will positively condition
the future behavior of the person who receives the punishment. We state
the principle of effectiveness of punishments and rewards (EPR) as follows.
(EPR) A punishment (or reward) of a wicked (righteous) act is just only
if it has a positive effect with respect to future conduct.
It should be noted that (EPR) needs the idea that there are causal con-
nections among events in order to be non-vacuous, in the sense that if
there were not any causal connections among events, no punishment or
reward would be just, simply because nothing would have an effect. And,
the kind of modal fatalism we are interested in — reasonable fatalism —
does not deny causal relations among events, because it accepts the Causal
Connectedness thesis. Hence, a reasonable fatalist can embrace (EPR). He
or she could then argue that it might be the case that a punishment as-
signed to a person after a wicked deed he or she has committed will bring
about that the same person will behave in a better way under similar future
circumstances. The same could be said for rewards, they are just as long as
they are positive reinforcements with respect to future conduct. It is worth
noting that (EPR) does not need at all to posit the power to do otherwise,
which is thought to be a necessary condition for moral responsibility by
the principle (PAP). This way it could be used by a fatalist to claim that
punishments and rewards may be justified, even in the total absence of
the freedom to do otherwise. Is the principle (EPR) plausible? For sure
we have reasons to think it is. Suppose we find out that a man has killed
several people. The police arrests him. Soon, we find out that because of
a severe disease the man has, the man is bound to die within few hours.
In such a case, my moral intuitions incline me to say that it would be a
gratuitous disgraceful act to inflict a punishment to this man. It would
be acceptable to make sure that he does not commit other crimes in his
last few hours, for instance by confining or controlling him, but other kind
of punishments would be unjust and a pure case of vengeance. (EPR)
explains why things are so. Given that the man is going to die soon, he
will not find himself in circumstances similar to the ones when he killed
other people. So, there is no future conduct to influence via the infliction
of a punishment. Hence, a punishment in this case would be unjust.
We shall see now how (EPR) deals with some cases traditionally dis-
cussed in the literature. Suppose that I find out that a good friend of
mine is being electronically manipulated by the same team of scientists
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who are controlling Green’s brain in the example discussed above. In this
case though, the manipulation is constant and we assume it takes place
throughout all my friend’s life. Any act performed by my friend is de-
cided and brought about by the team of scientists in California. Clearly,
my friend should not be held responsible for what he does or fail to do.
The (PAP) principle does not consider him a proper subject of moral atti-
tudes because my friend lacks at all the times the power to do otherwise.
Things are so for everyone according to a fatalist. Hence, as we have seen,
a modal fatalist needs another principle to account for this case. (EPR)
gives us the desired results. According to (EPR), it would be unjust to
punish or reward my friend for his behavior. In fact, all punishments and
rewards will never make a difference in the future conduct of my friend,
simply because his future conduct will always be determined by the team
of scientists. My constantly manipulated friend is just a mean for the ends
the scientists want to pursue. Hence, (EPR) can correctly account for this
case without appealing to the concept of moral responsibility.
Let us take the case of Ulysses binding himself to the mast to resist
the song of the Sirens. At the moment in time when he resisted the song,
he could not have done otherwise because he was tied up. (EPR) again
explains why Ulysses would deserve a reward for this. He bound himself
when he was in control of himself. He was coerced at the moment in time
when he resisted the song, but he himself initiated the coercion. Other
cases of coercion are different. Suppose someone put a pill in my drink
without my consent. The pill is so strong that it takes full control of my
behavior and coerces me to perpetrate evil acts. According to (PAP) I
would not be morally responsible for what I do, because the pill blocks
my power to do otherwise. (EPR) gives an analogous correct result. It
would be unfair to punish me for what I did when I was under control of
the pill, because the pill had an invincible force which overwhelmed the
control of my behavior. Nothing else could have affected my behavior in
the time when I was under the effect of the pill20. Hence, punishments
20It is interesting to note that if the pill has not an invincible force over me, but its force
is a matter of grade, then sometimes punishments or rewards might be acceptable. After
all, in future similar circumstances I might behave better in virtue of the punishments or
rewards I receive now. Say that someone makes me take a pill without my consensus
and it partly influences my behavior. As a result of the pill and other factors coming from
my, say, personality, I commit a bad deed. It seems that in this case (EPR) would allow
for a partial limited punishment. And this seems correct. If I will find myself in similar
circumstances, i.e. under the effect of a not-overwhelming pill, I might behave better as a
result of the punishment I received. Hence, it seems that (EPR) might account for mixed
cases, whereas (PAP) cannot, because the power to do otherwise seems to be a matter of
all or nothing.
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and rewards would be unjust in this case, because in such circumstances
only the pill exercises a causal role. The cases of the pill, Ulysses and
my friend constantly under total control of the scientists highlight a moral
phenomenon. External coercion excuses, internal coercion does not. If I
am externally coerced against my will, like in the case of the pill and my
friend, I am not a proper candidate for punishments and rewards. If I am
internally coerced, that is, I initiate the coercion, I am a proper candidate
for punishments and rewards. Again, this has nothing to do with the
power to do otherwise, and (EPR) provides results in accordance with our
moral intuitions.
We have seen that (EPR) can account for punishments and rewards
we usually assign without bringing into the picture the notion of moral
responsibility. What does it mean for a person to be morally responsible?
If being morally responsible just means being the proper candidate for
rewards and punishment, then (EPR) suffices. Under this sense, persons
are morally responsible, whereas things like particles, tables or trees are
not. If so, we don’t need (PAP). If being morally responsible also means
being the proper candidate of moral blame and praise, I would say that
blame and praise are nothing else than a form of punishment and reward.
So, again, (EPR) would suffice. But, one could add more to the concept
of moral responsibility. For instance, Fischer (1985) illustrates this broad
account of moral responsibility.
On this sort of account, a person is a morally responsible agent
when he is an appropriate candidate for the reactive attitudes
and for such activities as praise and blame and punishment and
reward (p.12)
By reactive attitudes Fischer has in minds attitudes like respect, grati-
tude, love, indignation, and resentment. And, Fischer invites us to consider
what it would be for such attitudes if we found out that, say, a good friend
of mine that I love and care about is constantly manipulated by the team of
scientist we have been talking about.
At first it would be hard to know how one would react to such
an unusual situation. But, I think, once you had been convinced
that direct manipulation exists, a striking thing would occur:
many of your most basic attitudes toward your friend would
change.
This is certainly true. I would change my attitudes toward my friend in
such a case. But what would be the reason of this change? I don’t think
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my attitudes would change because my friend can never do other than
what he actually does. Suppose I am totally convinced that fatalism is true
and that the power do to otherwise never exists. This would not strike
me as a good reason to change my attitudes toward all the people I know.
It would be just a metaphysical belief of mine with a little impact to my
feelings of love, friendship and the like. For the same reason, if I became
convinced that 4-dimensionalism is true, I would not be offended by the
fact that my friend is not wholly present with me while we are hanging
out at the bar. The reason why I would change my attitude toward my
friend after finding out that a constant manipulation is occurring has to
do just with the fact that my friend is externally coerced by the team of
scientists. If I admire and respect my friend, after the discovery, I would
rather be friend with the scientist than with him. And we have seen that
(EPR) accounts correctly for cases of external coercion. Again, we don’t
need to bring into the picture the power to do otherwise to make sense of
our reactive attitudes. (EPR) is enough for a reasonable fatalist.
To sum up, a reasonable fatalist can get rid of the concept of moral
responsibility. Moral responsibility comes with the notions of blame and
praise, understood as something more than just forms of punishments and
rewards. That is, moral responsibility is a judgment about people’s con-
ducts. On the contrary, a reasonable fatalist never judges. He thinks things
go the only way they can go, and therefore no one is morally responsible
in that sense. However, this does not imply that no one has to be punished
or rewarded. (EPR) can explain why punishments and rewards may be
just. They are just as long as they bring about moral improvements in
one person’s life. Moreover, the kind of acceptance towards events a rea-
sonable fatalist has, does not imply that we can’t hope for a better future.
Again, punishments and rewards might be capable of bringing about a
better future in our lives.
.
.
Chapter2
A New Argument for Modal
Fatalism
. . . so it goes . . .
Slaughterhouse Five - Kurt
Vonnegut
In this chapter I am going to provide my own argument in favor of
modal fatalism.
2.1 Two Principles which imply Modal Fatalism
We have seen in section 1.3.2 that modal fatalism can be stated through the
principle (MF).
(MF) For any act φ, for any agent A and for any time T, it is within A’s
power to φ at T if and only if A φs at t.
As we have already seen, the right-left side of the biconditional is
uncontroversial. Anyone should agree that if an agent does something at
a time, it is within her power to do so. The controversy between a modal
fatalist and an anti-modal fatalist arises on the left-right side of (MF).
(lrMF) For any act φ, for any agent A and for any time T, if it is within
A’s power to φ at T, then A φs at T.
Here are some instances of the principle (lrMF). If it is in Alice’s power
to swim at T1, then Alice swims at T1. If it is in Bob’s power to ride a
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bicycle at T2, then Bob rides a bicycle at T2. If it is in Carol’s power to
give a philosophy lecture at T3, then Carol gives a philosophy lecture at T3.
Here is the upshot of the principle — according to (lrMF), whenever it is
within an agent’s power to φ, then she actually φs and φing is a necessary
condition for having the power to φ. That means that if an agent does not
φ at T, it is not in her power to φ because that is simply the contrapositive
of (lrMF), thus, it is logically equivalent to it. In other words, (lrMF)
captures the idea that there is no room for non-instantiated powers. The
only powers we possess are the instantiated ones.
We now turn to two principles which entail (lrMF). The first one is the
principle I shall call (NC).
(NC) For any act φ, for any agent A and for any time T, if it is within A’s
power to φ at T, then all necessary conditions for A to φ at T are
met.
(NC) appears to be quite uncontroversial and hardly deniable. That
can be seen by what its contrapositive says. That is, if at least one of the
necessary conditions forφing is not met at T, then it is not within the agent’s
power to φ at T. For instance, if a necessary condition for swimming is not
being affected by paralysis, then an agent who is paralyzed has not the
power to swim; equivalently, an agent who has the power to swim is not
paralyzed. Or, if a necessary condition for a violinist to play violin is the
presence of a violin around, then the absence of it implies that playing the
violin is not within the violinist’s power. We should stress that the notion
at play is not the notion of know-how, expertise or ability. The professional
violinist would keep his ability to play violin even if all the violins on earth
magically disappeared forever. But in such case, the violinist would never
have again the power to play a violin. And the reason would be the lacking
of a necessary condition for the act of playing violin. All of this is captured
by (NC).
The other principle I want to appeal to is the following one.
(SUF) For any act φ, for any agent A and for any time T, if all necessary
conditions for A to φ at T are met, then A φs at t.
(SUF) is not as uncontroversial as (NC) is. We shall see in the next
section how to deal with it within the modal fatalism debate. For the time
being, we should note that (NC) together with (SUF) implies (lrMF). This
is so just because of the transitivity of conditionals. Thus we have the
result that (NC) together with (SUF) and the right-left side of (MF) imply
(MF), i.e. modal fatalism. I have argued that (NC) and the right-left side
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of (MF) are uncontroversial and should be accepted by any side of the
modal fatalism/anti-fatalism debate. Hence, the debate can be cashed out
in terms of the principle (SUF). That is, given the chain of implications
just shown, an anti-fatalist has to deny (SUF) and justify its denial. On
the other hand, a modal fatalist might or might not accept (SUF). After
all, even if (SUF) together with plausible principles imply modal fatalism,
a fatalist may have reasons independent from (SUF) for believing in the
truth of modal fatalism. However, for the purposes of this chapter, we take
the modal fatalist side to accept (SUF). What I want to highlight is that the
anti-fatalist side needs to come up with a justified denial of (SUF). In the
next section I shall argue that it is not so easy to do so.
2.2 The Disagreement on (SUF)
Before addressing the disagreement on (SUF), let us see another thing be-
sides (NC) and the right-left side of (MF) on which both the modal fatalist
and anti-fatalist sides agree on. A modal fatalist thinks that, given an ar-
bitrary act φ, it is not necessarily the case that all necessary conditions for
φing are fulfilled at all times during an agent’s life. That is so because,
according to the modal fatalist who believes in (SUF), all necessary con-
ditions for φing are met only when the agent φs, and quite obviously an
agent does not always perform the same deeds throughout her life. If an
agent, for instance, swims at T1, T3 and not at T2, according to the fatalist
who believes in (SUF), all necessary condition for swimming are met at
T1 and T3, whereas at least one necessary condition for swimming is not
met at T2. Times where all necessary conditions for φing are met and the
agent does not φ are ruled out by (SUF). Hence, in a fatalist account, given
an act and an agent, all the necessary conditions for the agent performing
the act are fulfilled at some times, whereas they are not fulfilled at other
times. But that things are so must be true also in a non-fatalist account. It
does not seem plausible to say that all necessary conditions for, say, swim-
ming are always met by a certain agent. Again, if the agent is paralyzed
at certain times throughout her life, whereas it is in her power to swim at
other times, then there are times where at least one necessary condition for
her swimming is not met and other times where all necessary conditions
are met. Hence, the anti-fatalist agrees with the fatalist that, given an act
φ and an agent A, there must be times where all necessary conditions for
φing are not met.
That being said, we are now in a position to state the disagreement.
The disagreement between the modal fatalist and the anti-fatalist is, given
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an arbitrary act and and an arbitrary agent, the partition of times with
respect to the fulfillment of necessary conditions for that act and whether
or not the agent does that act. The modal fatalist, given an arbitrary act
φ and an arbitrary agent A, very straightforwardly and in accordance
with (SUF) partitions times with respect to the fulfillment of necessary
conditions for φing and the agent actually φing in only two regions. In
one region, we have times in which the necessary conditions for φing are
met and the agent φs. In the other region, we have times where at least
one necessary condition for φing is not met and the agent does not φ. The
anti-fatalist partition is different since she has to claim that there is a further
region, namely times in which all necessary conditions for φing are met
and nonetheless the agent does not φ. Cases which belong to this third
region are ruled out by (SUF), because (SUF) simply claims that if at a time
all necessary conditions for φing are met, that is a time where the agent
φs. On the contrary, cases in the third regions are counterexamples to the
principle (SUF), and so those are precisely the cases the anti-fatalist needs
in order to falsify (SUF). In other words, the fatalist claims that this third
region must be empty, while the anti-fatalist has to claim and justify the
existence of cases in that third region. A possible fourth region, one in
which at least one necessary condition for φing is not met and the agent φs
would not be ruled out by (SUF). Yet it is ruled out by the uncontroversial
principles (NC) and the right-left side of (MF). In fact, if in such a region
the agentφs, in virtue of the right-left side of (MF), it is the case that φing is
within the agent’s power. If so, in virtue of (NC), all necessary conditions
for φing are met.
We now turn to an example to illustrate the disagreement between a
modal fatalist and an anti-fatalist. We go back to our naval admiral A,
who is in charge of a naval fleet. Throughout his life he issues the order to
attack several times. We then take all the times of our admiral’s life. The
modal fatalist partitions times this way, in accordance with (SUF).
Table 2.1: Modal Fatalist partition
First region Second region
- All necessary conditions
for issuing the order are
met
- At least one necessary
condition for issuing the or-
der is not met
- A issues the order - A does not issue the order
In the first region we have times where all necessary conditions for
issuing the order are met and A issues the order. In the second region,
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we have times where at least one necessary condition for issuing the order
is not met and A does not issue the order. As we have already seen, an
anti-fatalist has to add a third region, in order to have counterexamples
to (SUF). She needs to claim that there are times where all the necessary
conditions for issuing the order are met and A does not issue it. So, here is
the anti-fatalist partition.
Table 2.2: Anti-fatalist partition
First region Third region Second region
- All necessary condi-
tions for issuing the or-
der are met
- All necessary condi-
tions for issuing the or-
der are met
- At least one neces-
sary condition for issu-
ing the order is not met
- A issues the order - A does not issue theorder
- A does not issue the
order
Not only an anti-fatalist has to claim the existence of times in the third
region. She has also to justify those cases. Both in the first and third region
we have times where all necessary conditions for issuing the order are met.
Yet in the first region A issues the order, whereas he does not in the third.
What does distinguish elements in this third region from the ones in the
first region? It will turn out that it is hard to tell a satisfactory story about
what is going on in the third region.
The anti-fatalist, in order to deny (SUF), has to claim the following
statement, which we shall call ‘third region’ (TR).
(TR) there is at least a time T such that a) all necessary conditions for
issuing the order are met at T and b) A does not issue it at T.
(TR) has to be justified. How can this be possibly done? Let us start
with what I call the preventor story. The first-third region distinction may
come from the presence of a preventor in the third region. The idea is that
at times in the third region, even if all necessary conditions for issuing the
order are met, the agent does not issue it because of the occurrence of a
preventor, whereas there are no preventors at times in the first region. We
might think the preventor P(φ) of an actφ simply as the occurring of a state
of affairs which blocks the agent from doing φ, even if all the necessary
conditions for φing are met. To give an example with the act of swimming,
a typical preventor could be the absence of water around, but in the sense
of preventor here adopted also the agent’s unwillingness to swim count as
a preventor. In our admiral case, a preventor could be a momentary lack
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of voice for our admiral, or a counter-order from our admiral’ superior. In
such story, the anti-fatalist claim (TR) becomes (TRP)
(TRP) there is at least a time T such that a) all necessary conditions for
issuing the order are met at T, b) A does not issue it at T, and c)
P(issuing the order).
We might want to ask now whether the non-occurrence of the preventor
is a necessary condition for issuing the order. The answer must be either
affirmative or negative. Suppose the answer is affirmative. We know from
(TRP) that all necessary conditions for issuing the order are met. But,
then, answering affirmatively to the question above means that the non-
occurrence of a preventor is the case, because we are saying that its non-
occurrence is a necessary condition for issuing the order and all necessary
conditions for issuing it are met. But (TRP) says also that the preventor is
(or has been) the case. Hence, we have a contradiction and we cannot take
the non-occurrence of the preventor as a necessary condition for issuing the
order, together with the claim (TRP). Let us suppose now that the answer
instead is negative. That means that according to the answer we are giving,
the preventor non-occurrence is not a necessary condition for issuing the
order. But it follows from the adopted definition of a preventor that if the
preventor is the case, then A does not issue the order. But the previous
statement is tantamount to the claim that the preventor non-occurrence
is a necessary condition for issuing the order. Hence, we have another
contradiction. That means that the preventor story cannot be told to make
sense of cases in the third region without running into contradictions.
Hence, it cannot be told at all by an anti-fatalist. On the other hand,
the modal fatalist can safely take the non-occurrence of any preventor as
a necessary condition for issuing the order. Cases of prevention would
safely go in the second region.
Another story that could be told by the anti-fatalist in order to defend
the existence of cases in the third region is the one I shall call the reason-
story. The story goes like this; the first region contains times where all
necessary conditions for issuing the order are met and A does so, simply
because he decided to issue the order there. In the third region our admiral
does not decide to issue it, and that is why he does not do so there. If the
anti-fatalist does not like the concept of decision in order to justify the
distinction she needs to make, let us be more general and say that the
difference between the first and the third region is the fact that there is a
reason for issuing it in the first region whereas that reason is absent in the
third one. Here a reason for issuing the order, which we shall call R(issuing
the order), might be various things and an anti-fatalist can specify better
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the nature of it however she likes: our admiral decided to issue the order,
he freely decided to issue it, he intended to issue it, the power to issue the
order manifested itself, and so on and so forth. For our purposes here we
don’t need to enter into these niceties. It should suffice to say that R(φ) is
such that all necessary conditions for φing are met and the agent φs only
if R(φ) obtains. That being said, (TR) becomes
(TRR) there is at least a time T such that a) all necessary conditions for
issuing the order are met at T, b) A does not issue it at T, and c) it is
not (or has not been) the case that R(issuing the order).
And now we can ask the following question: is R(issuing the order) a
necessary condition for issuing the order? As we did before, we have now
to investigate two possible answers. Suppose the answer is affirmative.
Then, R(issuing the order) is a necessary condition for issuing the order.
(TRR) is a case where all necessary conditions for issuing the order are
met. Hence, R(issuing the order) is or has been the case. But, (TRR) says
that R(issuing the order) is not (or has not been) the case. Hence, we have
a contradiction and we cannot take the non-occurrence of R(issuing the
order) as a necessary condition for issuing the order, together with the
claim (TRR). Suppose now the answer were negative. This would mean
that R(issuing the order) is not a necessary condition for issuing the order.
Again, (TRP) is supposed to be a case where all necessary condition for
issuing the order are met. We have seen above that all necessary condition
for issuing the order are met and our admiral issues the order only if
R(issuing the order) is the case. That means that if all necessary conditions
are met, then, if he issues the order, then R(issuing the order) is the case.
(TRP) is a case where all necessary conditions are met. Thus, at those times,
if he issues the order, then R(issuing the order) is the case. But the previous
claim is tantamount to the claim that R(issuing the order) is a necessary
condition for issuing the order. Hence, we have again a contradiction.
R(issuing the order) is and is not a necessary condition for issuing the
order.
This means that the reason story cannot be told to make sense of cases
in the third region without running into contradictions. Hence, it cannot
be told at all by an anti-fatalist. On the other hand, the modal fatalist
can safely take the occurrence of the reason, whatever it is, as a necessary
condition for issuing the order. Cases where this reason is absent would
safely go in the second region.
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2.3 What are we left with
To sum up, we deemed the principles (NC) and the (MF) right-left side un-
controversial. Those two principles lead to modal fatalism, provided you
add the principle (SUF). I then argued that it is hard to justify counterexam-
ples to (SUF). Neither the preventor story nor the reason-story succeeded
in justifying the existence of cases in the third region which would falsify
(SUF). It is hard to imagine what else could work, and so we are left with
the idea that either modal fatalism is a true doctrine or that the distinction
of cases in the first and third region is somehow brute.
One way to see that distinction as brute would be to claim that powers
are primitive entities. In doing so, one could easily skip (SUF) and directly
falsify (MF) by saying that when an agent φs at a certain time, other
alternative actions are within the agent’s power. That would provide us
a genuine counterexample to (MF). However, taking powers as primitives
also means that powers cannot be explained at all. In fact, an anti-fatalist
willing to make such a move cannot give an answer to a very simple
question as why it is within a certain agent’s power to do something.
There would not be an answer, simply because in such an account powers
were primitives. On the contrary, a modal fatalist who embraces (SUF) can
provide a perfectly coherent answer to that question. She can simply claim
that it is within the agent’s power to φ because all necessary conditions for
φing are met.
There is actually a way to refute (SUF) through a counterexample, for
which no counter-argument along the lines of the previous ones can be
given. Suppose two mutually exclusive acts, call them φ and ψ have the
same necessary conditions. Suppose then the agent as a matter of factφs at
T. Then — because of (MF) right-left side — φ is within the agent’s power.
This in turn means — via (NC) — that all necessary conditions for φing are
met at T. But, by assuming that all necessary conditions for ψing are the
same of φing, it follows that also all necessary conditions for ψing are met
at T. But it cannot be the case that the agent ψs at T, simply because we are
assuming that the agent φs at T, and φ and ψs are incompatible actions.
Hence, such a case would be a case in which all necessary conditions for
ψing are met and it is not the case that the agent ψs, i.e. it would provide
a genuine counterexample to (SUF) and therefore to (MF). However, such
a counterexample would be a very small victory for an anti-fatalist.
Say that φ and ψ are respectively the act of turning left and the act of
turning right. Among the necessary conditions for φing we would find
states of affairs which play a causal explanatory role for the fact that the
agent φs, i.e. things that had not been the case, the agent’s φing would
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not have been the case as well. Now, if we claim that ψ have the same
necessary conditions to be met, it means that the states of affairs which
provide a causal explanation of why the agent φs, would also be a good
causal explanation of the agent’s choice, had the agent ψed. It seems to
me that this would be a case where whether the agent φs or ψs is just a
matter of chance1. But this would be a small victory for the anti-fatalist.
Pure chanciness cannot ground Free Will, because the outcome of a chancy
event is something over which no one can exercise any control. Hence,
we are left with two options: either modal fatalism holds in virtue of
our reasoning on (SUF), or (SUF) and hence modal fatalism do not hold
in virtue of genuine chanciness. In the former case, the power to do
otherwise is always ruled out by modal fatalism. In the latter case, the
power to do otherwise would be grounded in pure chanciness, a result
which cannot be satisfactory to a theorist who wants to argue in favor of
Free Will understood as the power to do otherwise.
It should ultimately be noted that my argument for modal fatalism does
not suffer the flaw which is shared by the Main Argument and Taylor’s. As
we have seen in section 1.3.3, both those arguments conflate deterministic
and indeterministic scenarios. That is, they apply necessity to outcomes
which are clearly contingent, like in cases provided by Quantum Mechan-
ics. My argument does not. It leaves open the possibility for contingent
events, which are treated by my argument as cases where two alternative
outcomes have the same necessary conditions. This result is due to the
fact that my argument employs just necessary conditions which lie in the
past with respect to an agent performing a certain act at a time, or in the
past with respect to a certain experimental outcome. Taylor’s argument in-
stead takes advantage of necessary conditions lying in the future, thereby
conflating deterministic and indeterministic cases. Yet, my argument, if
correct, scores a point in favor of modal fatalism. In fact, either it com-
pletely rules out the power to do otherwise, or it shows that the power
to do otherwise is nothing but chanciness, i.e. something which cannot
adequately ground our intuitive notion of Free Will.
1For instance, let us get back to the electron story told in section 1.3.3. Say that φ and
ψ are respectively the electron exiting the box from the black aperture and the electron
exiting the box from the white aperture. These two mutually exclusive states of affairs
seem to have exactly the same necessary conditions. For instance, the electron is measured
to be white at T, only if a white or hard or soft electron is fed in the box at T-1. And similarly,
the electron is measured to be black at T, only if a white or hard or soft electron is fed in
the box at T-1
Chapter3
Time Travel and Fatalism
In my experience, there’s no
such thing as luck
Star Wars - Episode IV
In this chapter we will be dealing with time travel and what I have
labeled modal and reasonable fatalism. Time travel raises worries related
to time and what people can or cannot do. Unsurprisingly, David Lewis
talked about fatalism in his famous paper about time travel. I will argue
that reasonable fatalism can correctly account for what is going on with
episodes of time travel.
3.1 Time Travel in One-Dimensional Time
In The Paradoxes of Time Travel (1976), David Lewis discusses the possi-
bility of time travel. His main point in that article is that time traveling in
one-dimensional time is metaphysically possible. He shows this is possi-
ble the only way one can show that something is metaphysically possible,
namely by telling a story involving that something and arguing that there
aren’t contradictions in the story. Lewis tells the well-known story of Tim,
who goes back in time to a space-time place where he has already been and
does what he has already done. Before Tim enters his time machine, there
are events which are past according to external time and future according
to Tim’s personal time. The distinction between external and a person’s
personal time is crucial when it comes to time travel. Lewis takes external
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time to be time itself1, whereas what is personal time has to be clarified.
First of all, personal time is not a further time-dimension. Second of all,
personal time applies usually to people, even though it can apply to objects
as well. In general, it applies to things in a world. Lewis (1976) provides a
functional definition of personal time:
it is that which occupies a certain role in the pattern of events
that comprise the time traveler’s life. (p.146)
Here Lewis is talking about a time traveler, but the notion is applicable
to everyone’s life. The role Lewis has in mind is the role of that which
orders. Suppose you are given in a disordered way all the stages of a
person and you are asked to order them with respect to time. You would
first start with the birth’s stage and end with the death’s stage. You would
put infantile stages before senile ones. If you are presented with a stage
where the person is eating a pizza and another one where the person is
digesting it, you would put the former before the latter. If in one stage
the person has much more memories than he has in another one, the latter
would be put later than the former, and so on. By taking into account more
and more things, you will eventually end up having a complete ordering of
the stages. This is what personal time does. It orders the stages of a person
in accordance with the regularities we are familiar with in our world. It is a
regularity which holds in our world that we first eat pizza and then digest
it, or that we are first young and old later on. Such regularities we are
familiar with provide a criterion for ordering stages according to personal
time. We can even assign coordinates to personal time, as Lewis observes:
But there is one way to assign coordinates to the time traveler’s
stages, and one way only (apart from the arbitrary choice of
a zero point), so that the regularities that hold with respect to
this assignment match those that commonly hold with respect
to external time. (p.146)
That is, we might assign the number 0 to the birth’s stage, the number
1 to the stages where the person is 1 year old, 2 to the stages where the
person is 2 years old and so on. Of course, this can be made more precise as
much as we like (2 years, 1 day and 3 minutes . . . 2 years 1 day, 3 minutes
and 10 seconds, and so on).
Take Tim’s events. Tim is born in 1950 (external time), and enters his
time machine to travel back to the past at the age of 25 (personal time)
1“Instead I reply by distinguishing time itself, external time as I shall also call it
. . . (p.146)”
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in 1975 (external time). He then arrives back in the past and steps out
of his machine in 1920 (external time). In 1921, say, Tim is 1 year older
than when he departed, i.e. he is 26 years old according to his personal
time. Before Tim enters his time machine, the events in the external past
are the events that will happen in Tim’s personal future. This episode of
time travel gives rise to a discrepancy between external time — time itself
— and Tim’s personal time. The discrepancy has not to do with the fact
that, say, Tim is 25 years old in 1920. This is a kind of discrepancy any
person displays — one might be 1 year old in 2017, for instance. Rather,
the discrepancy has to do with the fact that with episodes of time travel,
two same events in a time traveler’s life are separated by two different
amounts of time. We can illustrate this by means of the graph (3.1).
Figure 3.1: Tim’s graph.
Take the events A and B which occurred in Tim’s life. It is clear from
the graph that A and B are separated by 35 years according to external time
and by 20 years according to Tim’s personal time. This kind of discrepancy,
Lewis observes, is essential to episodes of time travel.
In Tim’s case, there is another discrepancy, which is not essential to
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episodes of time travel. The discrepancy has to do with the way events
are ordered. For instance, B is earlier than A with respect to external
time, whereas A is earlier than B with respect to Tim’s personal time2. To
wrap up Tim’s case, his journey to the past is instantaneous and has zero
duration. Hence, his line on the graph is a broken line.
We could also imagine a journey to the past which takes time. Suppose
that it takes one year of Tim1’s personal time to go back to the past, from
1975 to 1920. During the travel, Tim1 could do all the things he usually
does in one year. If he usually reads 6 books per year, he can read 6 books
during his trip. After one year journey, Tim1 will find himself at the arrival
one year older than when he departed. His line on the graph (3.2) would
be a bent one3.
Figure 3.2: Tim1’s graph.
2This disagreement about the way events are ordered is not essential to episodes of
time travel. Time travel toward the future provided by Special Theory of Relativity will
be a case where all ’times‘ agree on the way events are ordered. We will treat it later on.
3Tim and Tim1 can both depart at the same exact time and arrive at the same time
even if Tim’s journey is instantaneous and Tim1 trip takes one year. It’s just that Tim1 will
arrive at his destination older than Tim.
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In both cases thus far considered, two events may be separated by
different amounts of time, depending on which time we are considering.
In Tim’s case, his arrival is immediately after his departure according to
his personal time, whereas according to external time, those two events
are separated by 55 years. In Tim1’s case, the departure and the arrival are
separated by one year of his personal time and 55 years of external time.
We may imagine other cases of time travel, not treated in Lewis’s paper.
It is possible to time travel toward the future. Suppose cryogenic sleep
will become one day possible, with respect to the development of our
technology. Cryogenic sleep would put one person, say Tim2, into a state
of “total sleep”, where all body activities and aging processes would be
stopped. Time in the outside world would keep flowing, whereas Tim2’s
personal time would be stopped for a while, until he will be eventually
safely waked up by a team of future scientists. This would legitimately
count as a case of time travel, even if we don’t have any time machine
as we are used to from science fiction stories. In fact, again, we would
have a discrepancy between external and personal time. Tim2 falls asleep
in his crygogenic sleep, and according to his personal time, he wakes up
immediately after it, whereas according to external time, several years
may pass. We can represent Tim2’s case with a bent line on the graph
(3.3), where the horizontal segment stands for the time where Tim is sent
to cryogenic sleep. We assume Tim2 is sent to cryogenic sleep at the age of
15 and woken up after 20 years of external time has passed.
Another case of time travel comes from Special Theory of Relativity.
We can illustrate it by means of the famous Twin Paradox. It is not a real
paradox, because it can be fully explained within the Special Theory of
Relativity. Yet, it appears to be paradoxical because it has counter-intuitive
results with respect to some principle of relativity, like the principle that all
frames of references ‘are created equal’. That is, if you have a symmetrical
situation, and you reverse it, the explanation of what is going on should be
the same. Here is one version of the Paradox. Suppose Alice and Bob are
two twins; Bob is on planet Earth and Alice sets off with her spaceship to
reach a star 3 light years away from planet Earth, and she then comes back
to Earth. If she travels with a velocity of 0.6c, Bob will observe that her
round trip takes 10 years. Because of the time dilation principle — moving
clocks appear to run slow compared to the clocks of a stationary observer
— Bob would also observe that according to Alice’s clocks, her trip takes
less than 10 years. Bob will observe that Alice’s clock ticks 8 years. Alice
herself will claim that her trip took 8 years, according to her clocks. Here
is where the paradox comes in. Bob on Earth can understand what is
going on. He observes Alice moving, and he can tell why she is younger
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Figure 3.3: Tim2’s graph.
than him when she comes back on Earth. 10 years passed according to
Bob’s clocks, whereas just 8 years passed according to Alice’s clock, and
this is just the familiar principle of time dilation. What is paradoxical is
Alice’s perspective. As far as Alice is concerned, she is stationary and she
observes Bob moving away from her and then coming back to her at a
speed of 0.6c. Thus, Alice sees Bob’s clocks run slowly compared to hers.
Given that from the departure to the reunion her clocks ticked 8 years, she
will observe Bob’s clocks run slow. By doing some simple math, we have
the result that she will observe Bob’s clock ticking 6.4 years, again because
of time dilation. Hence, Bob will expect Alice to be younger than him at the
moment of the reunion. But Alice seems to have parallel reasons to expect
Bob to be younger than her. Of course this can’t happen. Either they have
the same age when they reunite, or, one twin is younger than the other
one. This paradox can be explained within special theory of relativity4.
4Sometimes it is argued that the Twin Paradox case cannot be explained within the
Special Theory of Relativity, because Special Theory of Relativity only deals with inertial
frame of references, where objects move with a constant velocity, whereas necessarily
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What happens is that when Alice turns around and change direction to get
back on Earth, her lines of simultaneity in the space-time diagram change.
When she reaches the star, what happens is that she reads on her clocks that
4 years have passed, and 3.2 years passed on Bob clocks. Bob instead will
observe that when she reaches the star, 5 years have passed on his clocks
and 4 on Alice’s clock. This is due to the relativity of simultaneity and
time dilation. On a space-time diagram, Alice and Bob will have different
lines of simultaneity, given that they are moving with respect to each other.
However, as soon as Alice changes direction, her lines of simultaneity are
going to change. Immediately after she turns around, she would observe
Bob’s clock jump from 3.2 years to 6.8 years. Again, on her inbound trip,
Alice would observe that it takes her 4 years to get back. Bob will agree on
that, but he will also observe that the inbound trip takes 5 years according
to his clocks. So, uncontroversially, Alice is the one who will be wo years
younger than Bob at the moment of the reunion. What interests us is that
this count as a case of time travel toward the future. By traveling across
the galaxy and then coming back to Earth, Alice will age 8 years, whereas
on Earth 10 years will pass. This count as a legitimate case of time travel
toward the future, even though Alice does not jump into a time machine,
but ’just‘ in a super-fast spaceship.
Thus far I have been using graphs which used as an axis Lewis’s notion
of external time, which is time itself, as he says. The problem with Special
Theory of Relativity is that there isn’t ’one time’. Time is relative to a frame
of reference, and Alice and Bod are in two different frames of reference.
Moreover, as far as they are concerned, their respective personal time and
’their‘ external time tick at the same rate. Hence, in their graph (3.4) I take
as axes Alice’s external-personal time and Bob’s external-personal time to
highlight that in this case two events are separated by two unequal amounts
of time, a feature which is essential to cases of time travel according to
Lewis5. In the graph, Alice’s round trip takes 8 years according to her
clocks, whereas it takes 10 years according to Bob’s ones. This time the
slope of Alice’s line will be greater than 1. More precisely, it will have a
Alice has to decelerate and then accelerate when she turns around at the star. But this
is not the case. We can idealize the situation and think that the deceleration/acceleration
elapsed time is so short that it does not affect the possibility of explaining the paradox
within the Special Theory of Relativity.
5Here we should note that we don’t have the kind of discrepancy which is essential in
case of time travel toward the past, i.e. the disagreement on how events are ordered. In
Tim’s case, the event A on his graph is earlier than B according to his personal time and
later than B according to external time. On the contrary, Alice and Bob agree on how the
events of, say, Alice’s trip are ordered. They disagree on how much they are separated in
time.
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slope of 1.25.
Figure 3.4: Alice and Bob’s graph.
Thus far we have seen four cases of time-travel. The first two of them
came from Lewis’s paper, whereas the third and the fourth involved cryo-
genic sleep and Special Theory of Relativity. All of them has to do with
a discrepancy between times. The first two were cases of backward time
travel. The time traveler sets off and she arrives to a point in time which is
past with respect to the time of departure. As Lewis observes, time travel
toward the past may involve oddities. A world where backward time
travel takes place would be a world very different from ours. For instance,
time-travel towards the past may generate cases of backward causation,
i.e. cases where an effect precedes in time its cause. The time traveler
punches himself before jumping in her time machine and when she arrives
in the past she has a black eye. Clearly, the punch causes the black eye. A
cause is later in time with respect to its effect. Time travelers to the past
CHAPTER 3. TIME TRAVEL AND FATALISM 94
might also give rise to causal loops, i.e. cases where every event does have
a cause but the whole loop does not. It might be that our time traveler
brings along a book and gives it to the author before the author writes it,
thereby creating a situation where the author copies his own work which
will eventually be brought back in the past by her. The author can write
the book because she just copies it, and the time traveler can bring it along
because the author already wrote it at the time of her departure. Who
wrote the book in the first place? The whole loop cannot be explained. It
may also happen that the time traveler visit her younger self and talks to
herself on the phone. But, Lewis observes, that is not a contradiction. It
is just two distinct temporal parts of the same whole talking to each other,
which is not the same thing bilocated in two different places at the same
time. The external time of the conversation would be the same, whereas
the personal time of the stages composing the whole time traveler would
be different.
Suppose you have a time machine in front of you and you can go back
in time with it. What can you do with it? Let us take Lewis’s example.
In 1975 Tim wants to go back to 1920 and kill his grandfather in 1921,
who lived until 1957. The year 1921 lies in Tim’s personal extended past,
29 years before his birth. It also lies in Tim’s personal future before he
steps into his time machine, because Tim travels to the past to live his
personal future. Grandfather lived until 1957, hence he must be alive in
1921, if we set aside cases of resurrections. As Lewis points out, we may
be tempted to speak of two 1921, the one which lies in Tim’s personal past
and the one which lies in Tim’s personal future. Here, though, we are just
referring to the same thing, the year 1921, with two different expressions.
And, either the year 1921 contains grandfather’ survival or it contains his
murder. 1921 cannot contain both, or else we would have an inconsistent
story. Tim goes back to kill grandfather, who wasn’t killed in 1921. Can
Tim change the past and make it the case that his grandfather will not be
alive at the end of 1921? He cannot. Laws of logic would not permit this.
Grandfather survived until 1957, hence he was alive during the year 1921
and nobody killed him. If Tim were to kill him in 1921, the year 1921 would
be inconsistent. It would contain both Grandfather survival and his death,
which is a contradiction.
To sum up, suppose you are at the time T10 and the earlier time T0
contains the event φ. Can you go back to T0 and make it the case that φ
is replaced by ψ? Either T0 timelessly contains φ or it timelessly contains
ψ. Either way, there would be no change in the past. Or, if you want to
claim that there might be such a change, from φ to ψ, when this alleged
change would take place? At T10 when you step in your time machine?
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It can’t be. You step in your time machine at T10 because T0 contains φ.
Perhaps T0 might change from containing φ to containing ψ at T0, at the
moment of your arrival in the past. But again, this can’t be. T0 is earlier
than T10, and T10 is such that it comes 10 units of time after the event φ
took place at T0. The point is that in a one-dimensional time, it seems
to be a non-sense to talk about a change in the past. Does this rule out
the metaphysical possibility of time travel in one-dimensional time? We
would like to travel in the past in order to change it, maybe to prevent all
the evil and unpleasant events which happened in the past. But changing
the past in a one-dimensional time is impossible, and just being around in
a past place where you haven’t been would amount to an alteration of the
past. However, the possibility of time travel in a one-dimensional time is
not ruled out. One could always go in a past place where she has already
been and do what she has already done. This way, the past will not be
altered. And in such a case, one could still have the possibility to affect the
past. Suppose Tim goes back in the past and buy a packet of cigarettes.
He is not altering the past. The event of him buying cigarettes was already
part of the past before his departure. Yet, he is surely affecting the past, in
the same way I am affecting the present if I go out and I buy cigarettes.
To sum up, changing the past is impossible, whereas affecting it is
possible, provided one does what she has already done. I now turn to
another story and I will then try to draw some conclusions from time-
travel stories.
3.2 Another Odd Story
Here I want to tell another story, which will help us to draw a moral from
time travel with respect to issues related to fatalism and the power to do
otherwise.
Here is the story. It involves Mit6, a guy who goes backwards in
one-dimensional time. Mit’s birth takes place in 1985 exactly the 31st of
December at 11:59 PM and 1 second (external time) and he dies somewhere
in time in 1920 (external time). He is an infant between 1980 and 1985, and
very old between 1920 and 1930 (external time). As external time goes
forward, he becomes younger and younger, from his death to his birth.
He has a personal wristwatch, which ticks at the same rate other clocks
in the world tick. But his clock also goes backwards. That means that,
for instance, when an ordinary clock is at 11:59 PM and 0 seconds in 1985,
6His name is Tim spelled backwards, for reasons that will be clear soon.
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Mit’s wristwatch ticks exactly 1 second, because at that time Mit is 1 second
old, according to his personal wristwatch. When an ordinary clock is at
11:59 PM and 1 second in 1985, Mit’s wristwatch ticks exactly 0 seconds,
the starting point which coincides with Mit’s birth. In principle we could
even shoot photos of ordinary clocks and Mit’s clock and say that they
agree about the rate of change, but they have opposite directions. Of
course, as far as Mit is concerned, he observes his clock going forward and
other people’s clocks going backwards. The opposite happens for ordinary
people in the same world. They see Mit becoming younger and younger,
digesting food before eating it, doing things before planning them. As far
as ordinary people are concerned, their clocks are right and go forward,
while Mit’s clock goes backwards. Of course, it seems that there isn’t an
absolute way to settle this issue about who is going forward and who is
going backwards. This story is odd, yet also possible, provided we accept
Lewis’s notion of personal time, which is crucial for bringing home his
point about the possibility of time travel in one dimensional time.
It is also interesting that many features of Tim’s story are mirrored by
our Mit. Lewis says that Tim’s time travel involves a discrepancy between
external time and Tim’s personal time. We have a very similar kind of
discrepancy also in Mit’s case: external time and Mit’s personal time go in
opposite directions. Tim’s departure and arrival back in time are separated
by two different amounts of time, 55 years of external time and are next
to each other in personal time. In Mit’s case, his birth and his death are
separated by 67 years, according to both the external time and personal
time. Yet, there would be disagreement between different ways of ordering
the events. Mit would say that his death is later in time than his birth, while
ordinary people would say that his death is earlier in time than his birth.
Tim’s case involves backward causation. Tim punches himself before
entering the time machine, and Tim has a black eye in the past after his
arrival. According to external time, the effect is followed in time by its
cause, while according to Tim’s personal time the cause precedes the effect.
Mit continuously provides episodes of backward causation. According to
his personal time, he first lights a cigarette and then he smokes it, while
people from the outside would observe that he first smokes a cigarette and
then lights it. We have seen that backward time-travel in one-dimensional
time might give rise to causal loops. So might Mit. When Mit is young, he
might observe a book, copy it and give it to the original author, so that the
original author can copy it as well.
Is Mit a whole unique person persisting through time? It seems that
if Tim is, Mit also is. Mit has the proper mental connectedness. There is
also the proper causality. According to Mit’s personal time all his stages
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Figure 3.5: Mit’s graph.
are continuous and causation works in an ordinary way. In fact, according
to Mit’s personal time, he eats first, then digests it. He lights a cigarette
first, then he smokes it. He plans to do something first, and then he does
it, and so on. If we use the graph we used for the previous cases of time
travel, Mit’s life would be a line with slope equal to negative 1, because as
external time goes by, he would become younger and younger.
Is this story metaphysically possible? Probably a lot of issues related
to physics might arise. I don’t have the time nor the competence to deal
with these issues. I just observe that if we think that time-travel in one-
dimensional time is possible and we further assume that it might take time
to go back in time, we would have something similar to Mit’s case. Suppose
the time-traveler goes back in time 10 years, and the trip takes two hours
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of personal time. Let’s say that she goes from 2016 to 2006 in two hours.
Then, if time is one-dimensional and there are no spatio-temporal tunnels,
she must be somewhere in space-time during her trip, at all times from
2016 to 2006. And since she is going back in time, people living normally
would observe her in the way I described Mit’s case7. They would observe
her going backward, given that her experience in the time machine would
probably be normal and lived forward.
We shall see in the next section why this case could be interesting with
respect to issues about fatalism and the power to do otherwise.
3.3 The Specter of Fatalism with respect to Mit
and Time Travel
Lewisian time travel to the past and Mit’ story raise worries related to
fatalism. Consider Tim before his departure. He has already been in the
past, or else his time travel would not be possible. We have seen that Tim
can go back to the past because he has already been there. He also does
go back to the past, because this is simply what happens in his world.
And, there is also a sense according to which Tim must go back to the past.
Consider him at the age of 25 in 1975, before he steps in his time machine.
His personal future stages are back in 1920, and there is nothing he can do
to change this fact, given that the past is unchangeable. It seems that he
can’t refrain from stepping into his time machine, because if he did so, he
would change the past, which is impossible. Hence, Tim can go back, does
go back and has to go back. The previous sentence seems to be nothing
else than the collapse of modalities we have been talking about in section
1.3.2, which is a peculiar feature of modal fatalism.
Now, consider Tim once he is back in the past. The actions he is perform-
ing and the events he is witnessing are part of his extended personal past.
He might have a record of what happened during those times. History
books, personal memories, photographies; all these sources of knowledge
could be available to him and he could have brought them along. In such
case, all that happens back there in the past, would be just a confirma-
tion of those records. Nothing which differs from what is written in those
record could happen, or else the past would change. Tim observes Tom,
an ordinary non-time traveler folk, doing such and such at a certain time.
7The only difference is that in Mit’s case I assumed that Mit’ slope in the graph is equal
in absolute value to the one of people outside, and just opposite in sign. In this trip from
to 2016 the slope would be negative as in Mit’s case, but also way greater than one.
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This was recorded among his notes. Tom could not have done otherwise,
because had he done so, Tom would have changed the past. Not only
Tim, in virtue of being a time traveler cannot change the past. Tom as well
cannot. Again, this seems to be nothing than the modal fatalistic principle
Tc, which states that if something happens, it is necessary that it happens.
Suppose that Tim bought the time machine from a time-machine ven-
dor. They could have had the following conversation. “Can I go back to
1207 with this product that I am about to buy?” and the answer would
be “Although this machine is properly functioning, you cannot go to 1207,
because you weren’t there. But you can go back to 1920.” Tim might then
ask “Can I kill my grandfather in 1921?” and the only true answer would
seem to be “no, you cannot because you didn’t”. This again sounds as a
pure modal fatalistic kind of talk.
Consider now the story of Mit and compare it to Tim’ story. Tim will
(personal time) travel towards an unchangeable and fixed (external) past,
in order to do what he already did. The same is true for Mit throughout his
entire life. We could even imagine that soon after (according to his personal
time) he is born, someone gives Mit a book about his entire personal future.
That book is completely detailed and it contains just true sentences about
his personal future life. It was really easy for Mit’s biographer to write
down the biography. The biographer didn’t predict anything at all. He
just recorded what he had seen in Mit’s external past. As long as Mit’s
life goes by according to his personal time, what is written in the book is
continuously confirmed. Very soon, Mit might become a fatalist, and it
seems he would have good reasons to do so.
Tim and Mit stories raised worries concerning modal fatalism. That
is, what happens to them might incline us to accept modal fatalism with
respect to what is going on with their lives. Is this a special feature of their
stories? The answer is negative. Mit is going, as far as he’s concerned,
toward events which are fixed, immutable and already there, namely his
personal future. The same is true for Tim when he is about to take his
journey to the past. But their situation is perfectly similar to the situation
of ordinary people who live in a block universe, where all past, present and
future events are ontologically on a par and fixed. It does not matter that
Mit is a backward-moving system and Tim is a time-traveler; in a block
universe everyone is going toward events which are fixed, immutable and
already there. If what I said in this section about Tim and Mit shows that
their lives are governed by fate in the relevant modal sense, then the same
should apply to everyone who lives in a block universe.
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3.4 The Specter fades away
All the worries we have been talking about in the previous section stem
from a common source: a block and fixed universe. In a block universe, all
past, present and future events or objects exist and are timelessly out there.
In such view, the universe is depicted as a static block which does not itself
change, and change is nothing more than qualitative difference between
spatio-temporal proper parts of the block. What is present, past or future
is just a matter of perspective. That is, there isn’t an absolute present that
in turn defines an absolute past or an absolute future. Rather, everything
is already there and the spatio-temporal place one finds himself defines a
relative present.
Tim’s trip with his time machine brings him toward a past (from his
perspective) part of the block. Mit continuously goes toward a past (from
other people’s perspective) part of the block. They are both going toward
something which is fixed and immutable. But, we observed, ordinary
people do the exact same. We are all going toward future (from our
perspective) parts of the block. Yet, in a block universe those parts are as
fixed as the past ones. To sum up, the worries from the previous section are
generated by two features of a block universe. The first one is realism about
the relative past and the relative future — the idea that when someone is
at a certain spatio-temporal point, her future and her past are as real as her
present — and the second one is fixity, i.e. the idea that the relative past
and the relative future cannot change.
Are fixity and realism about the future and the past enough to imply
modal fatalism? Although considerations as the ones we made in the
previous section seem to suggest so, it is not the case that modal fatalism
follows from fixity and realism. In fact, fixity and realism just show that
the future, like the past, is already written. But modal fatalism is not
just the idea that the future is already written. It claims something more.
According to modal fatalism, the future is already written, and the way it is
written is the only way it could have been written, given how the past has
been. Fatalism is a modal doctrine which has to do with what agents can
or cannot do. Fixity and realism just tell us something about what is actual.
Something else must be added to jump to modal fatalism. In fact, the Main
Argument, Taylor’s argument and my argument from the second chapter
aim to do so. The Main Argument tries to establish the validity of the
schema Tc, Taylor’s argument tries to establish that among two alternative
courses of action only one is genuinely open and my argument tries to
establish the validity of Tc^. Fixity and realism by themselves are not
enough. In fact, they can be coherently combined with theories which are
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anti-fatalist.
One way to combine an anti-fatalist view with fixity and realism comes
from the Thin Red Line theory already introduced in 1.2.2. According to
the Thin Red Line theory, at any point in time only one future is actual,
the one which is lit up by the the Thin Red Line and will actually obtain.
Its actuality implies fixity. What happens on the Thin Red Line cannot be
changed. Yet, it may be that at some point in time, perhaps because there
are free agents equipped with the power to do otherwise, or because the
world is indeterministic, other future continuations distinct from the actual
one are possible. A standard way to give a Thin Red Line semantics is to say
that a sentence Fφ is true if and only if φ itself is true at some future point
on the Thin Red Line. In such view, the operator ’F’ takes into account only
what happens on the Thin Red Line. We can then introduce the necessity
and possibility operator which range on all possible continuations from a
given point. This way, Fφ is true if and only if φ is true in all possible
continuations and ^Fφ is true if φ is true in some continuation. It is easy
to see that the schema Tc and Tc^, the two schemas which are constitutive
of modal fatalism, would no longer be valid. In fact, it may be the case that
Fφ is true in virtue of the obtaining of φ on the Thin Red Line, whereas
Fφ is false because φ does not obtain in all continuations. Similarly, ^Fφ
might be true becauseφ obtains in some possible continuation, whereas Fφ
might be false because φ does not obtain on the Thin Red Line. Hence, the
Thin Red Line would be a way to avoid modal fatalism and retain realism
and fixity about the future.
Another way to combine fixity and realism with an anti-fatalistic stance
comes from Lewis and his paper on the Paradoxes of Time Travel (1976).
Modal fatalism is a doctrine which is interested in what agents can or
cannot do. Lewis offers an account of ”can“ which has anti-fatalistic im-
plications. Here is his point:
To say that something can happen means that its happening is
compossible with certain facts. Which facts? That is determined,
but sometimes not determined well enough, by context. (p.150)
As he says elsewhere, ”can“ is equivocal. That is, its meaning varies across
contexts. We can illustrate what Lewis has in mind with an example. Alice
and Bob are close to a swimming pool at T1. Alice took swimming courses
and swam a lot of times before T1. Bob is afraid of water and has never
swam before. As a matter of fact, neither Alice nor Bob swim at T1, so
there is no water disturbance in the pool at T2. Lewis would say that there
is a sense according to which Alice can swim at T1. She has what it takes
to swim. When we say that Alice can swim, we are legitimately ignoring
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some facts. In Alice’s case, for instance we are ignoring external-future
facts such as the absence of water disturbance at T2, which is incompatible
with Alice’s swimming at T1. These facts, Lewis would argue, are not
relevant in determining what Alice can, in this sense, do at T1. The result
is that she can swim at T1, even if she doesn’t. Of course, Bob’s situation is
different. Bob cannot (in the same sense Alice can) swim at T1, because his
swimming at T1 is not compossible with the same type of facts we consider
in Alice’s case. For instance, the fact that he has always been afraid of
water inclines us to say that he cannot swim at T1, in the same sense Alice
can. As a corollary of this account of “can”, we have a counterexample
to modal fatalism. Modal fatalism can be described as the doctrine that
no agent can perform an action which he or she doesn’t actually perform.
Take Alice. She does not swim at T1, but there is a sense according to which
she can swim. Hence, this simple case goes against modal fatalism. And
this is compatible with fixity and realism about future events. The event
of there being no water disturbance at T2 is already there and fixed. Yet,
Alice can swim at T1, even if she does not.
I will have more to say about Lewis’s account in the next section. What
I wanted to highlight in this one is that realism about the future and fixity
do not imply modal fatalism. In fact, we can have accounts like the Thin
Red Line and Lewis’s which combine anti-fatalistic stances with fixity and
realism about the future.
3.5 Powers, Fatalism and Abilities
In this section I want to say something more about Lewis’s account of “can”
and how it relates to modal fatalism. In the Paradoxes of Time Travel (1976)
he says:
Fatalists — the best of them — are philosophers who take facts
we count as irrelevant in saying what someone can do, disguise
them somehow as facts of a different sort that we count as
relevant, and thereby argue that we can do less than we think
— indeed, that there is nothing at all we don’t do but can.
(p.151)
It is surely correct that according to a fatalist there is nothing at all
we don’t do but can. However, this is not precise enough. According to
modal fatalism, if I can φ at T, then I φ at T, which in turn implies that
whenever an agent does not φ he can’t φ. But we must be careful with
what sense of “can” we have in mind. It is true, as Lewis observes, that
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“can” is equivocal. But, we can pinpoint different senses of “can”. Let us
consider the following sentences.
(50) I could travel faster than light
(51) I can’t travel faster than light
(52) I can’t travel faster than light with my brand new spaceship today
The sentences (50) and (51) might not count as contradictions, despite
their appearance. In fact, with (50) I might mean that it is logically possible
for me to travel faster than light. There is no contradiction in conceiving
me as traveling in my spaceship at a speed of 1.5c. This happens in other
possible worlds. Hence, (50) would be true in this sense of ”can”. (51) is
different. Here I am referring to what is physically possible or impossible
in our world in general, given the prevailing laws of nature governing our
world. No matter how I try, no matter what I do, I am not going to travel
faster than light in this world. (52) sounds odd and even misleading. In
fact, it seems to have as an implicature that I could travel faster than light
other days, even though I can’t today. This gives us another hint on the
distinction between abilities and powers we already encountered when we
were talking about Taylor’s argument in section 1.2.3. Suppose I have the
ability to swim. One way to express this is to say that I can swim. Saying
that I can’t swim today seem to express something different. It might mean
either that I lost my ability to swim today or that external conditions are
such that I can’t exercise my ability to swim today. In general, when we
specify a time, we do so to refer to specific circumstances which take place
at that time. By doing so, we typically switch the sense of “can” from the
one which has to do with abilities to the one which has to do with powers.
It is possible for the professional pole-vaulter to pole vault 14 feet. This
is an ability he has. We can express this by saying that he can pole vault
14 feet. If we add that he can pole vault 14 feet now, we typically mean
that conditions for pole vaulting 14 feet are ideal now. For instance, we
imply that he is not locked in a room with a ceiling 10 feet high. This
way of talking should give us another reason to have a sharp distinction
between two senses of “can”. Abilities amount to what an agent can do
in general. Powers are what is possible for an agent at a specific time in
specific circumstances.
Lewis deals with fatalism in his paper about time travel, because issues
related to fatalism seem to imply a contradiction in his story about the
time traveler Tim. Here is the problem. As we have seen, Tim goes back
in 1920 and tries to kill his Grandfather in 1921, who lived until 1957. As
Lewis describes the case, Tim is well prepared to kill. He is at the peak of
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his training, he has the best rifle money can buy, and he knows everything
there is to know about shooting. As Lewis says here:
There’s no doubt that Tim can kill his victim; ... by any ordinary
standards of ability, Tim can kill Grandfather. (p.150)
and here:
Tim can kill Grandfather. He has what it takes. (p.149)
Hence, Tim can kill Grandfather. But, Grandfather lived until 1957, hence
he was not killed in 1921. If Tim killed him, he would change the past,
which is impossible. So, Tim cannot kill Grandfather. Hence the contra-
diction, we have that Tim can and cannot kill grandfather. If this were a
genuine contradiction, the metaphysical possibility of time travel toward
the past would be ruled out. Lewis explains away this apparent contradic-
tion by saying that ”can“ is equivocal. I agree on this strategy. When we
say that Tim can and cannot kill Grandfather, we are using two different
senses of ”can”. But, those two senses are well pinpointed by the context
provided by Lewis. Surely, Tim has the ability to kill. Again, we should
note that when we talk about abilities, we tend to talk about what one can
do in general. We say things like X has the ability to kill, or X has what it
takes to kill. By contrast, with expressions like ”to kill Grandfather” we
are implicitly referring to a specific time and specific circumstances. That
is, we are switching from a context where we are talking about abilities to
one where we are talking about powers. It should also be noted that the
only relevant sense of ”can” which matters in the debate about fatalism
and Free Will is the one about powers. In fact, we have already seen that
it seems to be a plausible moral principle that if an agent couldn’t have
done otherwise than what she in fact has done, then she cannot be held
morally responsible for what she has done. In general, moral responsibility
is related to what agents can or cannot do. For instance, someone might
be held responsible if she didn’t do something she could have done. Let
us now consider the following two situations. In both cases, a terrorist
threatens the President of the United States. The terrorist will let a bomb
explode, unless the President pole vaults 14 feet within an hour and puts
the video on the Internet. In the first case, the President has never pole
vaulted before and has no clue about pole-vaulting. She can’t pole vault,
she has not the ability to pole vault, thus she cannot be held responsible
if she does not. In the second case, the President is a professional pole
vaulter, yet at the moment when the terrorist threatens her, she is locked
in a room with a ceiling 10 feet high there is no way she can escape from.
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She has the ability to pole vault, yet she cannot pole vault 14 feet given the
prevailing circumstances. That is, it is not within her power to pole vault
14 feet at the moment when the terrorist threatens her. Nobody would
hold her responsible for not meeting the terrorist request, even if she has
the ability to do so.
To sum up, ability and powers are clearly distinct senses of what is
possible, impossible and necessary. Abilities have to do with what is
possible in general, whereas powers deals with what is possible in specific
circumstances at a given time. Having the ability to φ is a necessary
condition for having the power to φ, but the converse does not hold. I
might have the ability to φwithout having it within my power at a specific
time to φ. Powers are what matters within the debate about fatalism and
Free Will. Modal fatalism can’t be so easily dismissed by observing that at
some times we have the ability to do something we don’t actually do.
Ultimately, in Tim’s case, Lewis is on the right track when he says that
“can” is equivocal in order to explain away an apparent contradiction.
However, a more precise way to explain it away is to say that Tim can kill,
and Tim cannot kill Grandfather. In other words, Tim has the ability to kill,
but it is not within his power to kill Grandfather. If this latter sentence is
correct, Lewis’s account of “can” does not threaten modal fatalism at all.
To this issue I now turn.
3.6 Protecting the Past
Tim goes back in time and tries to kill Grandpa in 1921. But Grandpa sur-
vived 1921 and the past cannot be changed, or else we have contradictions.
Here is what happens according to Lewis:
You know, of course, how the story of Tim must go on if it
is to be consistent: he somehow fails. Since Tim didn’t kill
Grandfather in the “original” 1921, consistency demands that
neither he does kill Grandfather in the “new” 1921. Why not?
For some commonplace reason. Perhaps some noise distracts
him at the last moment, perhaps he misses despite all his target
practice, perhaps his nerve fails, perhaps he even feels a pang
of unaccustomed mercy.... Success at some tasks require not
only ability but also luck, and lack of luck is not a temporary
lack of ability. (p.150)
Someone or something must stop Tim’s attempt to kill Grandpa. The
past has to be protected!
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Tim is perfectly able to kill, Tim tries to kill Grandpa, and eventually
Tim fails. Something or someone must prevent Grandpa’s murder. We can
pin down two different senses of the previous sentence. According to one
sense, we say that
(53) necessarily, some event prevents Grandpa’s death.
According to another sense, we say that:
(54) some event prevents Grandpa’s death, and its occurrence is neces-
sary.
According to the former sense, necessarily one preventor or another will
make Tim’s attempt fail. Say that some noise distracted him. Had the
noise not distracted him, his nerve would have failed, or he would have
slipped on a banana peel, or he would have felt mercy, and so on. One
way or another, something must happen and make it the case that Tim
does not kill Grandpa. This seems to me to be a case of Lazy fatalism,
as I characterized it in section 1.1.2. According to Lazy fatalism, future
events will happen no matter what one does. No matter how Tim is
prepared, no matter how Tim is well equipped, no matter how he shoots,
Grandpa will survive. What is essential to Lazy fatalism is the denial of the
Causal Connectedness thesis, i.e. the idea that what happens at a time may
causally depend on what happens at other times. In fact, if we interpret
the necessary occurrence of the preventor as the idea that necessarily,
something will prevent the murder, we end up lacking the desirable causal
connection among events. Suppose that what actually happened is that
Tim’s nerve failed, and because of that his shot was not precise enough
and missed the target by few inches. His nervous breakdown caused the
bullet to have a missing trajectory. But, according to (53)’s interpretation,
and a standard counterfactual analysis of causation, this is not the case.
Take the counterfactual had Tim not had a nervous breakdown, the bullet
would not have had a missing trajectory. It turns out to be false in Tim’s
world. In fact, there isn’t a possible world where Tim does not have a
nervous breakdown and the bullet kills Grandpa, which is closer to any
world where he does not have a nervous breakdown and the bullet has a
missing trajectory. Worlds with a missing trajectory are closer than worlds
where the bullet hits and kills Grandpa. This is so because Grandpa has
to survive 1921, because his survival explains Tim’s attempt in the first
place. Had Grandpa been killed, Tim would have not been there in the
first place. Hence, the relevant counterfactual turns out to be false and the
counterfactual analysis (wrongly) does not count the nervous breakdown
as an episode of causation. The problem here is probably due to the fact
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that according to (53), necessarily, some contingent event must make Tim’s
attempt fail. As a result, the specter of Lazy fatalism, the worst kind of
fatalism according to anyone, arises. If (53) is the correct interpretation,
we seem to relinquish causation among events.
What I have said so far should incline us to favor (54). An event,
say Tim’s nervous breakdown, prevents him from killing Grandpa, and
its occurrence is necessary. This is something a modal fatalist, and a
reasonable fatalist as well, could happily embrace. In fact, according to a
modal fatalist any event is necessary8. The nervous breakdown prevents
the act of killing. If my argument in Chapter 2 gets through, the presence
of this preventor should lead us to say that it is not within Tim’s power to
kill Grandfather, because the absence of it is a necessary condition for Tim
to kill Grandpa. Maybe traveling back in time as Tim did, has as a side-
effect a more likelihood of nervous breakdowns. This does not affect Tim’s
ability to kill. But because Tim was about to shoot a relative of him, he got
all emotional and a case of nervous breakdown was bound to happen. A
series of causal chains made it the case that it was not within Tim’s power
to kill Grandpa. That is, it is necessary — in the relevant fatalistic sense —
that he fails. This fatalistic modal necessity gives us enough protection of
the past. What happened was necessary, it was the only thing that could
have happened given Tim’s personal past and the external circumstances.
It wasn’t within Tim’s power to kill grandfather, even though Tim has the
ability to kill. This should not bother us. Many times we are able to do
things which are not in our power to do. For instance, when I am tied
to a tree, it is not within my power to swim, even though I am able to.
On a side note, the metaphysical possibility of Lewisian time travel in one
dimensional time is not ruled by modal fatalism. There is no contradiction
to explain away. Tim can kill, i.e. has the ability to kill, and Tim cannot kill
Grandfather, i.e. it is not within his power to do so.
Can (54)’s interpretation make sense of the causation episode with Tim’s
nervous breakdown? Causation is n-transitive. If event A causes B, and
B causes C, C is causally dependent on A, because had A not happened,
B would not have happened and neither would C9. This can be iterated
n times in a causal chain. Suppose John one day turned left instead of
right. He turned left on his way to work because he wanted to enjoy the
view of the park which was on his left. This might seem a choice with a
little impact on his life. A tiny detail in John’s life. However, it turns out
8or purely chancy. We can set aside pure chanciness here, because it is not a case of
nomological indeterminism.
9We set aside cases of overdetermination, by saying that without A and B, maybe an
event of the same type of C would have happened, but not C itself
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that by turning left, John meets a woman and falls in love with her. He
later marries her, move to another continent, has kids with this girl and
live an happy life. John’s life has changed just by making a left on that
day. It changed from the unactualized way it would have been, had he
not made a left on that day, to the way it actually is. This is not a real and
problematic change as the one we were worried about with Tim’s attempt
to kill Grandpa. It is just another way to express causal dependence among
events. It might seem odd, but it is correct to say that had he not made a
left that day, John would not have played with his first kid 10 years later in
another continent, even though these two events are separated in time by
ten years. This again, is due to the fact that causation is n-transitive. Had
he not made a left, the whole causal chain I mentioned — the meeting with
his future wife, the marriage, the move to another continent and so on —
would have been wiped away from actuality.
In Tim’s case, we have a causal chain as well. According to Tim’s
personal time, Tim was born, then he decides to go back to the past, then
he steps in his time machine, steps out, then has a nervous breakdown,
and eventually the bullet misses Grandpa. All these events are causally
connected, exactly in the same way John’s events are causally connected.
Had he not decided to go back to the past, he would not have stepped out of
his time machine in 1920. Likewise, for the other events I mentioned. Had
he not decided to go back to the past, he would not have had a nervous
breakdown in 1921. However, Tim’s case is different. Tim travels back
to the past, thereby giving rise to episodes of backward causation. This
in turn gives rise to an interesting phenomenon, which seems to amount
to a pure case of causal loop. The bullet has a missing trajectory and
this event causes Grandpa’s survival. By a series of causal connections,
then Tim was born. He then goes back, has a nervous breakdown which
causes... the missing trajectory. A causal loop. Moreover, because of
n-transitivity of causation, it is also the case that the missing causes the
earlier Tim’s nervous breakdown. This is so because we can move from the
missing to the nervous breakdown in n steps within the causal chain. Is it
correct to say that had the bullet not missed Grandpa, Tim would not have
had a nervous breakdown? It seems odd, especially because the nervous
breakdown comes earlier in external time than Tim’s nervous breakdown.
But we should expect some kind of oddities, given that Tim’s world is a
world where time travel takes place and hence backward causation takes
place too. And, there is a sense according to which this counterfactual turns
out to be true. In fact, had the bullet not missed Grandpa, Tim would have
never been born and thus we would not have Tim’s nervous breakdown.
Back to the relevant counterfactual again. A modal fatalist who accepts
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(54) has to claim that the nervous breakdown causes the missing, or else
we are back to an unpleasant case of Lazy fatalism. Can he or she do
so? What would have happened if Tim’s nervous breakdown had not
occurred? Probably the bullet would have hit Grandpa, thereby killing
him. As a consequence, the whole causal loop — Grandpa’s survival until
1957, Tim’s birth, Tim’s time travel and so on- would be wiped away, the
way John’s causal chain would have been wiped away, had he made a right.
Who would have shot the killing bullet? Probably someone else who is not
Tim. Hence, a modal fatalist can claim that the relevant counterfactual is
true, and therefore causation is safely rescued and Lazy fatalism avoided.
That is, the modal fatalist can safely be reasonable.
To sum up, modal fatalism provides a straightforward way to protect
the past from changes. It was never the case that it was within Tim’s power
to kill Grandpa. The event of the bullet missing Grandpa is as necessary
as everything else. Moreover, Tim’s travel back to the past seems to give
rise to a causal loop and odd causal connections. The causal loop, together
with n-transitivity of causation, allows the modal fatalist to explain why
the missing causes Grandpa’ survival and why Grandpa’ survival is not a
case of lazy fatalism.
Chapter4
Changing the Past
Spirit walk sounds much safer
than time travel
Heroes - Third season
Thus far, we have been assuming that the past cannot change. For
instance, the Main Argument we’ve been talking about in 1.2.2 rests on
prior truths that lie in the past, which cannot be changed in virtue of being
past. Taylor’s argument in 1.2.3 for fatalism toward the past rules out
freedom of action with respect to actions which would change the past if
performed. In Lewis’s account of time travel in one-dimensional time, a
time-traveler can affect the past but he or she cannot change it. That the
past cannot change is a common and shared assumption. What lies behind
us is now unavoidable, in the sense that there is nothing we can do now to
prevent what happened or bring about what have not, no matter how we
try and what our powers are. Even though we might have a changing past
in a multi-dimensional time model, almost everyone agrees that the past
cannot be changed if time is one-dimensional. However, one of the most
fascinating aspects of philosophy is the fact that almost any assumption,
even the ones which are seemingly undoubtable and uncontroversial, can
be called into question. In this spirit, Loss (2015) recently argued for
the idea that the past can change, even if time is one-dimensional. In
this chapter I first illustrate the assumption Loss employs to reach his
conclusion that the past can change. I then analyze his own example
which should show a case where the past changes. I will then argue that
two assumptions he makes yield two problematic results. Ultimately, I
will try to show why those assumptions should be rejected in favor of an
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alternative view, which accounts for Loss’example and does not have as a
consequence that the past change.
4.1 An Attempt to Change the Past
In this section I am going to introduce the example Loss employs to show
that cases where the past changes are metaphysically possible, even if
time is one-dimensional. He argues for this metaphysical possibility by
discussing an example of his own, which involves a time-traveler who
goes back in the past thereby changing it. I want to stress that Loss’s aim
is to defend the metaphysical possibility of a past-changing time travel in
one-dimensional time. Before seeing the example itself, we should first check
what assumptions Loss makes.
The first assumption Loss needs is an eternalist ontology, i.e. the idea
that worlds are static unchanging blocks made up of a four-dimensional
manifold.
The second assumption he makes is an exdurantist account (or stage-
theory) of persistence, according to which continuants are instantaneous
stages which persist and possibly change in time in virtue of having qual-
itatively different counterparts located at different times. For instance, I
persist and change in time from T0 to T1, because my instantaneous stage
is, say, sitting at T0 and there is a standing-counterpart of me located at T1.
What makes my stage at T0 and my stage at T1 counterparts of each other
is a relation of continuity and similarity, which sticks together the stages,
even though they are qualitatively different.
The third assumption Loss makes is the fact that the whole world itself
can be treated as a continuant. Standardly, the stage-view, or any theory of
persistence for that matter, deals with things — objects, persons or events
— which persist and possibly change in time. Loss extends the stage-view
to world-T-slices where a world-T-slice is “is the mereological sum of all
the entities x, such that x esists at T, and only at T (p.4)”. Under this view,
the world persists and change in time the same way things in the world
persist and change in time. That is, a world persists and change in time in
virtue of the existence of T-slice counterparts located at different times.
The last assumption Loss needs in order for his point to get through
is the fact that more than one time can be attached to a single T-slice.
We shall see what this amounts to by means of an example Loss himself
provides. Loss makes us ponder the following possible world W1. W1 is
a qualitatively duplicate of our world, except for the fact that in W1 there
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is a 10 years break after the last1 instant of 1989. All continuants which
exist at the last instant of 1989 in W1, which is qualitatively identical to our
last 1989-instant , are completely annihilated and replaced by a bunch of
spheres bouncing around in an otherwise empty space for ten years. After
this 10 years break, all the spheres are annihilated and replaced by a slice
which is qualitatively identical to our first 1990-slice. W1 is a block universe
as any other possible world, given that we are assuming eternalism, where
all its T-slices are tied together by an earlier-later relation which tells us how
the slices are ordered. However, Loss argues, in some cases, we are entitled
to consider just some T-slices which make up a world. That is, whereas a
world is an unrestricted composition of all its T-slices, sometimes it makes
sense to talk of restricted compositions of T-slices. Take the initial segment
of W1 from its beginning up to the last 1989-instant and its final segment
which starts from the first instant after the spheres break. This is a proper
part of W1, let’s name it W1a, which is tied together by a relation of relevant
similarity and regularity. That is, within this restricted composition we
have the same kind of regularity and continuity which is supposed to hold
in our world. As Loss observes, people in W1 located in the year which is
qualitatevily identical to our 1990 will say things such as “The Berlin’s wall
fall occurred one year ago”, even though it happened eleven years before,
given the 10 years spheres break. This kind of talk gives us an hint for
what we were seeking for, i.e. the possibility to attach more than one time
to a single T-slice. In fact, it seems we can say that W1a has its own time.
Not only all W1a-slices are ordered by an earlier-later relation, but also a
time-talk throughout all W1a seems to make sense. That is, it seems that
there is room to claim that the first 2000-slice of W1 is the first 1990-slice,
according to W1a internal time. We have already encountered the notion of
personal time when we were dealing with Lewisian time travel in section
3.1. There, the notion of personal time proved to be useful in cases of
time travel and it has to be understood as what is measured by things like
the time traveler aging processes, the number of heart beats, wristwatches
ticking and the like. Loss extends this notion to a whole world-slice. In W1,
for instance, people in 2000 external time are one year older than they were
in 1989 external time, calendars read 1990 and so on. As a result, more than
one time can be attached to the year 2000. It is the year 2000 according to
external time, and it is the year 1990 according to W1a internal time, where
“internal time” refers to the whole world-slice version of personal time.
1For the sake of simplicity, I shall assume throughout this chapter that time is discrete
and non-dense. This way we can safely talk of the first, second and last instant of a given
interval. This assumption is neutral with respect to what I want to say.
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Having clarified the assumptions Loss makes, we are ready to deal
with his example which purports to show the possibility of changing the
past by means of time travel. Loss makes us consider the world V1. V1
is qualitatively identical to our world from its beginning up to the last
instant of 2009. But then, at the very last instant of 2009, Tim is in his
brand new time machine and press the button. The next instant, he finds
himself in a T-slice which looks qualitatively identical to the first 1920-slice,
except for his presence. As it is seen from the outside, V1 is a world where
the last instant of 2009 is followed by a final segment which starts with
a ’second‘ 1920 and then develops regularly. Here the notion of internal
time can be summoned. In fact, V1 from its beginning up to the last 2009-
instant displays the same kind of regularity which holds in our world.
Loss names this restricted composition V2. And, there is another relevant
regular composition, i.e. V1 from its beginning up to the last 1919-instant
together with the segment from 2011’s first instant external to V1’end. Loss
names this restricted composition V32. As we have seen, the fact that there
are regular restricted compositions in V1, V2 and V3, allows us to attach
their own time to them. As a result, the place where Tim finds himself
after his time travel is 2011 according to external time and the year 1920
according to V3’s internal time.
Did the past change? Yes, the year 1920 changed from being Tim-free to
containing Tim, provided we accept all the assumptions Loss makes. Take
the first T-slice of the ’original‘ 1920. Within Loss’s account, something
changes as long as there are qualitatively different counterparts located at
different times, and this can apply to whole world slices as well. In V1,
there is a counterpart of the ’original‘ 1920, namely external-2011 which is
1920 according to V3’s internal time. Hence, 1920 changed. Here is Loss’s
final point which states that Tim has changed the past by means of time
travel:
(Internal) times themselves can thus be seen as persisting and
changing in (external) time. Within an exdurantist account of
persistence, to say that the year 1920 has changed is to say that
the year 1920 is a continuant which has a qualitatively different
past counterpart. This kind of change is precisely what is the
case in Tim’s universe according to the theory I am presenting.
The internal 1920 changes from being Tim-free, to being Tim-ful.
It persists and changes in (external) time by having qualitatively
2Actually, as Loss observes, V3 is quasi-regular. In fact, in V3 Tim appears out of thin
air. This kind of local irregularity should not bother us, though. Tim’s case is a time-travel
case. Hence, some local irregularity has to be expected.
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different temporal counterparts: one occurring in 1920 external
time, the other occurring in 2011 external time. (p.10)
To sum up, I think Loss’s case shows that, even if time is one-dimensional,
it is possible to change the past, provided we accept his assumptions. In the
next section I will try to show that two assumptions Loss makes yield
problematic results.
4.2 Two Problems
In this section I want to highlight two problems which result from Loss’s
account of change over time and the assumptions we have seen. The
first one is that the past seems to change too much. The second one
has to do with the fact that it is highly doubtable that Loss’s example
should uncontroversially count as an episode which shows the possibility
of changing the past by means of time-travel.
As for the first problem, take the world W2. W2 displays the kind of
regularities which we take to hold in our world. Nothing bizarre and
odd like episodes of time travel occur in W2. Now, let’s take, say, the
first and second 1930-slices. Suppose they are qualitatively highly similar
— from the first to the second slice, everything stays at rest, except for a
single particle which moves 2 cm to the right. What should Loss’s account
say in such a situation? We have seen that according to his account,
continuants change in virtue of having earlier or later qualitatively different
counterparts, and this apply to whole-world slices as well. Loss claims
that in his example V1, the year 1920 changes in virtue of having a later
counterpart (2011 external time) which is qualitatively different from it.
The same applies with our particle case. The first 1930-slice does have
a later qualitatively different counterpart, namely the second 1930-slice.
The first 1930-slice is also earlier than the second one, i.e. it is past with
respect to the second one. Hence, Loss’s account yields the result that the
first 1930-slice has changed from having our particle at a certain position to
having it 2 cm to the right. But this clearly should not count as an episode
of a changing past. It is simply a case where a continuant, our particle,
changes and persist in time in an ordinary way. The moral to be drawn is
that if Loss’s example should be counted as a case of changing past, then
several other possible cases should be accounted in the same way. The
problem is that those other cases seems to be ordinary cases of change in
time, and not cases where the past itself changes.
Here is the second problem. As we have seen in the previous section,
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Loss argues that in his example concerning the world V1, we have a case
where the past changes by means of time travel. Tim presses the button
of his time machine the last instant of 2010 and immediately afterwards
he finds himself in what is 1920 according to V3’s internal time. I want to
argue that there is a different way to tell the story about what happens in
V1. One might say that it is not Tim that time travels to the past. Rather,
what happens is that all continuants, besides some which would make
room for Tim’s presence, in the last 1919-slice time travel to the future to
the external 2011. Such case would be a case of asynchronic fission —
continuants in the last 1919-slice would have counterparts in external 1920
and external-2011. This would be a story according to which Tim does not
travel to the past, and hence we would not have an episode of time travel
which changes the past.
Is there in V1 a fact of the matter which grounds that what happened
is that Tim time travelled to the past rather than all continuants in 1919
travelled to the future? One might argue that Tim should be counted as
the time-traveler because he steps into a time machine and activate it by
pressing the button, whereas 1919 continuants clearly don’t. I don’t think
this could do. Even though we are familiar with time machines from
science fiction stories, their presence seems not to be a necessary condition
for having a genuine case of time travel. In the Twin Paradox case we
have seen in section 3.1, one is able to time travel to the future by ’simply‘
using a very fast spaceship, without the help of any time machine. Or, one
could imagine an episode of time travel which happens in virtue of some
sort of magic power which make a person jump from one space-time to
another one. Or, it could be simply a brute fact that in some worlds people
time travel without the help of any time machine. Hence, the presence of
a time machine could not be taken as a necessary condition, and therefore
it cannot ground the distinction between our two possible stories about
what happens in V1. Another strategy to ground the distinction might
come from the fact that if it’s Tim that time travels to the past, then we
have a local case of irregularity, whereas if it’s all continuants from 1919
which jump to the future, the irregularity is much bigger. That is, V3
— the first segment of V1 up to the end of 1919 external time and 2011
external time onwards — displays just a local irregularity. In V3, at some
point Tim appears out of thin air and everything else displays the same
kind of regularity we have in our world. On the contrary, in the passage
from 2010-last instant to 2011-first instant, the irregularity is much bigger.
Everything but Tim is annihilated and replaced by something else, whereas
Tim persists in an ordinary way. However, this kind of strategy seems to
have difficulties. How much local an irregularity must be in order to have
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a genuine time travel case? How big enough the irregularity must be in
order to not have a time travel case? In other words, where should we
draw the line? Suppose it’s not just Tim who steps in his time machine,
but rather it’s his entire family. Or suppose it’s his whole city who does it.
Or, his whole country, continent, planet, galaxy which do the time travel,
in some odd way. It is not clear where the line should be drawn. Hence,
appealing to local irregularities versus huge ones does not seem promising.
Hence, this criterion cannot tell us whether in V1 Tim time travels to the
past or 1919-continuants travel to the future. Moreover, I fail to see what
else could ground the distinction. Therefore, it is not clear that Loss’s case
should count as an episode where Tim time travels to the past thereby
changing it.
To sum up, we have encountered two problems for Loss’s account. The
first one has to do with the fact that the past seems to change too much in his
account. The source of this problem is Loss’s third assumption, i.e. the idea
that T-slices can be treated as continuants which change in time in virtue of
the existence of earlier or later counterparts. The second problems stems
from Loss’s fourth assumption, the idea that we can safely and intelligibly
attach more than one time to the same T-slice. In fact, Loss argues, the
first 2011 external time-slice of V1 can be treated as 2011 external time and
as 1920 V3’s internal time as well. As a result, it is not clear whether it’s
Tim who time travels to the past or it’s 1919-continuants which travel to
the future. Those two assumptions yield these two problematic results. In
what follows I will try to argue why those two assumptions should not be
made.
4.3 Times and T-slices
We have just seen that attaching more than one time to the same T-slice
can bring about problematic results. In Loss’s example, the same T-slice
is 2011 according to external time, and 1920 according to V3’s internal
time. We have seen what internal time in Loss’s account amounts to—
something which is modeled on the notion of Lewis’s personal time and
applied to maximal restricted compositions of T-slices, unified by a relation
of relevant similarity and continuity. But what is then external time in his
account? Loss identifies external time with the earlier-later relation, as it
is clear from the following two quotes.
Each T-slice can be seen as a world-counterpart, and the earlier-
later relation linearly ordering the T-slices can be taken to be the
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genidentity relation for the world (that is, the relation making
all the T-slices stick together as counterparts of a certain world;
(p.4)
and
As we saw above, a T-slice (that is the mereological fusion of all
the entities x, such that x exists at time T, and only at T) can be
considered both as an external world, and as an internal world.
In the first case, the genidentity relation making a T-slice x a
counterpart of a certain T-slice y is just the earlier-later relation.
(p.9)
The earlier-later relation is commonly taken as a primitive, at least in
an eternalist ontology which Loss assumes. It does the job of ordering
all the T-slices belonging to a possible world by telling you for any pair
x,y of T-slices, whether x is earlier than y, or y is earlier than x3. With
this primitive at hand, you can then account for what it is for something
to be future or past, relative to something else. For instance, an event A
belonging to a T-slice x is future with respect to an event B belonging to a
T-slice y if and only if y is earlier than x. Likewise, the earlier-later relation
accounts for what it means for something to be past relative to something
else. Does the earlier-later relation necessarily tell you that a time-point
is, say, 50 years earlier than another one? The answer is in the negative,
because it depends on which nature it turns out to have. Before seeing
why things are so, we should make a short digression into the distinction
between a substantivalist and relationist account of time.
Substantivalism about time is the view according to which time is a
‘substance’ that exists independently of events and things located in time.
In such view, time is like a ’container’ which is — and might not very well
be — filled with events and things. On the contrary, a friend of relationism
would say that time is construed out of events and things located in time,
and as such it is not independent of events and things located in time. A lot
more could be said about this long-standing controversy. For our purposes
here, we could summarize what we need with a slogan. According to
substantivalism, first there is time, then events and things. According to
relationalism, first there are things and events, then time.
3The earlier-later relation does this job for any pair of T-slices, as long as time is linear.
In branching-time models we might have pairs of times which are not related by such
relation. We set aside this case, given that Loss’s example is a case where time is linear.
I am setting aside also considerations from special theory of relativity, where what is
primitive are spatio-temporal intervals.
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With this distinction in mind, we can come back to our previous subject.
What does it mean to say, for instance, that World War II’s beginning is
6 years-earlier than its end? I take the previous claim to be significant as
long as there are clocks in the world this claim is about. We might agree
with Saint Augustine that when we are asked, we don’t know what time
is. Yet, it seems we have a pretty clear grasp of what is the length of a
time interval. A time interval is what is measured by a clock. A clock is
not necessarily an ordinary clock we are used to in our everyday lives.
A clock is any device that keeps going through repetitive cycles. In this
sense, the swinging of a pendulum, the Earth rotating around the Sun, a
beam of light bouncing up and down in a box with two mirrors, human
hearts beating and the like are all clocks. Of course, some of the clocks
mentioned are more precise than others. But in principle, they all do the
same job. They behave ciclycally, and by doing so they determine a time
unit, which in turn can be exploited for making measurements. That is,
you count the times the cycle completed itself and that tells you how much
time has passed. Once you have a master clock, you can set up other clocks
which agree with the master one4. So, to say that World War II’s beginning
is 6 years-earlier than its end is to say that the Earth rotated 6 times around
the Sun from war’s beginning to its end5. In terms of T-slices, to say that
World War II lasted 6 years — which is equivalent to say that its beginning
is 6 years-earlier than its end — is to say that there is a T-slice containing
the World War II’s beginning and the Earth-Sun system in such and such
position, and there is a later T-slice containing World War II’end and the
Earth-Sun system in such and such position.
The procedure just described is how we make and understand time
measurements. Are things fundamentally so? Is the lenght of a time
interval nothing over and above than what is determined by the procedure
just described? The answer is in the affirmative, if friends of relationism
are correct. In fact, according to relationism, events and things come first.
If so, then what determines the length of a time interval can be just the
presence of clocks and the measuring procedures just discussed. On the
contrary, if substantivalism is the correct view, I think we may have two
4Synchronizing clocks separated in space is not as unproblematic as one might think,
for at least two reasons. Within Special Theory of Relativity, synchronization of clocks is
relative to a frame of reference, as it is simultaneity. Moreover, synchronization relies on
the convention that in a round trip the speed of light is the same in any direction
5Of course this is not accurate enough. There are clocks more precise than the system
Earth-Sun which we should rely on. But again, here we are interested in what is the
nature of the length of a time interval, and the system Earth-Sun can serve such a purpose
as an example of a clock.
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sub-cases. It depends on whether the substantivalist ’container‘ comes
with a metric or not. That is, whether the ’container’ not only tells you
for any pair of times x,y whether x is earlier than y or y is earlier than x,
but it also tells you things like x is n-units-of-time-earlier than y. If the
’container‘ does not come with a metric, then it seems to just be the earlier-
later relation as applied to time-points which are then filled by things and
events. If so, we would be in a case which is similar to the relationist
side when it comes to determining the length of time intervals, and hence
the same considerations would apply. If the container does come with
a metric, then the length of a time interval depends on the structure of
the fundamental metric. To sum up, either the substantivalist ’container‘
comes with a metric or it does not. If it does comes with a metric, Loss’s
example does not get through, because the time intervals are established
at the fundamental level. If so, by stepping in his time machine, Tim goes
to a point which is fundamentally future and one instant later, and thus it
cannot be counted as past as Loss wants it to. No matter how that T-slice
is filled — because first comes time and then events and things which fill it
— it is future with respect to the one where he he departs. Hence, the only
viable option for Loss between the two substantivalist sub-cases is that
the ’container’ does not come with a metric, but rather it just determines
what is earlier and what is later. To sum up, independently of whether
substantivalism or relationism is the correct view, Loss can identify external
time with an earlier-later relation which does not come with a metric, or
else his own changing-past example would lose all its force.
The earlier-later relation gives you a time-series, i.e. it gives you all the
times, or T-slices composing a possible world, in an ordered fashion. An
useful metaphor to introduce people to possible world is the one which says
that possible worlds are like fiction books. Our actual is world develops
in such and such a way, but, it is said, it might very well have been
different. Authors of fiction book are pretty much at liberty when they
are writing a fiction. So are we when we imagine a possible world. As
long as contradictions are avoided in the story, the result is something
which is possible. Now, consider the following misprinted book. On its
even pages, Fahrenheit 451 by Ray Bradbury is printed, whereas Crime and
Punishment by Fyodor Dostoyevsky appears on the odd ones. Such a book
may be thought of as a possible world where a lot of oddities take place. ’At
the end of any even page‘, Guy Montag, his companions and surroundings
are annihilated and replaced by Raskolnikov’s universe. ’At the end of
any odd page‘, Montag will restart exactly where he has left. In terms of
T-slices, such a world would be composed of an alternating sequence of T-
slices containing Montag-universe and Raskolnikov-universe, all ordered
CHAPTER 4. CHANGING THE PAST 120
in an earlier-later relation. In such world, it would make sense to say that,
for instance, Montag meets Clarisse as he walks home, and 1 hour later he
comes home and find his wife Mildred near dead, even though the two
events are located ’on different pages‘. However, it couldn’t be intelligible
a claim such as “Raskolnikov murders Alyona two years later than Montag
meets Clarisse”. Each story has its own time, even though they are both
tied together in the same possible world by an earlier-later relation. The
most we could say would be that a given Fahrenheit 451 event is earlier or
later than a Crime and Punishment one, again in virtue of the earlier-later
relation.
The misprinted book example and the world associated to it can lead
us to a distinction which can be useful, i.e. the distinction between what I
shall call a time-series and a time-measurable-series. A time-series is the se-
quence which result from the mereological sum of all T-slices belonging to
a world, ordered as the earlier-later relation dictates. A time-measureble-
series is a maximal (and not necessarily proper) part — a maximal mereo-
logical sum of T-slices— of a world such that: a) it exhibits the same kind
of regularity found in the actual world, except for episodes of time travel
and b) it is possible to keep the time throughout all T-slices composing
it. Clause (b) has to be understood as the requirement of the existence of
clocks, defined as persisting objects which behave ciclycally. It does not
have to be the same persisting clock throughout all the time-measurable-
series. Sometimes we may rely on one master clock according to which
we synchronize the other clocks, and then switch to another device. The
switch is possible as long as there is a time where the two clocks are per-
sisting together and hence we can check at which rate they are respectively
ticking.
Here is how the time-measurable-series notion is supposed to work.
For instance, our misprinted-book-world has one time-series and two time-
measurable-series. Fahrenheit 451-slices compose a time-measurable se-
ries with its own measurable time. Likewise for the Crime and Punishment-
slices. What must interest us, is the fact that two time-measurable-series
cannot overlap, i.e. they cannot have a T-slice in common. In fact, assume
per absurdum A and B are two distinct time-measurable-series with a T-slice
in common. Then, throughout all A it is possible to keep the time, and
the same holds for B. Given that A and B have a T-slice in common, it
is possible to time-measure events in A and B, and compare the length
of time intervals by means of the same unit. If so, A and B are one and
the same time-measurable series by definition, and we end up having a
contradiction with what we assumed. Hence, two time-measurable-series
cannot have a T-slice in common. This gives us the result we were looking
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for. It is not intelligible to attach two times to a single T-slice. Given that
a T-slice belongs at most to a time-measurable-series — because two time-
measurable-series cannot overlap — a single T-slice cannot have attached
to it more than one time.
As for the other problem we were talking about in the previous section
— the fact that the past seems to change ’too much‘ — we individuated its
source in the fact that Loss’s account treats T-slices as continuants which
change in time in virtue of the existence of earlier or later counterparts.
Such an exdurantist account applied to T-slices has, Loss argues, as an ad-
vantage the fact that it allows us to account for the platitude that the world
changes, “by considering the world itself as a continuant that changes in
time” (p.4). However, this implies the ’too much‘ change problem. An
alternative, which is mentioned by Loss himself, is simply to say that the
world changes in virtue of things which change in time.
4.4 The Past has not changed
We have seen in the previous section that at most one time can be intelligibly
assigned to a T-slice, provided we don’t take the earlier-later relation to
have a metric, which in turn would rule out the possibility for the past to
change. This should incline us to favor the notion of a time-measurable-
series over the notion of internal time used by Loss, because employing
time-measurable-series necessarily implies that we can’t assign two times
to the same T-slice. Loss’s notion of internal time comes from considering
maximal proper parts of a possible world which exhibits the same kind of
regularity (or quasi-regularity in cases of episodes of time travel) found in
the actual world. On the contrary, a time-measurable-series requires also
the presence of ways to keep track of time, i.e. the presence of one clock or
more clocks suitably overlapping throughout all the series.
To conclude, I want to show how the notion of a time-measurable-series
behaves with respect to Loss’s examples and his notion of internal time.
Consider again the world W1, the one which has a 10 years spheres break.
Internal time can account for broken maximal parts of a world. So can a
time measurable-series, since its definition does not require continuity be-
tween the T-slices composing a maximal proper part. A time-measurable-
series can also account for claims like the ones made by people on what Loss
calls internal 1990, which occurs after the spheres break. People located
there would say things like “The Berlin’s wall fall occurred one year ago”.
According to time-measurable-series, the claim is correct, given that W1
without the spheres break compose a time-measurable series. Moreover,
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time-measurable-series do not entail a claim which I think it’s problematic
for Loss’s account. Loss claim that the spheres break lasts 10 years. I fail
to see how the previous claim can be intelligible, unless the earlier-later
relation comes with an intrinsic metric, which as we have seen is not a
viable option for Loss’s purposes. In fact, saying that something lasts 10
years means that during its occurrence The Earth rotated 10 times around
the Sun. But the Earth and the Sun are not there during the spheres break.
Of course, one might react by saying that the year-unit can be employed in
measurements without using the Sun and the Earth as means. True. But
in W1, everything is annihilated and replaced by spheres bouncing around,
and hence we can’t compare intervals in the spheres break with intervals
outside it. In fact, supposes that during the spheres break, the sphere A
moves from the point in space x to the point in space y, where x and y are
separated in space by 100 kilometers. This sphere trip takes 10 years, Loss
would say. Hence, sphere A moves at an average speed of 10 kilometers
per year. However, how can you distinguish this case from a case where
sphere A covers the same distance in 5 years at an average speed of 20
kilometers per year, or in one year at an average speed of 100 kilometers
per year? Arguably you cannot. Hence, I fail to see what could ground
the claim that the spheres break lasts ten years6. Time-measurable-series
do not yield such a result. According to an account which employs them,
the spheres break compose a time-measurable series, and the rest of W1
compose another one. How long the spheres break lasts? It depends on
whether there is some sphere which behaves cyclically, thereby determing
a unit — let’s name it XYZ — and as such can be taken as a clock. If so, the
only intelligible answer would be that the break lasts a certain number of
XYZs, and such interval cannot be compared to intervals which belongs to
the rest of W1, given the complete irregularity at the beginning and the end
of the spheres break.
What about Tim’s case? Tim goes from what Loss calls ‘external’20107
to what he calls an internal-1920. The problem was that there seems to
be no way for Loss’account to say that it’s Tim that time travels to the
past, rather than 1919-continuants which travel to the future. With time-
measurable-series we don’t have such a problem. In fact, throughout the
whole Tim’s world there is always a way to keep track of time. During the
most abrupt change, the alleged episode of Tim’s time travel, Tim himself
can be taken as a clock. In fact he regularly persists from the last 2010-slice
6It should be clear that this holds for whatever the number of spheres is. I talked just
about one sphere for the sake of simplicity.
7If I persuaded the reader, then the specification ’external‘ is superfluous. It is 2010
period, given that only one time can be assigned to a T-slice.
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to the first 2011-slice. Hence, the whole Tim’s world is a time-measurable-
series and therefore what Loss calls ‘external 2011’ is just 2011. That being
said, the correct and unique answer is that 1919-continuants time travel to
the future. Is it an odd result? Definitely yes, but just because the world
Loss describes is an odd one. To conclude, Tim didn’t travel to the past
and the past is safe. Nobody, as we should have expected, changed it.
Chapter5
Defending A Mutable Future
And now for something
completely different
Monty Python
In this final chapter we move from modal fatalism to a view, originally
due to Peter Thomas Geach, according to which the future might literally
change. I have already briefly introduced it in section 1.2.2. In chap-
ters 1,2,3 I have been arguing in favor of what I have labeled reasonable
fatalism. One of the consequences of reasonable fatalism is that future
events are unpreventable, even though I suggested in section 1.1.2 to not
cash out reasonable fatalism in terms of unpreventability, because doing
so wrongly conveys the idea that there aren’t causal connections among
events, whereas reasonable fatalism accepts the Causal Connectedness the-
sis. On the contrary, according to the geachian view, agents can prevent
future events from happening. As such, it is a view which clearly goes
against fatalism. Hence the disjunctive nature of the overall thesis: either
reasonable fatalism or there is the mutable future as an alternative.
In this chapter I present the view and provide an example which is
supposed to score a point in its favor. My general aim is to highlight the
fact that although the idea that the future might literally change received
little attention thus far and surely comes with problems, it is a metaphysical
view worth discussing.
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5.1 Free Will and the Future
One natural way to gloss the notion of Free Will is as the power to do
otherwise. Alice made a right at that corner the 10th of February 1967.
Could she have turned left? We tend to answer affirmatively, as long as we
think that her action was a free action. A billiard ball obeying Newtonian
laws of nature seems to behave differently, for it never has that kind of
power Alice seemed to have. Given an isolated system of billiard balls
bouncing around in a table, the trajectory and the destiny of each particle
is just one, namely the one dictated by a single instantaneous state of
the system, boundary conditions and the laws of nature. Nobody would
want to say that a billiard ball moving with a certain velocity at a certain
time could be moving in another way, others things being equal. So, we
typically tend to say that we human beings are different from material
things like billiard balls; we say that we are free, while billiard balls are
not. It is worth thinking what we do care about when free will is involved.
It is likely that we as human being do not like the idea that we behave
just like billiard balls when it comes to our deliberations. We don’t want
that our deliberations are fully settled by things like laws of nature and
previous states of the physical system we are involved in. But there is at
least another thing we care about; we want that our acts have an impact
on the future. In short, we want that our free actions shape the future the
way we desire.
We can see that by taking under consideration the following very
bizarre possible world W1. At W1 there is Bob and Bob is a free agent,
in the sense that at any time, Bob has within his power to do otherwise
than what he actually does. Yet, the world outside Bob is a very bizarre
one. At T1, the time measured by Bob’s wristwatch, the whole universe but
Bob’s body is completely empty. At T2, Bob is still there but the universe
is now completely filled with chocolate peanut butter. At T3, the peanut
butter has been replaced by a big donut with a small hole suitable for Bob’s
survival, and so on. In short, W1 is such that Bob has the kind of regularity
which is normally required for someone to be an agent, while the things
outside Bob’s body are highly irregular, in a way that it could even be
hard if not impossible to say that there are laws of nature governing what
happens in W1. We are also describing Bob as a free agent. Bob raised
his right hand at T1, but he could have raised his left hand instead. Bob is
free, yet Bobs free will is completely useless to him. The reason is that Bob
cannot in any way affect his future surroundings, because W1 is such that
Bob’s environment abruptly changes every second.
What a world like W1 shows is the fact that some sorts of predictability
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and regularities, in the world outside an agent, are required in order to give
the agent the capability of affecting the future. I buy a flight ticket today
because I want to bring about the event of me traveling to my holiday
destination next summer. I can plan the trip and bring about the future
I want as long as I can make reliable predictions based on patterns of
regularities with flight companies, airports and so on.
In our actual world, a world full of regularities, we constantly bring
about and cause future events. While we cannot affect the past, unless there
are episodes of backward time travel, there is no doubt that we constantly
affect how the future is, in the sense that we are capable of bringing about
events. Can we also change the future? Many philosophers think that even
though changing the future is an expression frequently used in everyday
non-philosophical discourses, it is actually a philosophical non-starter, in
the sense that after a quick analysis it turns out to be a meaningless notion.
This is so for at least three reasons. One of the reasons is that change re-
quires time. An object may change when it has certain properties at a time
and different properties at another later time. For instance, I can change
by sitting at T1 and standing at T2. It looks as if times themselves do not
change, while things can change in time. Another reason is that when
we talk about changing the future, we have in mind situations like the
following. On Monday, I decide to have coffee for breakfast on Wednes-
day, because I am having an important work meeting and I want to be
wide awake by then. On Tuesday, I change my mind and I decide to have
tea the next morning. Coffee makes me feel too anxious. It’s better to
have tea. So, one might want to conclude from an everyday perspective
that from Monday to Tuesday the future has changed. The future was
coffee-for-breakfast-on-Wednesday, and then it became tea-for-breakfast-
on-Wednesday. The common philosophical reaction is that such a talk
cannot be a correct analysis of what happened. If on Monday coffee-for-
breakfast-on-Wednesday was part of the future, so it was my changing
my mind on Tuesday. It would seem unjustified to claim that Wednesday
was part of my future on Monday, whereas Tuesday wasn’t. And then,
this means that tea-for-breakfast-on-Wednesday already was the future on
Monday, even though it didn’t seem so. A further reasons comes from
considerations about the two standard approaches to time, the so-called
A-theory and B-theory. According to the standard B-theory, the world is
a static block which does not itself change. In such view, there isn’t an
absolute future and the ordering among events is given by an earlier-later
relation among times. What counts as future is always a matter of per-
spective — what is future depends on where on the block someone finds
himself. Typically, in a standard B-theoretic account, if something (objects,
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events) is extended in time, then we might say it has temporal parts. Then,
change is nothing more than qualitative difference between distinct tem-
poral parts. What constitutes the content of a time, which might be future
from someone’s perspective, does not change. In a standard A-theoretical
framework there is an absolute present and therefore an absolute future.
What time is present is fundamentally part of what constitutes reality, and
of course what time is present continuously change. What is now present
was once future and will become past. Similarly, what is now future will
change and become present, and then past. Yet, standardly, this is the only
kind of change in the future allowed. What constitutes the content of a
future time does not change.
As Todd (2011) interestingly pointed out, contrary to what is commonly
believed, there is room for claiming and defending the idea that the future
might literally change. Todd discusses the rather unknown position about
the changing future, which is originally due to Thomas Peter Geach (1977).
In the next section I want to briefly sketch Geach’s view on the future.
5.2 Geach and the Changing Future
Geach argued for the idea that the future might sometimes change. He
thought that it may happen that at some time the future is going to be in
some way, whereas at a later time something else is going to happen at the
same future time. As he says:
So what was going to happen at an earlier time may not be
going to happen at a later time, because of some action taken in
the interim. This is the way we can change the future. (p.50)
In other words, it might be the case that at T1 the event X is going to
happen at T10, whereas at T2 X is no longer going to happen at T10. So, the
future time T10 might change from containing X to containing something
else. Geach provides the following basic example in order to illustrate
his view. Suppose that at T1 there’s an accident on an airplane and the
airplane starts to fall down. At T1, the airplane is going to crash at T10. But
then, at T2, the pilot intervenes with a brave maneuver and prevents the
airplane from crashing. Because the crash has been prevented by the pilot,
the future time T10 changed from an airplane crash to a safe landing. The
rationale for claiming that in such a case the future has changed is what
Geach calls the logic of prevention. When we have a case of prevention,
what is prevented is what was going to happen and then did not happen.
The pilot’s act prevented the airplane from crashing at T10. Before the pilot’s
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intervention, the airplane was going to crash at T10. After the intervention,
the future is such that it does not contain anymore the airplane crash at
T10.
In order to understand the boldness of the geachian view, it is worth
mentioning his view about future contingent propositions, which behaves
in accordance with the view that the future might change. He adopted
a tensed view of propositions, namely a view where the tense operators
are fundamental and irreducible to tenseless elements. Let us take the
proposition expressed by the sentence
(55) The plane will crash at T10
In such view, the proposition expressed comes with a future tense
operator as fundamental. Yet, the future tense operator is not filled by a
metric content like ’n units of time from now’, but rather with a reference to
a specific time, in this example T10. (55) uttered at T1 and, say, T3 express the
same exact proposition. Yet, in this view, the proposition is true at T1 and
false at T3. The same proposition changed its truth value, in accordance
with the future time T10 which itself changed. Propositions of this sort
are allowed to change truth value from truth to falsity and from falsity to
truth. For instance, the proposition that the plane will safely land is first
false and then true.
To sum up, according to Geach, our discourses about prevention show
that what is prevented is what was going to happen and then did not hap-
pen. In order to make sense of prevention talks, Geach argues, a mutable
future is required. The natural reaction to the geachian view is that the
logic of prevention does not require a mutable future. One might argue
that what is prevented when a preventive act takes place is not what was
going to happen and yet did not happen, but rather something else. The
most natural candidate as the object of prevention is what would have
happened, had the preventive act not occurred. This is what might be
called the counterfactual analysis of prevention.
Counterfactual Analysis of Prevention When an event X occurs and
later in time Y does not occur, X prevents Y if and only if a) X is causally
sufficient for not-Y and b) had X not occurred, Y would have occurred.
The counterfactual comes in the (b) clause and we adopt the standard
truth conditions we have seen in section 1.1.1. Where A and B are proposi-
tions, A B — if A were true, B would also be true — is true at a possible
world α if and only if either a) there isn’t a possible world where A is true
or b) there is a possible world β where A and B are true and such that it
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is more similar to α than any other possible world where A is true and
B false. In the plane crash case, the pilot’s act at T2 prevents the crash at
T10, because the pilot intervention ensures the non-occurrence of the crash
at T10 and, had the pilot not intervened, the plane would have crashed at
T10. The advantage of the counterfactual analysis is that we don’t need to
posit a mutable future in order to account for what Geach calls the logic of
prevention. What is prevented is not what was going to happen, but rather
what would have happened, had the prevention not taken place. Thus, if
the counterfactual analysis succeeds in explaining the logic of prevention,
then it is preferable to the geachian view because it does not depart from
the widely accepted idea that the future is immutable.
Todd (2011) raises two worries for this counterfactual analysis of pre-
vention. The first one is what he calls the problem of the explosion of
preventions. Take the event of the New York citizens going to sleep at a
normal time the night of the 1st of March 2016. The following counterfac-
tual is true: had the citizens not gone to sleep at a normal time, the 2nd of
March there would have been a great amount of car accidents and fights in
New York, because of the irritability and stress due to the lack of sleep. In
addition, going to sleep at a normal time the 1st of March ensures that the
day after there isn’t an unusual amount of car accidents and fights. Thus,
according to the counterfactual analysis of prevention, going to sleep at a
normal time prevents fights and car accidents. This result is problematic
because it can be multiplied ad nauseam with a lot of other ordinary cases.
This is not the case with the geachian view. The unusual amount of fights
and car accidents on March 2nd wasn’t going to happen in the first place,
and so in accordance with basic intuitions, nothing has been prevented
when people went to sleep at a normal time.
The second problem that Todd points out comes from another exam-
ple, originally suggested by Kenneth Boyce. Nuclear war is not going to
happen because our adversaries have firmly decided that they will not
launch their nuclear weapons (in such a way as to causally settle the mat-
ter), regardless of whether Obama chooses to sign the peace treaty or not.
But Obama does sign the peace treaty, and his doing so is also causally
sufficient for nuclear’s war not happening. However, in all the nearest
worlds in which Obama does not sign the peace treaty, it is because Mc-
Cain won the election. And in all those worlds, McCain launches our
nuclear weapons, thereby causing nuclear war. So we have it that Obama
does something that is causally sufficient for nuclear’s war failing to occur,
and we have it that had Obama not signed the treaty, nuclear war would
have occurred. The counterfactual analysis yelds the result that Obama’
signing is a case of prevention. Yet it seems false that Obama prevented
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nuclear war, since our adversaries had already decided not to launch the
nuclear weapons regardless of whether he signs the treaty. Once again, the
geachian view does not suffer of this problem. The nuclear war was not
going to happen in the first place, thus, by signing the peace treaty, Obama
did not prevent the nuclear war.
Those two problems might not sound as killing objections against the
counterfactual account of preventions, and surely there are ways to resist
them. As for the first case, one might say that the going at bed at a
normal time really prevented fights and car accidents the day after, it’s
just that we don’t usually consider as relevant and significant those cases
of prevention. As for the second case, it appears to be weak because
it involves the problematic claim that the nearest possible world where
Obama does not sign the peace treaty is a world where Obama is not
President. In any case, I don’t want to discuss those cases here. Rather,
what I will do is considering a new example which sounds problematic for
the counterfactual analysis of prevention. To this example I now turn.
5.3 A case in favor of the Changing Future
The example involves two free agents, Alice and Bob, who are playing
pool in a bar. We assume that the pool balls behave in perfect accordance
with Newton laws of motion. If there is no intervention from the outside,
the future behavior of the pool balls is completely settled by the present
physical state of the table and the laws of nature. Alice has direct control
over the pool ball number 1, whereas Bob has direct control over the pool
ball number 2. That means that they can freely use their sticks to impart a
velocity to their respective pool balls. Alice and Bob shots are not dictated
by Newtonian laws of motion. When they impart a certain velocity to their
ball, they do so freely. We consider the game from T0 to T10 and we then
make the following assumptions. The game is not an usual pool game,
because Alice and Bob are allowed to hit the balls simultaneously or, when
it is not the case that all pool balls are at rest. In addition, we assume that
at all times of the the interval considered, it is not the case that all pool
balls are at rest. Ultimately, Alice and Bob know newtonian laws of nature
and they can predict what is going to happen given an instantaneous state
of the table and the velocities of the balls. Given their knowledge and their
ability to shoot pool balls, Alice and Bob can affect the future the way they
want, by imparting a proper velocity to balls number 1 and 2. For reasons
of their own, Alice wants the ball number 8 to end up in the upper-left
pocket at T10, whereas Bob wants the ball number 8 to end up in the upper-
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right pocket at T10, and both Alice and Bob want to intervene as little as
possible. Then, the game goes like this. At T0, given the present state of
the table and newtonian laws of nature, the ball number 8 is going to end
up in the upper-right corner at T10. Alice wants to prevent that, and after
a quick calculation, she imparts a velocity to ball number 1 at T1, so that it
will hit the ball number 8 with a velocity such that ball number 8 will end
up in the upper-left pocket at T10. After realizing what is going on, Bob
is determined to achieve what he wants. Hence, at T7, Bob shoots balls
number 2 which in turn hits ball number 8 and send it in the upper-right
pocket. What actually happens is that ball number 8 eventually ends up
in the upper-right pocket at T10.
For the sake of simplicity, we name the events as following: ‘A’ is Alice
shot at T1, ‘B’ is Bob shot at T7, ‘R’ is ball number 8 ending up in the upper-
right pocket at T10 and ‘L’ is ball number 8 ending up in the upper-left
pocket at T10.
While it is debatable whether A prevents R because R eventually hap-
pen, for sure B prevents L from happening. We shall see now how the
counterfactual analysis of prevention deals with this case and the events
involved. The event A does not ensure the non-occurrence of R because
R does eventually happen. This suffices to claim, perhaps correctly, that
A does not prevent R. The second case is more interesting, because B does
prevent L from happening and the conterfactual analysis makes a wrong
prediction. B ensures the non-occurrence of L and hence the first clause
of the counterfactual analysis is satisfied. However, the relevant counter-
factual is false. It is not true that had Bob not intervened, L would have
happened. The counterfactual ¬B  L is deemed false by standard coun-
terfactuals truth conditions in such scenario. It is false because the worlds
similar to Alice and Bob’s world where Bob does not intervene are also
worlds where Alice does not intervene, given that both want to intervene
as little as possible and Bob intervenes because Alice did it as well. But
the worlds where they do both not intervene are worlds where R instead
of L happen at T10, given the Newtonian dynamics governing the balls’
behavior and the state of the system at T0. Hence, a world where ¬B and
¬L is closer to the one Alice and Bob inhabit than any world where ¬B and
L. The fact that the relevant counterfactual turns out to be false implies
that the counterfactual analysis of prevention does not count Bob’ shot as
a case of prevention and this result is clearly wrong.
The geachian view does not suffer this kind of problem. One who
endorses the geachian view would say that at T6, before Bob’ shot, L was
going to happen, but then, Bob prevented that, thereby changing the future
time T10 from containing L to containing R. Thus, if I am right, this case
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scores a point in favor of the geachian view on prevention, the mutable
future and against the counterfactual analysis.
5.4 Conclusion
To conclude, I have been arguing in favor of a version of modal fatalism.
Fatalism scared generations of philosophers and has often been seen as an
untenable doctrine. However, I tried to show that a version of it can be
reasonable. Reasonable fatalism does not rule out causation, does not have
total laziness as a consequence and can account for our moral judgments
with respect to punishments and rewards. In chapter 2 I gave an argument
in favor of modal fatalism, which together with the Causal Connectedness
thesis constitutes reasonable fatalism. In chapter 3 I tried to show that
reasonable fatalism can provide a correct account with respect to what
agents can or cannot do when it comes to episodes of backwards time
travel toward, and how time traveler can affect events in the past.
The unchangeability of the past is an assumption that fatalism shares
with several other metaphysical theories. In chapter 4 I argued against the
successfulness of a recent attempt to show that the past might change.
According to fatalism, we don’t have the power to change the future.
However, as we have seen, the fact that we might literally change the future
is the main claim of geachianism. In this chapter I provided an argument
in favor of this view. The geachian view surely comes with problems — for
instance, it seems that it has to relinquish the factivity of knowledge — and
it is in need of further developments — for instance, what kind of ontology
of time does it need? Yet, it appears to be promising. Geachianism is a view
that has as a consequence the falsity of fatalism, cause it claims that agents
have the power to change the future. Hence, fatalism and geachianism are
incompatible. Moreover, both theories are quite unpopular. The received
view is that the future cannot change and yet fatalism is false. I argued for
the denial of the previous conjunction. Hence the disjunctive nature of my
thesis: either we should accept (reasonable) fatalism and deny the power
to do otherwise, or we should think that the future might change.
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